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ABSTRACT
The International Relations of the French

Communist and Socialist Parties 1968-1975
:

May, 198 2

Richard Goldberg, B.A. Indiana University
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Peter

J.

Collaborations between the two large

Fliess

parties of the Left

in France have generally collapsed because of outstanding differ-

ences in international politics.
the war in

19M-7

.

So it was in 1939 and again after

This work examines the years 1968 — 1975, when Commu-

nists and Socialists were once again joined in collaboration, con-

structing a Union de la Gauche

.

Drawing upon data from those years,

it is argued that the central factor is the particular power-bloc

This factor is

identities of the respective alliance partners.

seen to be the ultimate determinant of the success or failure of the

domestic alliance, since each of the two Parties is identified with
The thesis explores the international pol-

its own world movement.

icies of the PCF and PS

and the Third World

-

-

regarding defense, European integration

to establish the viability of their alliance.

The idea is developed that because each of the Parties identifies

with

-

and has internalized the value system of

-

a

rival power bloc,

the long-term viability of the Left coalition is problematic. How-

ever, domestic factors of compelling force do suggest that the two

Parties will remain allied for the short term, muting their more

abrasive

differences.
viii

Abstract: continued

French Communists early in their development
transferred

their revolutionary elan to a new international,
or foreign, identity.

Today, there is much evidence that they
continue to con-

ceptualize in internationalist categories within the
overall framework of bloc interests, namely the anti-imperialist
"camp of peace

and socialism."

Paradoxically, Communists continue to hold them-

selves forth as a national, even patriotic, entity, carriers
of a

Jacobin legacy reaching back to 1789. Whether or not this contra-

diction or double identity can be resolved, remains to be seen. It
is shown here, however,

that without links to its world movement,

the Communists lose much of their force. They and the world move-

ment have reciprocal needs for each other.

Since 1958 the PCF has,

however, established a critical distance from its historic model in
the East.

Furthermore, it remains independent of other European

Parties, rejecting any regional identity or Eurocommunist designation,
This has put it at odds with some of the more autonomist Southern

axis Parties of the Continent. Without seeking to establish a mis-

leading symmetry, the idea is further developed that French Socialists are also asserting their own critical distance from

classical European social democracy.

Exploring foreign policy behavior of the two Parties, the
thesis identifies some significant role reversals from earlier

periods. Thus the pre-war Socialists, embedded in pacifism and

neutralism, have since the war, reversed this perspective. And in

ix

Abstract: continued

recent years they have become
articulate advocates of a formidable national defense policy.
Communists, who rallied to the

bourgeois Republic in the inter-war
years, urging rearmament, today insist upon an independent
France outside the blocs. They
are even begimingto lead an
embryonic disarmament campaign. It
is shown that these reversals
from long-held positions

can be

explained by the respective bloc identities
of the two Parties.
The PCF, despite Soviet actions in
Afgnanistan,

Prague, con-

sistently denies an aggressive intent to
the USSR. For the Socialists, a bloc identity with a more social
democratic Europe
has legitimated for them the construction
of Europe. Communists,

who once heralded internationalism

in their outlook, reject

this construction. The thesis develops the
idea that the PCF
has not yielded its revolutionary elan. Rather,
the realities of

power-bloc politics have imposed themselves over earlier
teenth century categories of class struggle.

X

nine-

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the international policies of France's
two major "socialist parties" from 1958 to 1975.

communiste frangais

,

(PCF) and Parti,

Any study of Parti

socialiste franqais

(PS)

international behavior is at the same time an exploration of the link

between domestic and international policies.

Hence, from time-to-time

the discussion here will cross the line between domestic politics and

international relations.

The two major opposition parties considered

here are, after all, intimately involved in electoral and alliance

strategies, while simultaneously entwined in complex international
links.

Thus the PCF continues to maintain ties to the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the world Communist movement.

The

Socialists, too, have maintained some relationship to the Soviet Communists, but retain their basic affiliation with the Internationale

socialiste

.

These interactions persisted during an era when the PS

and PCF were themselves seeking an alliance.

Thus the two parties

engaged in their domestic role while simultaneously confronting the

international environment.

This raised questions regarding defense,

Europe, national sovereignty, the world Com.munist movement, events in

Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Chile and the Middle East, to cite only a few.

1

2

The Communist Parties of Western Europe have been largely

excluded from participation in government for over thirty years.

But

by the nineteen seventies one could no longer assume that they
would

remain on the margins of power, or that they would always be in an

opposition-party-role.

Donald Blackmer, for example"'', considered it

unlikely, but hardly impossible that they would one day return to
participate.

This would surely project their views and actions into

significance for policymakers.

It was an outcome which was not un-

thinkable if America's role in Europe declined, if Soviet influence
were to grow on the Continent,

As Blackmer notes,

or,

if detente were to be reestablished.

the Communists of Italy and France have been

active for well over half a century, and it is as yet undetermined
where their ultimate allegiance lies.,

In some ways,

"they are without

question European parties, well rooted in their native soil and remarkably well adapted to the political and social context in which they

operate."

2

In other respects, they have often behaved like foreign

bodies whose heritage, organization and ideological loyalties have

reflected the duality of their Leninist and Stalinist origins on the

Blackmer, "The International Strategy of the Italian Communist Party", in Blackmer and Annie Kriegel, The International Role of
Center
the Communist Parties of Italy and France (Cambridge, MasSo
of International Affairs, Harvard University, 1975), p. 3. And six
years later the PCF held several ministries in the Mitterrand Government that arrived in the Spring, 1981.
:

2

Ibid

.

,

p

.

3

3

one hand, and native roots on the other.

This ambivalent behavior will

be seen througout the analysis here.

Given the scope of the subject, what can be learned from a
study such as this?

It is perhaps

Interesting to know PCF views towards

nuclear defense, a supranational Europe and the German question.

Or

it is useful to know how the Socialists respond to European integration

or issues concerning the Third World.

But these policy investigations

alone are not sufficient to understand the broader directions of the
two Parties and their possible ability to govern jointly.

stated,

I

Broadly

shall seek to explain the foreign policies, attitudes and

strategies of the respective parties, in order to determine the origins
and rationale of their international behavior.

I

will seek to estab-

lish the historical givens that have shaped party attitudes and caused
the current stresses and forces that have led to significant trans-

formations in their international orientations.

The French Socialists, of course, operate as an independent

entity.

While they have their international affiliations, they have

never been subject to a centrist organization abroad that could impose

discipline and determ.ine policies.
problem.

The Communists present a different

Yet if it was once reasonable to assume that the European

Communist Parties were mere extensions of Soviet diplomacy, such was
no longer the case by the end of the 1960s.

Too many intervening

4

variables have upset old relationships of earlier decades:
de-Stalinization, the relaxation of East-West confrontation in Europe,
the Sino-

Soviet dispute, and the economic resurgence of Europe, to cite only
a
few.

All of these factors have compelled the European Parties to re-

think old positions and loyalties to the original center in Moscow.
These are aspects to be explored.

Significance of the Study

1) There is an

:

intrinsic value in locating and contrasting

the world views of the mass social democratic and Leninist parties

operating on the Continent.

These are parties which intend, or put

forth the pretension, to achieve power and enact political trans-

formations.

2) The two parties are major forces in the French polity.

During the eight years examined here, the PCF and PS formed an electoral alliance, and later a governmental program, under

a

unity of the

left strategy, which by 1978 brought them close to a narrow margin of

electoral success.

In other words. Western European communism nearly

emerged from its post-war opposition status into a governmental role.

3) Even in opposition,

international environment.

the two parties strongly influence the

5

The PCF throughout its history has tended to assign primacy
to

questions of foreign policy.

Yet some have argued that despite this

priority, French Communism has essentially failed in its efforts to

influence and determine
century.

the major international issues of this

Jacques Fauvet, in an anniversary essay marking the 50th

birthday of the PCF on Christmas, 1920, presents the case.^

He cites

a list of historical political circumstances in which PCF positions

were unable to prevail.

Thus the Communists, despite widespread efforts,

were unable to halt the Rif colonial war in North Africa in the 1920s.
They were unsuccessful in preventing France's occupation of the Ruhr

following World

VJar

I, an

internationalist position they maintained in

support of the German Communists of that time.

The PCF could not

prevent France's participation in the Munich accords; nor was it able
to reverse the non-intervention policy of the Blum Government during

the Spanish Civil War.

All these were high priority goals of PCF inter-

national policy during the interwar years.

Fauvet'

s

list continues:

Following the Second World War, the PCF failed in such major objectives
as blocking French participation in the MarshaU Plan, the Atlantic

Alliance and the EEC.

They could not prevent France's wars in Indo-

China and Algeria, nor could they reverse her ultimate support for the

rearming of Germany.

"^Le

Monde, December 25, 1970, pp.

1

and 11.

5

Do these historical failings justify Fauvet's conclusion
that

the French Communists have been mere marginal bystanders
unable to

influence foreign policy? Have they been constantly defeated on
the
salient international questions that have arisen for France in this

century?

This will be a central inquiry of this dissertation.

Generally, it will be argued here that the French Communists
have a significant policy influence that must be reckoned with.

In

fact, one could cite an equally long list of postwar PCF international

goals which have ultimately been realized.

If the PCF was unable to

prevent the rearming of Germany, its actions did contribute significantly
to the defeat of the European Defense Community in the 19 50s.

Throughout the 19 50s and 1950s the PCF sought such goals as a
French rapprochement

v;ith

the USSR, establishment of ties with China,

withdrawal from NATO, a slowdown in the construction of a united Europe,

recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), destruction of the
Franco, Salazar and Greek-Colonels' regimes in Southern Europe, a Commu-

nist victory in Indo-China.

If these were idle dreams and wishful

thoughts in the 1960s, they had become reality by 1975.

The point is

not that the PCF necessarily brought about all these results (clearly
the policies of Gaullism were significant).

But they were influential.

These were tangible policies repeatedly and often urgently demanded

7

over the years in the pages of

L'

the Communist Party apparatus

itself— all of which were ultimately

realized.

Human ite and in the resolutions of

The point is a simple one:

if much of the international

political framework which French Communists once sought ultimately
became reality by the 1970s, then it would be imprudent to dismiss

lightly the international programs and aspirations urged by Communists
today.

This does not mean that the international framework envisaged

by the PCF today foreshadows outcomes in coming decades.

The point

is that their policies bear watching.

One can note certain attributes of non-ruling European CPs which

endow them with special significance and distinguish them from other

parties in Western Europe: for example their access channels to certain

power centers.

Thus in 1968 the de Gaulle Government was powerless in

urging the Soviet Union not to invade Czechoslovakia.
a frequent Gaullist complaint

(In fact it was

that France was never in a strong enough

position to influence the policies of the superpowers.)

But the French

Communist Party (and the other CPs of Europe) are at times positioned
where they have leverage unavailable to the government parties of their

respective states.

It will be shown that the PCF and the Italian

Communists (PCI) initiated powerful efforts in the summer of 1968 to

discourage the Soviet invasion.

Even though they failed, one cannot

deny the force and significance of their efforts.

It is the ability of

8

European CPs to invoke leverage such as this, coupled
with their

privileged access to Soviet policymakers, which helps to
explain the
force of the ties that continue to bind them to the CPSU.^

It is even simpler to make the case for the influence of the

Socialists: they have been an active government party at various times
since the 1930s and during the post-war years up until the early years
of the Fifth Republic.

In electoral strength, they were the leading

party on the left during the period reviewed here.

Methodology

.

The task of gathering data and information for

this inquiry has been essentially one of determining policy positions,

decisions and outcomes sought by the two parties in question.

Do the

Communists accept a forward defense strategy in Europe and the emplacement of Pluton missiles?

Have they derived any conclusions from the

failure of the peaceful road to socialism in Chile?

accept a tout azimut nuclear defense?

Will the Socialists

Have they particular views on

the role of U.S. multinational corporations in Europe?

Answers to

questions such as these will constitute much of the data here.

The

span of the inquiry is the respective positions of the two parties (or

possible factions within them) on the hundreds of policy questions

arising in the eight -year period.

I

will confine the inquiry to a

access role is further shown by the ability of the PCI's
Sergio Segre to facilitate the several years of discussions that
occurred between Willy Brandt's delegation from the SPD and that of the
See Le Monde October 28, 1970, p. 3.
SED (the Communists of the GDR).
'^This

,

9

finite, workable number of policy areas.

This inquiry can not provide

an exhaustive compendium of the positions of the two parties on all

conceivable foreign policy areas; this would present a staggering and

unmanageable bulk of data.
areas are my own.

I

The criteria in determining critical policy

identified those policy areas which appeared

important, because of the heat and debate they generated, or because
of the attention they received in party publications and Central

Committee resolutions.

The international questions

I

shall address

concern defense, Europe, relations with the super powers, relations

with respective international movements and policies regarding the
Third World (particularly Africa, where France continues to be engaged

politically and economically).

Given the nature of the data, most of the sources used were

official party sources, resolutions, programs, national congresses, and
the party press, such as L' Humanite , Cahiers du Communisme and others,

all of which are detailed in my bibliography.

Of particular value has

been Le Monde, since it provides a chronicle of the major policy issues
and debates that have surfaced in French public life

.

I

have sought to

gain a deeper understanding through interviews with officials of the

respective parties, US and French journalists who covered these parties.
Embassy people, and a half a dozen scholars and authors in the

fiijld

who

have provided me with insights on two European political parties which.

10

at the outset, were rather arcane to me.

The interviews

I

obtained in

Paris with officials of the Communist and Socialist Parties were
invaluable not so much for the substantive information they provided (it
is

unlikely that such persons will deviate significantly from official
policy), but for the opportunity to discuss, probe and debate.

This

highlighted certain aspects, emphases and passions often unobtainable
from the printed pages of party resolutions.

The PS is a lively, democratic political party, fraught with

factions and tendencies that often present a morass of policies.
earlier stage of this inquiry

I

At an

asked a Socialist official his party's

policy on an issue of national defense.

His reply: "Which Socialist

Party?"

When dealing with the Communists it is easier to find a definite
line, but attempts to derive PCF beliefs exclusively from their resolu-

tions, texts and party press can be misleading.

tion to attribute views to

a

It is an oversimplifica-

party leadership that is conceived as

monolithic or of one mind on major issues.

However, simplifications

are necessary to ascertain the world view of the PCF.

Nevertheless, the

world view that the PCF projects is a coherent one, that is.it is generally consistent during a particular period,.

allows limited generalizations.

It is this consistency which

Views of Party intellectuals, historians

and others in Party forums and journals will be treated as essentially

11

valid reflections of official thinking, since even minor
divergencies
from orthodoxy are rare when dealing with Communist Parties.

CHAPTER

II

FRENCH SOCIALISM: ITS INTERNATIONAL

PERSPECTIVES SINCE 1870

The early Third Republic, although occupied with domestic

issues, such as the Dreyfus Affair and the clerical problem, faced
two major international questions:
.

Relations with an assertive and now unified Germany.

.

Attitudes towards expansion of the French Empire.

These foreign policy issues compelled the newly formed socialist

groupings and parties to design international strategies and perspectives
going beyond earlier exhortations of working class brotherhood."^

The next section will briefly survey and explain the inter-

national behavior of the various French socialist movem.ents and factions

during

v^^hat

Robert Wohl has termed the "muddy waters of the pre-war

period

"''The revolutionaries of that era could not isolate themselves
from international currents. French and European socialists were part
of (or loosely affiliated with) an international organization, the
Second International, lending them a niore worldly perspective.

2

VJohl, French Communism in the Making, 191^-1924 (Stanford:
University
Stanford
Press, 1956), p. VI.

12

13

Early Socialist Formations and Parties

Before the formation of the Section francgaise de I'interna-

tionale ouvriere (SFIO) in 1905, France lacked a single, disciplined

Socialist Party, such as existed across the Rhine (or would later form
in Britain).

Rather, a variety of contending movements had emerged

out of the chaos of the Paris Commune.

French working class parties, unlike the British Labour Party,
for example, did not grow out of the unions.
gal until

1884-

functioning.

Trade unions were not le-

in France, well after the various socialist groups were

This contrasts with Britain, where unions appeared first,

and themselves helped form the Labour Party.

In France, many workers

had grown alienated from traditional party politics and distrusted their
socialist politicians.

Many turned towards syndicalism, which urged

direct economic action in the workplace itself, rather than political or

parliamentary methods.

The General Strike was their strategy for both

gaining reforms and ultimately seizing power for social transformation.

The historic dispute between anarcho-syndicalists and Marxists,

then,

was largely over whether the class struggle should be expressed

through insurrectionary trade unions or through political parties.

The

^See David Thompson, Democracy in France Since 1870 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 48-49. He contrasts the ConfederaGerman workers ortion Generale du travail and British trade unions.
Party.
Democratic
ganizations were well controlled by the Social

14

latter, around whom were grouped Jules Guesde and Paul
Laf argue, had

organized the Parti ouvrier in

18 83, a

faction oriented towards tradi-

tional class strusele.

Socialists believing in parliamentary action were further split

over the question of ministerial participation.
parties owe allegiance to the existing Radical

ministries?

Should the working class
(that is

non-socialist)

The more reformist factions urged cooperation with bour-

geois ministries.

The more doctrinaire Guesdists rejected such arrange-

ments.

Jean Jaures, a more reformist-minded leader of the left, would

ultimately

issue his passionate call for a "defense of the Republic"

strategy, particularly when the events surrounding the Dreyfus affair

appeared to endanger the Republic itself.

When the reformist Socialist,

Millerand, actually joined the Radical Ministry of Waldeck-Rousseau,

many on the left interpreted this as a betrayal.

The dispute over ministerialism split the Jaures and Guesde blocs
and remained an obstacle to the elusive unity sought by Jaures.

Guesdists and
Wohl, French Communism in the Making p. 11c
Blanquists went on to form their own party, the Parti socialiste de
For a
France, while Jaures formed his Parti socialiste frangais
discussion of syndicalism, see G.D.Ho Cole, Socialist Thought: The
Second International , vol. Ill (London: MacMillan and Co., 1967),
Syndicalists assimilated George Sorel^s notions of heroic
pT). 382-388.
It
is often termed the direct heir of the unfulfilled egaliwar.
class
promised
by the Revolution of 1789, evoking a strain later
tarianism
Communists.
French
co-opted by the
,

.

15

Jaures, a towering figure of the socialist movement,
argued for the

conversion of capitalist property relations into social property,
but
he advocated a transformation within France's humanistic
and democratic

tradition.

Socialism could not be installed by a minority.

Guesde, also

a major figure in French socialism, adhered to a more rigid,
Marxian

approach: working class politics should not seek gains through employer

bargaining, but should actually seize the means of production and the
state.

He visualized a party organizationally similar to the German

Social Democrats, centralized and strictly disciplined,^

In 1904, the Second International supported Guesde on the issue

of ministerialism and instructed the various factions of French socialism
to seek unity.

A year later, at the Congress of Unity in Paris, the

Parti Socialiste (SFIO) was formed, marking an alliance of Guesdist revo-

lutionaries and Jauresian reformists.

Yet there remained basic differences with deep theoretical roots

tracing back to the rival Jacobin conceptions of democracy that had

Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaures (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1952), pp. 242 and 251, The German Social
Democrats had immense prestige in the years before World War I. By
See Wohl
1914, they had a membership ten-times larger than the SFIO.
Social
of
these
prestige
by
the
not
overwhelmed
Jaures was
p. 19.
Democrats: they lacked the democratic revolutionary tradition of France.
Because they "never conquered universal suffrage on the barricades,"
they could not comprehend the collaborationist strategies of French
Socialists in their "defense of the Republic" position, p. 328.

16

emerged from the French Revolution.

These contending notions continue

to haunt the relationship between French Marxists.

Ronald Tiersky iden-

tifies one segment of French marxism which developed
with Jacobin roots.
It based itself on a General Will theory of democracy—
volonte du peuple!

Any political group representing this general will would attempt
to invoke its inherent rectitude.

nal structural opposition.
all opposition.

And, such a group saw no need for an inter-

Any embodiment of this will could overrule

This form of one-party conception clearly clashed with

classical bourgeois democracy deriving

.from

the British Liberals and

Montesquieu, who argued that tyranny would inevitably follow from arrangements lacking a structural opposition.

Disputes arising from these

rival conceptions form a recurring motif among left parties.

Early Socialist International
Perspectives

Described thus far is a brief background on different Socialist
groups.

After 1905 the earlier disputes over Millerandism and syndi-

calism declined in significance.

If Guesde first appears to be the

victor at the Congress of Unity, it is ultimately Jaures who emerges
as the dominant force in French Socialism between 1905 and World War I.

During that decade, a new issue surfaces: national defense.

On one le-

vel, the argument over defense repeated in another form the issues raised

^Ronald Tiersky, French Communism: 1920-1972 (New York: Columbia
Univeristy Press, 1974), pp, 8 and 9.
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Millerandism.

It posed the question of what obligations,
if any, the

working classes had to support bourgeois regimes.

At the same time, it

confronted the Socialists with their national and
international identities,

Socialism's classical outlook had been internationalist.

very lives of the uprooted intellectuals of post- 1848

The

Europe, exiled

from one country to another, fostered an internationalist perspective.
For these revolutionaries the struggle for socialism implied an interna-

tional proletariat whose components had stronger ties to each other than
to any national entity.

country himself, Marx

In Schumpeter's glib formulation,

"having no

readily convinced himself that the proletariat had

.7

Despite these internationalist perspectives, many of the leaders

accepted the reality and force of national identity,

Harvey Goldberg has

pointed out that Jaures "accepted the nationstate as the basic unit in

world politics, and neither as socialist nor as internationalist did he

anticipate that it would soon wither away.

g

In the present state of humanity, where our only
organization is on the basis of nationality, social
property will take the form of national property.
But the action of the proletariat will assume more
and more an international character. ... but for a

Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New
Harper
and Row, 1975), p. 312,
York:
'Goldberg, op. cit

.

,

p.

3

04,
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long time to come the nation as such will furnish
the historical setting of socialism: it will be
the mould in which the new justice will be cast.^

The German question

.

Much of the French foreign policy debate in the

1890s focused on Germany.

Lorraine by force.

Revanchards urged the repossession of Alsace-

Various Republican ministries sought Russia as an

ally to balance German power.
an alliance with Tsarism.

The Socialists, however, had doubts about

Guesde thought it risky for France to throw

herself into the arms of Russia in order to purchase security from Germany.
Jaures at first invoked "defense of the Republic" as the rationale for
a flirtation with Russia.

But as his parliamentary career matured, he,

along with other Socialists, sought an accommodation with Germany, rather
than a revanchiste solution.

Alsace-Lorraine was not to be recovered by

force; this violated Jaures' deep commitment to peaceful solutions of

international problems.

Jaures now looked across the Rhine to the militants
of German socialism.
Here, he felt was the real
hope for the future of Franco-German relations; for
once the Social Democrats had won power, he predicted,
old disputes would be resolved and the damage of 1870
repaired
''"'^

.

The Confederation generale du travail (CGT), too, which we have

9

\

Jean Jaures, Studies in Socialism (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1905),
Jaures, despite a basic pacifism, affirmed Marx's view that the
8.
P
preceded by decades of strife
revolution might be precede(
.

10

Goldberg, p. 199.
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seen was quite independent of political parties,
had strong feelings

about a rapprochement with Germany, as the war threat
mounted.

Its

hope was that the concerted actions of French and German
workers, acting

through their unions, could thwart any efforts of the European
ruling
classes to launch a war. 11

However, the syndicalists of the CGT could

not enlist the cooperation of their counterparts in the German
unions.

German unions lacked the political independence of the CGT.

Such inter-

national coordination, they insisted, had to be arranged on a party-to-

party level.

While important segments of French public life, from

conserva-

tives to Radicals, were eager to settle the score with Germany, the

socialists of all factions were largely immune from this national obsession.

Most envisioned a reconciliation with Germany, looking to the

growing success of the working class parties across the Rhine and
sible entente of friendly proletarian states in Western Europe.

Colonial expansion and the parties of the left

.

pos-

12

The early socialists

were often ambivalent regarding the question of imperialism.
11

a

13

One might

Cole, op. cit. p. 363.

12

Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Baltimore: .John Hopkins
Press, 1962), p. 380.
13

Marx himself had at first viewed colonialism as a progressive
historical force, since it would raise the level of productive forces in
Later, as in his writings on India, he would reverse
the backward lands.
this position.
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say that the response of the various socialist factions towards
France's

expansion into the realms of Equatorial Africa, Morocco, Madagascar
and
Indo-China varied from a kind of benign indifference in the 1870s and
1880s
to one of opposition thirty years later.

As late as the 1890s,

Jaures did not oppose colonial ventures.

His position had reformist

overtones: he would oppose further expansion; at the same time he would

campaign to improve conditions in the existing colonies."''^ The Socialist

leader did not speak out on the Moroccan venture until late in 1903,
when he attacked the military groups and the colons who sought to seize

forcibly large slices of North Africa.

But opposition was not absolute.

As Goldberg notes, "he accepted as valid both a French interest and a

French mission in North Africa.

It was important

'to police the Sud-

Oronais vigorously and vigilantly,' and then to carry to Morocco the

benefits of Western Civilization."

Jaures apparently had some belief in

France's ennobling, civilizing mission.

15

It was only by 1907 that various socialists opposed expansion

into Morocco.

But the impetus was not a basic anti-colonialist commit-

ment to self-determination.

Rather, it was a fear that such adventures

could lead to a general European war.

^'"^Goldberg,
15

p.

340.

If there was any moral revulsion,

...m

Jaures and other socialists,
Ibid., pp. 343-344 and 203.
their desire for Franco-German reconciliation, were prepared to tolerate
Empire building was legitimate if done with German
colonial ventures.
approval: as quid pro quo for France's having yielded Alsace-Lorraine.

21
it stemmed from occasional shared notions of
injustice.

Note Jaures'

address to the Chamber on June 28, 1912, at a time when
France was consolidating

its protectorate over Morocco:

All of those peoples, who have seemed inert ...
and sunk deep in an eternal sleep, are now awakening, demanding their rights, flexing their muscles.
The races of Africa and Asia, the peoples of Japan,
China, and India, now linked to the rest of the
world through railroads, are stirring

The Revolutionary Syndicalists took a more anti-colonial line

than other parties: this derived more from their basic anti-militarism.

They saw little gain from adventures into African expansion.

To support

such ventures only enmeshed political parties in the schemes of the

bourgeois state.

The question of national defense

.

The issues that surfaced over colonial

expansion foreshadowed many of the disputes that later arose among
socialists regarding the question of war and national defense

— which

were to haunt the socialists until the outbreak of war in 1914.

syndicalists took the most extreme stand against defense.

The

Their Mani-

festo of 1902 urged army conscripts either to desert or to propagandize

against war directly in the barracks.
CGT committed themselves to

a

In

1908 the syndicalists of the

general strike if war were to break out.
'

But such strategies were extreme in the view of many socialists.

1

c

Cited in Goldberg, p. 427.

Even
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Jaures held that socialism required an essential loyalty
to the nation
as well as to the brotherhood of man.

After all, the nationstate was

still the basic unit claiming attention.

Furthermore, the nationstate

would remain even after the revolution: men still derived their
basic

identities from language, culture, and common historical experiences.
Therefore, even the working class stood to lose if
quered.

its

nation were con-

It was not a realistic policy merely to oppose invading armies

from abroad with general strikes and insurrections, as Gustave Herve was
urging.

17

These disputes gathered force as the threat of war grew in Europe.

The Socialists were arguing among themselves a key strategic-ideological

question of priorities: should they expend energies to prevent a war-or should they direct their actions towards the social revolution?

Fear

of an all-European war gradually nudged Jaures into the camp of the in-

ternationalists.

He believed that the Second International should in-

creasingly divert its efforts to the preservation of peace.
directly conflicted with other factions within the SFIO
ceeding World War

I.

Such a view

in the years pre-

Herve, of course, articulated the sentiments of

the most radical of the "anti-patriots" within the recently merged party:
17

Paradoxically, Jaures was capable of uttering the rhetoric of
proletarian internationalism. Thus at the Stuttgart Congress in 1911:
"II n'y a ni socialisme frangais, ni socialisme allemand, ni socialisme
beige: il y a un socialisme ouvrier, un socialisme proletarien commun a
tous los pays ou la civilisation industrielle developpee a marque nette
ment I'antagonisme des classe s." Annie Kriegel, Aux Origines du Commu
nisme Franqais: 191^-1920 (Paris: Mouton, 19B4), p. 41.
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outbreak of war would be the signal to change the
social system.

Guesde took a third position.

He dismissed the Herve stance as

anarchistic, that could only lead to a futile, romantic
insurrection.
He also characterized Jaures'

waste of effort.

campaign against war and imperialism as a

Operating within his own narrow framework

(a

kind of

crude Marxism), he quite logically pointed out that since war and imper-

ialism were endemic to capitalism, they would disappear only when capitalism did.

Thus anti-militarism was a diversion.

Working class par-

ties should devote themselves to opposing capitalism.

Given these disagreements, Jaures could only seek to bridge the
gaps in the socialist movement.

His was a struggle to reconcile a

profound wish for peace with an inherent instinct of patriotism.

By

1905 at the SFIO's Congress of Limoges,' he, along with Edouard Vaillant,

set forth a resolution that foreshadowed ideas that would later be

expressed in his L'Armee Nouvelle

.

It pledged patriotic working class

support of a defensive war, but not of an aggressive war launched by

Herve 's position was one of total anti-patriotism and antimilitarism: the "workers would lose nothing if their nation were conquered." is how Goldberg formulates it. op. cit , p. 351. Those who had
the greatest love affair with revolutionary violence, seemed to be the
Herve 's appeal was to those most under
most passionately anti-military.
the influence of Sorel, who appeared to want to drown every rationalist
advance from the Enlightenment onward in a revolution of violence.
.

Jaures'

Vaillant was a veteran of the Paris Commune; thus he endowed
position with solid revolutionary credentials.

2H

France.

The latter would be opposed by all means:
parlianientary action,

protests and even insurrectionary strikes.

A year later, European socialists gathered at the
Stuttgart

Congress to formulate a position on the recurring question of war
and

revolution.

Did a fundamentally anti-capitalist position free the

socialists of Europe from the responsibility to defend their respective
nations?

A celebrated compromise resolution was devised, incorporating

the collective wisdom of some of Europe's leading revolutionaries.

While

it did not go so far as to endorse the extremist Herve line of anti-

patriotism, it did not reject the general strike. ? 0

Jaures and L'Armee Nouvelle

.

Anti-militarism had been an instinct of

left politicians and Republican thinking generally.

The army was suspect

since it represented basically authoritarian aspects of France. 2

Dreyfus Affair heightened these instincts.

The

Yet defenders of the Republic

could not realistically ignore the ultimate need for a defensive arm to

contend with the latent threat of war with Germany.
dilemma.

This was Jaures'

Much of his intellectual and political effortwas an attempt to
20

Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg insisted on a clause to the effect
that if war nevertheless arrived, the duty of the working class was to
See
convert the ensuing chaos into an all-out assault on capitalism.
Goldberg, p. 383 and Cole, pp. 59-59.
2

"Every sou spent on increasing France's military power seemed
to strengthen the social classes most dangerous to the survival of the
Republic," according to David Thompson, op. cit_. , p. 129„ Note, however,
that the Radical Party of the late ninteenth century largely renounced
Many radical ministries actively
its earlier Republican anti-militarism„
supported aggressive overseas expansion policies.
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bridge the gap between patriotism and opposition to war within
the
socialist movement, certainly a prerequisite to any form of unity.
Hence in his celebrated book of 1911, L'Armee Nouvelle

,

he envisioned

the formation of a popular army to replace the standing army.

Such a

people's militia, rallied in times of national defense, could not serve
as an instrument of aggressive wars.

The threat to France was from Ger-

many, whose forces would launch a quick, decisive, offensive war.

Hence,

the existing professional army on the frontiers would be of little value.

Rather, France required a vast, popular army of trained reserves with

genuine ties to the people.
from the people.

It did not need a military sect, remote

Jaures' plan had the further advantage that the defense

force could not be used for repression against the people.

Jaures' conception had deep historical roots.

22

The notion of

"every citizen a soldier" reached back to the Revolution, when it had

been invoked to assure the defense of a free nation.
sons of France were to be enrolled in her defense.

In theory, all the

The "nation in arms"

concept is Jacobin in origin, since by suppressing the permanent armies,
it represented a genuine arming of the people.

It has been argued by

some that acceptance by the socialists of the "nation in arms" concept
22

m

G.D.H. Cole claims that Jaures' proposal was unworkable
isolation, but had to be part of a world-wide socialist arrangement
France's uni(which presupposed the victory of socialism in Europe),
impotent step
been
an
have
militia
would
lateral creation of a people's
year's
the
in
preparations
given the scale of great power defensive
375-377.
Ibid., pp.
following 1911.
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could only have occurred when the party was
starting to grow reformist.

Richard Challener points out that class solidarity
was starting to wane

and socialists were beginning to distinguish between
nations.
ways Jaures' book derived from his earlier views.

In many

Recall that he had

inspired the view that all French workers indeed had a
patrie.^"

Today, it is interesting to note. Communist historians of
that

period embrace Jaures' conception.

Louis Baillot states that when the

Jaures book first appeared, "Anarcho-syndicalist currents and anti-militarist conceptions prevailed within the working class
it with bourgeois ideas.

impregnating

But it was Jaures who courageously restored

ideas of patrie and an armed nation."

Socialist doctrine and war

.

In reviewing the pre -World War

I

period, one would have to acknowledge that the Jauresian synthesis tri-

umphed in its major domestic objectives: it prevailed in the Republican
23

See Richard D. Challe ner The French Theory of the Nation in
1866-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 70-71.
,

Arms:

24

.

.

Louis Baillot, "L'Armee et la Voie democratique au socialism,"
Cahiers du Ccmmunisme, March 1976, p. 187. The French Communists by 1920
would reject the "nation in arms", opposing all militarism and conscription.
See Challener, p. 165.
Today, the Jaures concept can be reinvoked
because it corresponds to current Communist views on defense:
Far from seeking to destroy the army, as our enemies
pretend, we wish to give the nation the army it needs
and to assure to it the mission, structure, weapons
and working conditions which will free it from the
impasse that the policies of the current regime have
placed.it, Cahiers du Communisme, p. 190.
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struggles over church and army, in winning
labor's right to organize
legally.

But in the realm of international
politics the Socialists were

not destined to triumph.

world role.

It was not they who were defining
France's new

And it was international politics that
would now dominate

Europe on the eve of war and revolution.

The relationship of war to revolution has historically
been am-

biguous in the Marxian framework.

Classical socialists viewed war as a

carnage which would only decimate the working class, and
the workers
had little at stake in such battles because of their essential
alienation
from the bourgeois state.

Later strategists of revolution perceived

that war might perhaps have a certain instrumental value.

Might it not

lead to the social breakdown so vital to revolutionaries?

On the eve of

war, European Socialists manifested a range of attitudes towards war.

For example, classical Leninists sought to resolve any ambiguity
on the issue.

They refused to allow any "defense of the nation" doc-

trine to be confused by non-historical abstractions that could justify

any kind of participation.

Leninists would decide whether or not to

join in a defense de la pattie by forming a judgment on the war's effi-

cacy in furthering the revolutionary moment.

In other words, they would

attempt to apply class notions of the just war, inquiring about the
nature of the political relations between the warring states.

oppressor fighting an oppressed state?

Was an

Or was it a war of imperialist

28

spoils between two equally oppressive states?

In the latter case there

would be a duty to exploit the chaos, converting it into a revolution^.
ary situation.

25

European Socialists in the years before 1914 agitated against

war and the alliances likely to unleash it.

The Second International

in 1907 attributed war to capitalism and its "rivalry for world mar-

kets".

But if capitalism were to launch a war, the

unleash a revolutionary struggle to conquer peace.

proletariat would
The aim, Annie Krie-

gel suggests, was to bind the bourgeoisie in a dilemma: while the pro-

letariat hardly needed a war to reach socialism, the outbreak of war

would only hasten the conditions bringing about the revolution.

25

Jaures' position on war was not free from contradictions.

As

usual, he merged the rhetoric of revolution with reformism; interna-

tionalism with patriotism.

But the essence of his thinking amounted to

a kind of "just war" doctrine:

be distinguished.
the former.

that offensive and defensive wars could

Socialists had a duty to revolt if France launched

But if attacked, the working class would rally to the

Republic as described in his L'Armee Nouvelle
25

26

.

Kriegel, Aux Origins du Com.munisme Frangais,
Ibid., see her discussion, pp. 37-38.

p.

35
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The syndicalist-minded CGT had its own
point of view.

It would

oppose any war, regardless of cause, invoking
familiar notions of the

general strike and the fact that the workers
had no country.

Guesde

very logically rebutted such an argument,
pointing out that it would
simply condemn the nation with the more advanced
working class movement
to a defeat by the one with the more backward.

World War

Bolshevism and the Left

I,

The foregoing represents the range of views held by Socialists;

and these views were guaranteed to generate lively debates at party
gatherings.

But events were to overtake these debates.

War intervened.

Jaures was assassinated, and Socialist deputies voted unanimously for
war credits.

The Jauressian synthesis, hammered out in the 1905 Congress

of Unity, was shattered.
1)

Its two major underpinnings were scrapped:

Anti-Ministerialism
Socialists now entered
bourgeois government, with Guesde and Marcel
Sembat joining Poincare's national union
.

cabinet.
2

)

Interna t ional i sm
This doctrine was dead for
the duration.
The SFIO severed all ties with
the Socialist Parties of the Central Powers.
.

"Fifteen years of anti-militarism and talk of insurrection swept

away

m

ishing

a few mad hours

27

Perhaps this behavior is less aston-

if one accepts the implications of Kriegel's argument that

27

VJohl,

pp.

52 and 54.
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Guesde, Vaillant and Jaures were in reality
patriots all along.

French

working class patriotism was hardly born in
1914, but reached back to
the Jacobin stirrings of 1792.

The point is that these dormant passions

were resurfacing in 1914, as the Socialists
joined the Union sacree

Bolshevism confronts the French left

.

.

As the carnage of trench war

wore on, anti-war sentiment began to surge, particularly
among

the dis-

illusioned remnants of class conscious socialists and
syndicalists.
It was their leaders who travelled to Zimmerwald in
September, 1915,

the first wartime gathering of Europe's revolutionary
socialists.

Zimmerwald was significant in that it defied the established leaderships
of Europe's Socialist Parties.

Even more important, Zimmerwald marked

the first step on the road to the creation of the Third International.
In fact, this war-time conference in Switzerland marked Lenin's debut

on the world political stage.

It was there that he implored the French

delegates to launch a massive opposition to the war.

Zimraerwaldist opposition spread to the SFIO and CGT; links were

established with Trotsky and other Russian exiles in France, who were
urging a Bolshevik-style "revolutionary defeatism" on the French left.
Most of the left rejected these extremist calls.
was beginning to loom as a terrible tragedy.

Yet the Union sacree

More moderate Socialists

rall;gd to Wilson's call for a negotiated non-annexationist peace with

Germany.

Socialists within the government coalition were for the first
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time articulating different war aims from France's other
political
parties.

Russia's 1917 Revolution offered further ambiguities to the

moderate leftists.

While it was a defeat for autocracy (legitimating

Russia as a democratic ally), it threatened a military collapse on the

Russian front.

SFIO Majoritaires

,

Pierre Renaudel and Albert Thomas

(the two pro-war Socialists in the Cabinet) wanted Russia to remain in

the war, urging her acceptance of Wilsonian war aims, rather than

signing a separate peace.

But Poincare refused to allow Socialist dele-

gates to meet with their Russian and German counterparts in Stockholm,

placing further strains on the Union sacree.

The October Revolution split the French left even further.

Lenin's famous call for general peace talks (made over the heads of

governments) galvanized the anti-war Socialists.

But the Majoritaires

,

dreading an imminent Bolshevik separate peace (freeing countless new
German divisions to fight France), gave their support to French inter-

vention against Lenin's revolution.

Minoritaires

,

on the other hand,

hailed the Revolution and increasingly fell under the sway of Lenin and
Trotsky.

Few seemed to notice it, Wohl notes, but an historical corner had

been turned; "the mystique of the Russian Revolution had become a weapon
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in the irternal politics of the French working class
movement

But Bolshevism was more than a mystique.

,^28

„'

Lenin and Trotsky were

setting forth their own priorities for a new international political
order to prevail in Europe:
1)

Formation of a new International, break with social
democracy.

2) An end to
3)

Allied intervention in Russia.

Revolutionary seizure of power by socialists in Eiorope.

This summons had a key effect on the French left.

was a surge of popular sympathy for the Russian Bolsheviks.

In 1919 there

This senti-

ment must be examined, since it led to the historic "grafting of Bolshevik theory and practice into the several powerful and often contradictory traditions of French socialism".

30

Here is how the various factions

reacted to the Bolshevik summons:
The Right Wing of the SFIO clustered
Ma joritaires
It opposed the 21 conditions for
around Leon Blum.
adherence to the Third International. As social
democrats they denied that Bolshevism had any
it was
universal value:
:

28

The Bolsheviks inspired admiration on the left,
Wohl, p. 86.
fear on the right.
Many now saw two enemies - the national enemy, Germany, and the new social enemy, the Third International, in Moscow.
See Thompson, p. 194-195.

...
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The Russians were optimistic about their international political prospects: European-wide revolution seemed likely in the advanced
countries, and was in fact spreading from Budapest to Bavaria. See

Kriegel, pp. 268-259.

Tiersky, p. 13.
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irreconcilable with France's democratic heritage.
Minor ita ires

These were traditional style SocialVTrestling with Jaures' old dilemma of
reconciling patriotism and internationalism.
Many of the more democratic and Jacobin
elements
:

ists,

were quite sympathetic to the Bolshevik seizure
of power, but in the long run they probably
preferred the ideas of Wilson or the Declaration
of the Rights of Man, rather than any serious
attempts to universalize the Bolshevik Revolution.

Zimmerwaldists They derived largely from the prewar left wing.
Well-grounded in syndicalism ,
they could easily transfer much of their passion
to the new Russian reality.
They represented
tendencies that would be drawn to the new Communist Party to be formed in 1920.
:

Wohl and George Lichtheim offer interesting psychological inter-

pretations for the left's allegiance to the soviet patrie: according to
them, French sympathizers were not admiring the Russian reality so much,
"but their own revolution, the one they

1920."

had failed to make in 1919-
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The international prospects for France's once unified Socialists

were now in disarray.

The policy of war socialism had failed.

And when

the Communists won a majority of delegates at the Tours Congress in 1920,
it aligned a large segment of the left with Russian policies.

^^Wohl, p. 127
32

Wohl, pp. 203-204.
Also see George Lichtheim, Marxism in
Modern France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp. 70-71.
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Reformism, which had sacrificed so much in the
Union sacree
had received little in return.

,

In fact, none of the international and

foreign policy objectives that the SFIO had sought in the
Union sacree
were met by Clemenceau:
1)

Socialists were unable to moderate French war
aims.
Their dream of a non-annexat ionist peace
was doomed

2)

Socialists were powerless to prevent intervention in Russia.

In sum, moderate social democracy emerged
from the war with no

voice in French foreign policy.

It again posed the classic Socialist

dilemma of collaboration with a bourgeois
state.

yielded no dividends.

This time collaboration

The logic of SFIO policies led to the Union
sacree ,

but class collaboration came tied in a nationalist
foreign policy.

Wohl notes, one could not be had without the other.

As

Many on the left

wanted to return to an earlier Jauressian synthesis,
wrapped in Wilsonian
trimmings of a new international order.

But the

intervention of the

Bolshevik Revolution unleashed new historical variables, and
conferred a
mistaken, but powerful prestige on the more extremist and undemocratic

portions of French socialism.

The French Left between the Wars

French Communism, despite national roots, was an international
creation.

Lenin and Trotsky, having concluded that the SFIO was reformist

hardly a structure to make a revolution,
were resolved from the start
to split the French left, to drive out
the rightists.

And after the

split at Tours, they would continue to shape
the Party towards Bolshevik

requirements, despite their changed perceptions
on the likelihood of
revolution.

France, after all, was important to the
Russians; it held

world power status^^ and had been a natural ally
since Tsarist times in
the event that an anti-German alliance was needed.

Hence, there would

always be a special interest in the Pa rt^ communis te
francais

.

And when

the Russian Bolsheviks went through their own
bureaucratization, they

would impose their organizational maxims on other sections
of the International, including the PCF.
•

.

.

By 1924, one could describe a PCF that was:

More proletarian in its values, composition and
behavior
More c entralist , in that its various sections
lost initiative to the center.
More i nternationalist in that its leaders would
yield to the requirements of the Soviet Union
(or the International).
,

The French Communists were more persuaded than ever of their

inherent rectitude, or what Tiersky terms their self -assigned role of the
vanguard.

Whether inherited from the Bolsheviks or acquired by histori-

cal osmosis, the claim was asserted that the pre-1914 mandate to represent the people was given over by history to the Communist Parties: that

33

Lenin and Trotsky had always taken a special interest in the
young PCF^ France was one of the centers of world imperialism, and they
recognized her status as a world power. Compare this with the contempt
the Soviets held for post World War II France.
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a latent revolutionary legitimacy
derived from the Party's vanguard

and tribune roles in French life.^^

Given the structural changes in the PCF
and its special rela-

tionship to the world movement, it will be
helpful to examine certain
foreign policy positions in these early
years.
German Policy.

The PCF opposed the Versailles settlement
for three

reasons
1)

Anti-colonialism Poincare's slogan "make the
Germans pay" and his later occupation of the
Rhineland were construed as a kind of colonialism imposed on the vanquished by the Allies.

2)

Revolutionary politics Comintern policy was now
urging solidarity with the German workers. While
prospects for revolution had cooled in France, the
young PCF would seek to prevent any French intervention against Germany's revolution.

3)

Internationalism The Russians, eager to emerge
from postwar isolation, were reaching out to Germany, as evidenced by the ties established at
Rapallo.
The argument has been made that the PCF
was for the first time serving Comintern policies
and furthering Soviet diplomatic interests (a
recurring argument in nearly all examinations
of PCF behavior).

:

:

:

Colonialism

Opposition to imperialism was not a central policy issue

.

of either the PCF or the SFIO in the 1920s.

Tiersky, French Communism , p. 84,
35

.

Ibid., p. 34.

The pre-war SFIO, we

37

saw, came to oppose colonial adventures.

of war than from a fundamental
opposition.

But this was more from a fear

The PCF, despite its inter-

nationalization of the Leninist stand on
imperialism, also gave the
issue a low priority.

To understand PCF behavior, one must
understand that the colo-

nies of the French Empire had their own embryonic,
and often weak fedstations of socialists.

They often had a different perspective from

that of the Comintern.

iated

Algerian Socialists, for example, although affil-

with the Third International, went so far as to reject
the idea

of a colonial liberation

movement.

In their analysis, Algeria's social

revolution was derivative; it was tied to the success of the social
revolution in France.

37

Hence it was futile to struggle for a Communist

Algeria (Tunisia or Morocco) until France fulfilled its own revolution.

It can be said that the PCF was lax on colonial issues because

the problem had not ripened fully and would not until after

194-5.

When

the issue did surface, the Party took an anti-colonial stand, as shown
in the 1923 struggle for Moroccan independence: the Rif War.

Because

the SFIO took a weak stand, only the PCF could claim to champion
36
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Ho Chi Minh was himself present at the Tours Congress.
.

m
.

Marx himself
earlier writings justified colonialism, such
as a British rule in India, as a progressive stage, since it raised
the level of productive forces towards capitalist levels.
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colonial self-determination 38

Some broader perspectives

.

Before examining the Popular Front

period, some general conclusions about the
international context within

which the two leftist parties were operating may
be useful.
>

The Communist Parties of Europe, despite the
abandonment of the

world revolutionary doctrine, nevertheless comprised a
functioning international movement.

By contT'ast, the Socialists (and this surely

applies to the SFIO) lacked any universal or world appeal.

The latter

were urging the parliamentary road to power, implying a model
that
could advance only on a nation state-by-nation state basis.

For example,

when the chips were down for the German Social Democrats in 1932-33,
they had no allies abroad to call upon.

There simply was no mechanism

or organization that could summon f orth the aid of working classes in
.

other countries.

Such was not the case with the Communist Parties.

They at least

had the pretense (and quite often the substance) of a world movement behind them, even if it was increasingly rallied to promote Soviet interests.

This distinction between the two parties of the Left is important:

Communists conceived of themselves as sections or detachments in
38

Tiersky, p. 43.

a

world-
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wide movement

Social democracy not only lacked a
movement as such, but it also

lacked a world creed.

Its strategies and solutions were,
in the final

analysis, designed for Western states,
especially those with well -developed institutions of bourgeois democracy,
to offer the colonial world?

^^at universal appeal had it

Could the parliamentary road have any

meaning to states that had not yet evolved
parliaments?

And to pursue this line of reasoning, one could
equally ask whe-

ther The Soviet model had any meaning to a
well-developed bourgeois demo-

cracy?

It appears that despite the cross fertilization
between European

revolutionaries in the years 1915-1921, some basic misundertandings
persisted: the post-war Bolsheviks misread the revolutionary
potential of
France.

They may have ignited what Kriegel calls a "revolutionary elan",

but they could not transform such an elan into a revolutionary
situation.

And clearly, such revolutionaries as Pierre Monatte, Boris Souvarine and

Rappaport misread Lenin's revolution and its applicability to a bourgeois
republic.

What

I

am suggesting is that the historic split at Tours spawned

an SFIO that was essentially irrelevant to the underdeveloped world and
a PCF condemned to inevitable frustration in a parliamentary democracy.
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Tlje_^ular Front era.

In theory, the post-war years
were to usher in

a new system of order in international
relations: the League of Nations

was to replace the pre-1914 world order
of alliances and balance of
power.

Under new collective security arrangements,
the aggression by

any one nation would be opposed by all.

In France, however, collective

responsibilities were not taken that seriously.

Germany, a potentially

powerful and revisionist neighbor, continued
to be the obsession of
most politicians.

In fact, the motive of most mainstream
parties in

having France join the League was chiefly to obtain
protection against

Germany and to insure that the Versailles settlement be
strictly enforced,
France,

(like most states in the League) felt little duty to
protect

other nations from aggression. 39

The parties of the left were not bedeviled by the same obsessions,

The PCF had launched few initiatives in foreign policy before
of relative isolation.

The rift of Tours had hardened.

1934-

,

years

The class-

against-class tactic targeted social democracy as the number one enemy.

The Popular Front was a response to new international exigencies,

new international forces tugging at the PCF, shaping policies and behavior.

Fascism had advanced to the frontier as close as Germany and

Italy: by 193 6 the frontier with Shain would be in the shadows.
39

This argument is forcefully presented by Arnold Wolfers in
Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962).
See
his discussion on pp. 253-252.

It has been said that the
Popular Front imbued the Communist,
:s

with a new vision in the 1930s: it
superimposed the conflict of

de:
5 mo era

cy-fascism over the conventional Marxian
dichotomy of capitalismsocialism.
other.

Destruction of one no longer entailed
eradication of the

This is the view of Annie Kriegel,
who points out that the

German crisis of 1933 and the destruction
of the German Communist Party
(KPD) compelled the International
and its sections to set new, inter-

mediate stages and objectives.

"A revolutionary no longer lived for
th

future; new conceptions of international
politics were formed".

The far left has traditionally criticized the
alliance, terming
It the PCF's first step towards reformism, a
collaboration with the

government that reversed the Party's opposition to bourgeois
rule.
Tiersky, however, claims the Communists throughout this
period retained

both their intent and capacity for revolutionary action.

The alliance

was a policy designed to preserve the Third Republic in order to
disput
xt later on.

The broad goals of the PCF during this period were
.

Protection for France against a German threat.

.

Support for Soviet interests.

'+0

.

Kriegel, The French Communists , trans. Elaine P. Halpern
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 110.
41

.

Tiersky.

See his discussion on pp. 71, 93 and 372.
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Specifically, the goal was a Franco-Soviet alliance,
going

beyond the Laval-Stalin Pact of 1934.^^

French Communism was finally reconciled with its patriotic
aspect, its Jacobin

identity with la patrie

taking unpopular anti-national stands.

:

the Party was no longer

To put it differently, inter-

national policy was not only aligned with Soviet foreign policy interests,

but for the first time, it was aligned with the PCF's own domes-

tic alliance structure.

43

If the PCF was attempting a defense de la Repu blique strategy,

where was the SFIO?

Like much of European social democracy, it equi-

vocated during the inter-war years: Socialist and Labor Parties did
not view the rise of Nazism as an international danger in the same
sense that Communists did.

While fascism may have been a domestic

threat endangering basic democratic structures and trade unions, it was
not viewed as a threat to peace and world order by Clement Attlee, Leon
42

The Pact was not a binding agreement since it lacked a formal
military convention. See Adam Ulam's discussion in Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger 1974), pp. 223-225.
43

This type of alignment is rare in PCF history.
It would only
recur during the war years, 1941-4 5 and in the Tripartite era. See
Tiersky's discussion, pp. 372-374.
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Blum or Paul Faure.^^

European Socialists were not urging
policies of national re-

armament against aggression.

In France, the SFIO continued its
tradi-

tional struggle against the danger of
militarists in the government.

Socialist pacifism outweighed any resistance
to dangers from abroad.
The PCF had also opposed military credits
from 1920 to 1934, but rever-

sed itself in 1934 when Stalin signalled to
Laval his appreciation of

France's need for defense.

The SFIO under Blum also hewed a pacifist line
towards Spain,

fearing any actions that might provoke Germany against
France.

The

PCF, however, cautiously urged military aid to
the Republic, and then
a more open intervention after Germany and Italy had
joined in.

The

PCF also took a far stronger stand in the French Parliament
against the

Munich Pact than did SFIO deputies.

The ironies are obvious.

The PCF
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See Adolf Sturmthal, The Tragedy of European Labor (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1943). Especially note his chapters on
France.
His book is a critique of European social democracry between
the wars.
It argues that democratic socialists stubbornly behaved as
narrow pressure groups in protecting the interests of labor during the
crisis of the thirties, but had no broad national vision.
Blum's pacifist leadership of the SFIO is also criticized.
Although Blum sought
close links to Britain after the 1936 remilitarization of the Rhineland,
it was clear he would do little to thwart aggressions in Ethiopia and
Spain.
He also accepted the Munich settlement.

45

The PCF did not actually support a vigorous defense effort unt
admonished by Stalin.
See Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 228.

.
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and SFIO were playing out an intriguing
role -reversal

.

Leninist doc-

trine had historically rejected
national defense as a legitimate
goal

under a capitalist regiiBe.

Yet the PCF was invoking a quasi-Jacobin

patriotism, affirming its lineage from
Jaures.

World War II and its Aftermath

The Nazi-Soviet Pact and its trauma to
the PCF has often been

recounted.

For our purposes, the famous reversal it
launched in the

Party confirmed the reflexive acquiescence by
French Communism in furthering internationalist goals so utterly opposed
to French interests,
Since the drole de guerre was a war of rival imperialisms,
it called
for old-style revolutionary defeatism.

Tiersky terms such behavior:

a voluntary allegiance bestowed by the French
Communists upon a political leadership and

national myth not their own.^^

Yet it was also behavior which reaffirmed the radical nature and

capacity of the Party: it could pursue its radical ideal "through the
vehicle of Soviet foreign policy".

Only when Germany invaded the USSR

in the Summer of 1941 did the PCF enter the war, joining the resistance

with what Stanley Hoffmann termed an "extraordinary nationalist fervor

which transcended a mere tactical shift, but took on more of a moral
45

period

French Communism , see pp. 94-100 for a discussion of this
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fervor and expiation for the dishonor
of the years 1939-4 1".'^^

The PCF, emerging from the war with
immense prestige and its

patriotic image restored, joined de Gaulle's
Tripartite regime.

Domes-

tically, it behaved with moderation, urging
full production and acquies-

cing in de Gaulle's order to disarm
Communist-led resistance groups in
1945.

Why did the powerful PCF, encompassing a quarter of
the electo-

rate, not move for an insurrection?

reasons.

Surely there are many domestic

Yet the focus here is on the international reasons
responsible

for the inaction.

It is a question that will recur and will be dis-

cussed in the next chapter.

Later, it will be shown that there were

fundamental limits set by the international system itself which determined what armed Communists could and could not do in liberated France.
At Yalta, the Big Three had carved out de factD spheres on the Continent.
It was understood that West European Communists could not upset this

balance.

The presence of U.S. and British troops in Western Europe

dashed any hopes for a successful insurrectionary takeover.

Instead,

the PCF had to forego such plans in favor of helping the USSR consoli-

date the already realized gains for socialism in Eastern Europe. 4 8
47

Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community"
Hoffmann et al., I n Search of France (New York: Harper and Row, 1965),
pp.

35-36.
48

French Communism, see Tiersky's discussion on pp. 227-228,
274 and 374.
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Nothing was to be done that
the Yalta understanding.

Mght provoke

the West into reconsidering

Stalin described the situation
candidly:

This war is not as in the past;
whoever occupxes a territory also imposes on
it his own
social system. Everybody imposes his
own
system as far as his army can reach.
It
cannot be otherwise.

During the Tripartite years, de Gaulle
had his own vision:
France as a link between East and West, as
an arbiter between Soviets

and Anglo-Saxons.

This, however, was not to be the case.

Instead, a

Europe of blocs congealed, creating an entirely
new post-war reality,

destined to affect the relationship between the PCF
and SFIO.

During the Popular Front, Communists and Socialists
at least

agreed on foreign policy essentials: fascism was the adversary.

But

with the onset of the cold war, such congruence was out of
the question.
The two rival parties of the Left now seemed to have their
feet planted
in different blocs.

When the cold war tugged France into the Western

camp, the Socialists tilted towai-ds "Third Force" conceptions and a
proUS orientation in international affairs.

Leaders such as Leon Blum were

now anathema to the PCF,^° not only because of their pre-war behavior
49

.

.

Milovan Dallas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1962), p. 114.
50

Alexander Werth, France: 1940-1955 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955),
Werth holds that it was Blum's mission to the U.S. in 1946 that
marked one of the key steps in France's integration into the American
sphere.
This was towards the end of Tripartisme , when the PCF was being
removed from the French Government.
p.

295.
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regarding Spain and Munich, but because they were insisting
on their
democratic model of socialism, a Jaures-inspired Marxism.

This was at

a time when Social Democrats everywhere had been severely
shocked by the

fate of the Socialist Parties in the countries under Red Army
domination.

By 1947 the PCF was headed for a complete rift with its SFIO

and MRP allies.

colonial issues.
China.

There were important foreign policy differences over
The SFIO was not supporting decolonization in Indo-

In fact, Leon Blum was Premier when the Indo-China War broke

out in October, 1946,

Communists were also in the Cabinet.

The PCF

first equivocated on the Indo-China issue (ostensibly because it did not

want to disrupt Tripartisme )

51
.

Ultimately, the Party did come out in

support of the Ho Chi Minh forces (and in Africa it backed a suppressed

uprising in Madagascar).

These positions helped bring about the expul-

sion of PCF ministers by Paul Ramadier in May, 1954.
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With the collapse of Tripartisme, the PCF entered its years of
exile, while the SFIO extended its centrist, "Third Force" role.

Once

There is no secret about this embarrassing episode in PCF colonial policy.
For example see Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (New
She notes that both the
York: Random house. Vintage Books, 1972), p. 87.
"French Communists and Socialists defected to the imperialist cause ...."
52

These were the important disputes on foreign policy among the
The PCF supOn Germany there was no dispute.
left during Tripartisme.
ported Internationalization of the Ruhr. This was a national policy, at
odds with that of the German Communists and Moscow.
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again. French Communists were
caught in an international
system over
Which they had little control.
As in 1920, 1934, 1939
and 1941, powerful events of an international
nature would intervene and
compel a re-

casting of Communist strategy,
doctrine and behavior.

Since the 192 0s, as has been
shown here, the USSR had looked

upon the PCF as an instrumentality
to be projected into Western
society.

And this was very much the role
the Party again played when it
was assigned the tasks of agitating
against the Marshall Plan or campaigning for "peaceful coexistence".
Soviet leaders stressed that US

economic penetration of Europe would
soon be followed by military domination.

A major PCF priority, then, was
its campaign to reduce US influ-

ence in Europe.

Thus the Marshall Plan was the "Trojan
Horse" of US

imperialism.

_Germ_any and issues of European defense

.

French foreign policy during

the early Fourth Republic clung to many old
pre-war patterns.

Germany

was the major potential adversary; she was to be
suppressed by the same

pre-war alliance policy of concert with Russia (which
had worked so often
since the 1890s).

But the cold war shattered old patterns.

Russia now appeared as the major threat to France.

Soviet

It was not in France's

interests to have the Red Army too close if there was a danger
of a

53_

.

This policy was aligned with early Gaullist policy as well.
De Gaulle had signed a 20-year alliance with Stalin in
1944.
See Roy
Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.
~~
Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 81.
•

s
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Co^nist

takeover, as .any thought in
those years.

Many now felt that
Germany had to be integrated
into the defensive alliance
syste. of the
West.
For Frenchmen, it called
for so.e agonizing soul
searching.
France no longer had a capacity
for fully independent
self-defense.^^

The logic of this reappraisal
gave birth to the European

Defense Community (EDC) proposal.
man re-armament.
ion,

Communists opposed all forms of Ger-

The SFIO, however, like most
segments of French opin-

divided on this issue.

Ultimately, ir came out in favor of
German

re-armament, clothed in the slogan of
"Europe".
to a revived

"Wehrrre^

This seemed preferable

as the dilemma was posed in those
days.

Hence

the Socialists, their leading newspaper,
Le Populaire, and many of their

outstanding leaders, such as Guy Mollet, Andre
Philip and Maurice Faure,
supported EDC.
1954.

But National Assembly opposition mounted
between 1953 and

Such leaders as Daniel Mayer and Jules Moch
remained firm Anti-

cedistes within SFIO.^^
54^

m

Many
France (including Gaullists) had a moment of truth
regarding traditional alliance strategy. Agreements
with the USSR no
longer assured France a reliable partner. At Yalta the
USSR had been
hostile to certain French wishes, especially regarding
Germany.
Many
segments of opinion felt that the danger to France no
longer came from
Germany, but from the USSR, particularly since there
was a fear of a
Communist takeover in that period.
55^
It IS interesting that German Socialists (the SPD) opposed
EDC.
Ties between the SPD and the SFIO were poor after the war, and
the two parties disagreed on many European issues.
See Alfred Grosser'
essay "Germany and France: a Confrontation" in France Defeats EDC
eds.
,
Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1957)
E,
,
,
p. 62.
.

.
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The European Army idea was
defeated, and it marked the
first

demonstration that Gaullists and
Communists could join as objective
allies in certain political
actions.
This affinity becomes more
significant in the Fifth Republic.

The idea of "Europe", or a
European Community, took root in

France as it became apparent that the
nation's destiny no longer lay in
overseas Empire or a French Union.
Many European-minded Socialists saw
EEC and economic integration as a
prelude to political integrat ion-a

socialist nation of Europe.

Gaullists scorned any such arrangement,

preferring a Europe of states, perhaps
joined in confederation, but
retaining full national sovereignty.

Gaullism presented paradoxes to the Communists.

At first the

PCF opposed the Fifth Republic vehemently,
fearing both its constitu-

tional aspects as well as its threat of personalisme

.

Yet Gaullists'

international perspectives oddly converged with many
PCF policy positions, on such issues as decolonization, fear of a
politically integrated

Europe, fear of US domination in foreign policy, and
recognition of
China.

Heightening the ambiguity, much of this was occurring in the
mid-

sixties, a period when the PCF was starting to reach out to an
electoral

alliance with the SFIO.

This situation would require the PCF to defy for

the first time the immediate foreign policy desires of the USSR.
are aspects to be examined further on.

These
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This chapte. has provided
an overview of leftist
perspectives
on Prance's international
relations fro. aaur.3 to de
Gaulle, leading
up to what will he the
.ain focus of this dissertation:
the years 1.681975.
These latter years cannot
be understood fully apart
fro. their

historical antecedents.
essential background.

Hence the foregoing was
intended to provide
To grasp current PCF or
Socialist conceptualizing

on Germany, defense, or
relations with the USSR, one
.ust understand
past struggles and convoluted
events that are often still
alive in the

consciousness of Frenchmen.

From time-to-time
Lu cime It
it will
win be necessary to

return to these earlier developments.

Discussion here has not dealt with
PCF-CPSU relations (except
for the formative years around
1920).

I

have tried to show that the

USSR, following World War II, became
obsessed with holding on to its

furthest European penetrations.

Among other tasks, the PCF was assigned

that of not disturbing this new state
of affairs.

Hence French Commu-

nists had to defer their revolutionary class
struggle, which, after all,

comprised so much of their raison d'etre.

I

have tried to show that doctrinally, war and
revolutionary

defeatism were the classical Leninist routes to revolution.

But this

changed utterly with the advent of nuclear weapons in
international
56_,

.

This will be discussed in the next chapter,

.
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relations: if war was now unthinkable,
it could hardly provide the
road
to revolutionary power.

I

have not, however, had space in one
introductory chapter to

deal with de-Stalinization, a process
which since 1956 has loosened the
ties of European Communist Parties to
the CPSU and the world movement,

freeing the PCF (and other parties) to launch
new, independent initiatives.

chapters

The

implications will, of course, be examined in
further

CHAPTER
1968:

III

THE DYNAMIC OF UNITY

France's post-war years required
adjustments to wartime reoovery, disintegration of Empire,
and acceptance of Germany's
new role into
the Western Alliance.
Gaullism accepted these realities.
But by the
1960s it was seeking a new leadership
and independence for France
within
a Europe of nationstates-a
Europe described as dominated
by the superpower blocs. This was the central
historical setting as one approaches
the years examined here.

Favorable Perspectives for the Left

1968 marked the tenth year of the Fifth
Republic,

the Commu-

nists had been in opposition for 20
years; the Socialists for ten.

The

PCF had maintained its post-war level of
electoral strength, a little
more than a fifth of the French electorate.^

declining steadily since Liberation.

The Socialists had been

Yet there was an aura of optimism

on the French left at the start of 1958:
a moment of potential alignment.
For the first time, the Left saw a possibility
of defeating a decade of

entrenched Gaullism.

For several years, the Communists had learned to

accept the reality of the Fifth Republic and its
constitutional arrange^Jean Poperen, L' Unite de la Gauche (Paris:
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Fayard, 1975), p. 61.

^

.

»ents; they were no longer
rejecting it as a bourgeois
dictatorship.
Abroad, events appeared to
be confirming certain
conceptions generally
held by the left:
1)

Strsin^^^^hejtest. The United States,
chief representative

Of capitalist, was in a drift
or decline, sy^olized by
Lyndon Johnson's
decision not to run for the
Presidency, balance of payments
deficits,
and disorders at home. January,
1968 opened up with the Tet
offensive
in Vietnam, auguring
further setbacks.^
^'

^declining threat from the East.
France under de Gaulle had

been able to establish reasonably
good ties to the Soviet bloc.

In

Czechoslovakia, Dubcek's new leadership
generated much excitement on
the left.

Frenchmen

could increasingly view Communists
more favorably

now as possible alliance partners,
as reform after reform was announced
in Prague.

Ihe decline of_^ritain. Britain was reassessing
its relationship to Europe.

Early in 1968 it had announced its withdrawal
from East

of Suez, symbolizing a declining world
role and a reaching out towards

Europe
'+)

The world Communist movement

was encouraging autonomy of parties.

.

A decade of de-stalinlzation

At a meeting in Budapest early

that year, the Soviets agreed that no parties would be condemned or
2

See the discussion in Tiersky, pp. 230-232.

3

The general optimism of the period is reflected in Rochet's
speech at the World Conference of Communist Parties. L'Humanite, June
7,

1969, p. 3.

.
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expelled fro. the

_nt.

There would be no action
taken against the

Chinese

For the left in France,
these developments (along with
internal
factors) were encouraging the
moinentum towards united action.
By February of that year, the Communists
and the Federation of the
Democratic
and Socialist Left (FGDS) were
able to sign a Common Declaration.^

1958 was not the culmination of Left
unity, nor was it the begin-

ning.

As early as 1954, the PCF had been
seeking some form of united

action or electoral alliance with the
Socialists in order to break out
of its isolation.^

For several years it had articulated
a doctrine of

peaceful transition to socialism, fully backed
by the Soviet Communists
(CPSU).

At its 17th Congress in 1964 the PCF
declared that the parlia-

mentary road to power, only a remote possibility
50 years earlier, was
more likely than ever, because of the new
correlation of world forces.
But such a development would require a long-range
entente between the

PCF and the SFIO, which did, after all, share certain
doctrinal objectives and a common Marxist heritage.

To facilitate such an alliance, the Communists were prepared
to
4

Le Monde

,

February 25, 1968, p.

7.

5^
For a good discussion of the 1964 period see Frangois Fejto,
The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1957), pp. 150-170.
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reject the notion of a single
party as a necessary condition
for the
transition to socialise.
This had been a false notion,
based on the
limited experience of the Soviet
Revolution, hardly applicable to
France.
The PCF even invoked the
experience in certain East-bloc
countries
where there existed, at least
nominally, other parties of the left.
Such a doctrinal concession was
not always persuasive to the SFIO
which

feared being absorbed like the Social
Democrats of East Germany or
Prague.

But the PCF hinted that such alliances
might take on new and

original shapes, in order to

dispel any such fears.

The hope was that

the SFIO would at least respond.

Along with the PCF's desire for a new opening
with the democratic
left, was a hope that the Socialists in France
would soften their tradi-

tional Atlanticism and agree to a loosening of
France's postwar ties to
NATO.

Anything that encouraged the SFIO's perceptions of a
peaceful

Soviet Union undid much of the rationale for NATO.

Success here required

the PCF to emphasize the "peaceful road" and "peaceful
coexistence" line,
that the Chinese Communists (CCP) rejected as a reformist betrayal.^

The rationale behind unity

.

It is sometimes said that the Socialist-

Communist alliance originated in a banal necessity: each needed to
5

Throughout the 1960s, the PCF accepted the Soviet condemnation
of the CCP as splitters of the world movement, attempting to usurp the
primary role of the USSR in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The
Yugoslav and Italian Communists invoked polycentrism and a desire to
restore unity.
Hence they resisted attempts to expel the CCP, a view the
PCF would later adopt.
Fetjo, pp. 185-192.

—
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gathe. on the .un-off elections
the other's fi.st .ound
votes in order
to protect its parliamentary
strength.
Practical necessity was concealed

behind an ideological fagade

.

More basically, there was a
realization

that nothing could be done by
the left in France without the
Communists.
There could be no progress towards
socialism without the participation
of the Communist Party.
Neither Party could make transformations
in

French life without the agreement
of the other.

Much of the momentum

towards unity of the left stemmed
from the PCF.

To demonstrate their

commitment to a parliamentary road, the
Communists had backed the Socialist, Francois Mitterrand, in the
September,

1965 presidential election,

a historic act of disobedience
to the CPSU, since the Soviets had
sig-

nalled their support for de Gaulle.^

This tension in PCF-CPSU relations,

regarding which candidate the Communists would
support, would recur in
future years.

However the deepening rapprochement between
the Fifth

Republic and the USSR did not weaken the French
Communists' resolve to
oppose the personal power represented by Gaullism.

It is the political ambiguity of this situation,
compounded by

the recurring international differences between the
two Parties, that must
be analyzed.

7^

Thus throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Socialists had
con-

Apparently the Soviets preferred their ties to the existing
Government of the right over the risks of a PCF-Mitterrand
coalition
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sxstently supported the
Atlantic relationship to
which the Communists
were hostile.^ The Socialists
had always inclined
towards the construe
tion of Europe, viewing
it as a Third Force
between the two blocs.
The PCF always opposed
it.

Also to be resolved were
questions of polic

towards the USSR, Czechoslovakia,
defense and other areas of
contention
These were major international
obstacles as the two Parties of
the Left
struggled towards their 1972
Common Program.^

Pre- 1968 Steps towards Unity
The dynamic of unity, as the
French often term it, has had a

long genesis in post-war France,
and 1958 marked an important step
along
the road.

But the concept itself was born
well before 1968 and did not

reach fruition until the signing of
the Common Program four years later.

A Gaullist, Roger Frey, has argued
that the concept of a Common

Program was originally dreamed up by the
Communists exclusively ^°
.

Claude Estier, a National Secretary of the PS,
denies this view.

A

simple reading of the motion authorizing the
program at the Congres

d'

g

^ the Alliance
..I^^'^''
of

^^""^^^ withdrew France from the military organization

m

1966, Mitterrand, then head of the FGDS, told the
Assemblee^nationale that the decision was harmful, detaching
France with
out engaging her elsewhere.
Le Monde , April 16, 1966.
9

.

This paper will not be concerned with domestic
differences between the two parties, on such issues as
nationalizations, le gauchisme
proportional representation voting, a strong presidency
versus the
legislature and other sources of disagreement.
'

-'-'^

Le Monde

,

March

1,

1973.

Epinay in 197X demonstrates
the point.
solve a dispute Of paternity.

The purpose here is
not to re-

It can be noted, however,
that Maurice

Thorez first employed the
term ..common program., as
far back as October,
1958 in a speech before the Central
Co™ittee." If the Socialists
were
hardly responsive at this
time, it was because they
were still participating in the Gaullist Government.
Even when the Socialists
moved into
the opposition four months
later, their critical view of
cooperation
with the PCF remained. In fact,
during the important referendum
of October, 1962, where de Gaulle
sought to legitimate direct
elections for the
Presidency (a constitutional innovation
considered as threatening by the
entire left) the SFIO remained
hostile to Communist overtures.
If the

Socialists were

being wooed in the early 1960s, they
would respond only

to arrangements that were purely
electoral.

cal rapprochement.

There would be no ideologi-

As Guy Mollet, then Secretary
General of the SFIO,

said;

There will be no unity of action and
no Front Populaire as long as the PCF leaders subordinate
the TKterests of French workers to the foreign
policy of the
Soviets.-'-^

This refrain would be repeated often.

And Communist overtures

Branko Lazitch, L'Echec Permanent (Paris:
Laffont, 1978), p. 72.
'

'

Ibid.

,

p.

73.

Editions Roberts
'
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for Left unity were continually
rejected because of the SFIO's
historical memories, its basic suspicion
of Communist ties to the
Soviets, and
a conviction that the PCF
aspired to operate as le parti
unique.

was probacy Mollet's falling
out with the

made

receptive to PCF overtures.

hii.

It

Ganll7^^^~Zr^^ately

The Socialists were declining

seriously as a political force in the
early 1950s.

Gaston Defferre's

failure to direct the SFIO into a
centrist alliance in 1965 also argued
for unity.

The momentum gathered force.

By 1964 the term programme commun

was listed as a long-term goal of the
PCF at its Seventeenth Congress.

Thorez died in July of that year, but his
appointed successor, Waldeck
Rochet, continued the momentum.

A year later, the PCF and SFIO were

able to agree on the single candidacy of Frangois
Mitterrand to oppose
de Gaulle.

The challenge was respectable, gaining 44 percent
of the vote,

13^,

The polemics were strong in early 1968.
Thus the SFIO's Claude
Fuzier (editor of Populaire) termed PCF loyalty to the USSR
as that of
a "Fifth Column", L e Monde , January 6, 1958, p. 6.

Communist spokesman Rene Andrieu replied that the Socialist leadthemselves had privileged ties to the United States, since they repeatedly followed the U.S. lead, as in expelling PCF ministers in 1947.
favoring France's entry into the Atlantic Alliance, and opposing her
withdrawal from NATO in 1966.
Le Monde , January 9, 1968, p. 6.
ers

These polemics
that the two political
opposite world camps.
improved French-Soviet

are repetitive and boring, but they do demonstrate
formations perceived each other as residing in
These polemics were proceeding during a period of
ties.
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Frustrated by Mollet and the SFIO leadership in
going beyond
these electoral agreements, the Communists reached
out to other forma-

tions of the democratic left.

In 1966, first contacts were made between

Rochet and Mitterrand's Federation de la gauche
democratique et social ^^^^ (FGDS), a grouping of non-Communist leftist
parties.

In June,

1967, the two sides agreed to form a working group to formulate
a Joint

Declaration.

As Tiersky notes, the non-Communist left was now
ready for

an alliance "at the top", rejecting Defferre's earliest
strategy of

seeking to absorb the Com.munists

"^^
.

The Declaration Commune of Februar y, 1958

With this declaration, the two sides devised a partial agreement

not a common program of government nor a joint legislative program.
Rather, both sides set forth their respective positions: agreements and

disagreements on foreign and domestic policy.

The document, which op-

posed the personal power regime associated with de Gaulle, did not speak
IM-

FGDS was a leftist political formation of late 1965, created
after the defeat of Gaston Defferre's seeking of the Presidency.
Its
general goal was to develop unity behind Mitterrand's Presidential campaign in 1955.
FGDS sought to link together the SFIO, the Radicals,
UDSR, CIR (Conventions des institutions republicaines ) and other dem.ocra
tic-left political clubs of the era.
Its strategy revised earlier think
ing on the left.
It followed the Mitterrand line of cooperation with
the Communists.
The Federation begins its decline after the events of
May 1968, and Mitterrand resigned as president in November of that year.
15

.

Tiersky, French Communism, chapter five.

.
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Of the transition to socialisn,
although it did define a social
progra™.
Its foreign policy aspects will
now be considered; they are
an early
articulation of different international
conceptions held by the
nists and the non -Communist left.

Co™-

The document reflected inherently
different conceptions of Euro-

pean unification and supranationality

Thus the Federation supported a

.

general European framework, but opposed
hostile, cold-war era military
blocs.

A durable peace required that
the blocs be replaced by what FGDS

described as a "European collective security"
framework
The Democratic Left and E uropean integration

.

The FGDS was articulating

Mitterrand's position: France should be integrated into
a political construction of Europe— the only means of insuring
genuine independence
from the two superpowers.

Such an agreement might even lead to a lasting

rapprochement between East and West.

But lacking such an arrangement,

France must not break unilaterally with the existing alliance—
as the

Communists were urging in their demand that France withdraw from
the
Atlantic Alliance, due for renewal in 1969.

Not only should integration

16^
It IS never fully clear just how European leftists qualify
what they describe as collective security.
One can assume they are not
suggesting the rigorous, automatic, world-encompassing system outlined
in the American school of international relations, as, for instance, in
.

Hans Morgenthau and Inis Claude. Communists, too, call for collective
security, but it is hard to see how it reconciles with their equally
vocal demands for national independence in foreign policy, since the
doctrine does require a large surrender of sovereignty.
17

Le Monde

,

February 25, 1968, p.

7.

.
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be accelerated, said the FGDS.
but Europe should be enlarged
to include
Britain as well as other European
Free Trade Association
(E.F.T.A.)
states.
Furthermore, sectoral areas of EEC
competence should be broadened to include monetary policy,
planning and even political competence
through a parliament elected by
popular, universal suffrage. The
FGDS
asserted:
From now on it seems quite possible
to delegate a
limited but real power, under democratic
control
to the current institutions formed
at the Treaty'
of Rome

The Communist view.

The PCF demurred.

as the essential of foreign policy.

It viewed national independence

National security required that

France not be led into a war that was not
in its own interest (that is

through an alliance dominated by the U.S.,
which was currently playing
a "world gendarme" role in Vietnam).

While awaiting the simultaneous

dissolution of military blocs, France must stay outside
the alliance and
seek collective security with all European
states.

The Communists were in effect arguing that France should
with-

draw from the frame^;orkof Western Europe.
to a capitalist Petite

Europe

,

Instead of remaining bound

she must develop economic ties to all of

Europe on the basis of mutual advantage.

At the same time, the PCF restated its long-standing hostility

Ibid.

.
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to the creation of any
supra-national authority, particularly
one domi-

nated by large business interests.

The Federation had no such
fears of

political union and envisioned a
supranational

political authority

composed of representatives from
different states.

Again, the PCF ob-

jected, such an entity would
progressively be invested with all
the
powers that today reside in national
parliaments and governments
As they saw it, Germans,
Italians, Belgians,

Dutch and Luxembourgers

would be able to decide vital issues
of French life and destiny, over-

ruling French representatives within
the supranational organization.

There were two further aspects of the
PCF argument:
1) Such a supranationalEuropean authority dominated
by capitalist

interests would not in fact unify Europe,
but would heighten its division, since it would exclude the East-bloc
states.
2) A Petite Europe would not be truly independent since
it would

be compelled to submit to the hegemony of what
in those days was described as an "expansionist and revenge-seeking Germany",
itself under

the tutelage of the Americans through links to the
Atlantic Pact.

The Communists, in rejecting supranationalism, did not reject

EEC outright.

Because they considered the Community to be dominated by

trusts and cartels, they (along with FGDS

)

insisted that it be given a

"democratic content in its institutions" through vague references to
19

L'Humanite , February 26, 1968, p.

5,

.

participation of „orker and
facers organizati ons
In other aspects of
foreign policy, the two
signers of the

Declaration were able to
reach agreement:
.

Defense

Both sides renounced
France's force

-

ii^oSf L^x^r Ldir"-°
the nuclear

no^lZifTrt.Tol l^T.^:

Si;

rie

-^^-ar'"^^^^
°'

?h:^od:r-tiL°f Sn^e'r:-^^^"."""^--

existence of two German
staSs' andT
Federal Germany of its
n^^n^^Lar

^

°'

s^at^^r^S^^^

JiSi?™

•

- Both urged a halt to
the bombings of 1968

Sa1::^w:s^?^^Ji::^?L"ihrr

--"^.^^^ Sn::a"^eement.

The^^L

nam (DRV,.
^fnT^ur^h^^r'lns"?-"'
unconditional fl q tth+k^
/ "^^^^^^^ insisting on
for the DCT and N^F
="PP°"
tSf L"tt
°nly legitimate
representatives in Soutt WetnLf
"IgDs'' =°?s^dered the
NLF only one of the parties
^^^ th
.ue. .o. t.e ne.t.ai?S;-n
'

oJ

^T^'^^.^ TsL,

arrangement based on
^^^P^^^i-g
the national
vl2ls of Palestinian
rights
"""""l'
Arabs and supporting the UN
decision against acquiring
territory by force
FGDS held
tiers as vital to any settlement.
Here, the PCF disagreed
calling for an immediate,
unconditional Israeli withdrawal.'

'

liilTl^.ht't''

pSL?

•

•

Rightwing^ dictatorships - Both sides
issued rhetorical
condemnations of the regimes in Greece,
Spain and Portugal.

Overseas Departments

-

The PCF supported demands
for

20.

At thn.

^Ln ; I
ooHc?L
condJ

^^^^^Pf ^^^^s

-T

Germany will be treated fully in
Chapter X
'^"^
Communists rejected al! coope^a
"'""^""^ ^"^^1
1-ders accepted thesf
"^P^^^^^ Ultimately fulHlled these

,

1

1
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complete independence of Martinique,
Guadeloupe and Guianna. FGDS urged'
free elections on that issue.

Clearly the outlook for joint action appeared
promising in

early 1958.

The Left was eager to achieve power.

And the Communists'

doctrine of peaceful transition to socialism
was being put to the test
in their new understandings with the
non-Communist left.

June crisis intervened, undermining the entire
edifice.

But the May-

Before the end

of the year, FGDS would disappear as a political
force in France;

Mit-

terrand would be in retirement.

The Events of May- June

,

1968

While the upheavals in May-June in Paris will not be examined
in detail, their international relevance cannot be ignored.

To begin with, the student movement itself can be viewed as part

of a broader, international phenomenon; not in a formal but in a spi-

ritual sense.

Similar disorders were, after all, igniting in Berlin,

Prague, New York, London, Madrid and Rome that year - as well as in
Paris.

Marcel Niedergang even went so far as to speak of a "Youth

International", which invoked the same slogans, flags and symbols. 2
In fact, Daniel Cohn-Bendit s movement of March 22 was born on the eve
'

of a large demonstration against the war in Vietnam.
21

See his essay in Le Monde

May 23, 1958, pp.

Amid

1

^1

the

and 10.
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shouting, it could be said that
the students were articulating
a fundamental awareness of the injustice
of international relations.
The anarchists were demanding an end to
international frontiers.
The very existence of Maoists implied some
inspiration from abroad.
In fact, much
of the PCF's hostility toward
the Chinese Communists -and its
willingness
to accept the Soviet critique
of Maoism-arose from the Party's
fury at

domestic Maoist factions seeking to
outflank them on the left.

These, then, were certain internationalist
aspects of the May-

June events which help to frame a context
and emphasize that the events
were not a purely domestic phenomenon.

One might also note that many

Frenchmen saw an international aspect to the
disorders.
for instance, demagogic references to
Cohn-Bendit

's

There were,

Jewish origin.

Marchais would even refer to "that German".

A basic question is why the PCF failed to act and
seize the re-

volutionary initiative in 1968.

While there were, of course, domestic

reasons, one cannot ignore the international framework (or what
the

Communists term the world balance of forces).

The question is a recurring one in Communist behavior,, going
to

the issue of revolutionary pretensions in the Communist Party.

Tiersky

terms it the dilemma of a revolutionary political formation operating
in a historical context that it considers non-revolutionary.

The question

68

relates tc the very raison
d'etre or
of the PCPPC.
Five
general explanations
can be given for the
PCF's failure to act in
196a
ru
lybS.
Three are domestic;
two are international.
„j=
The
ine merit,
mer.,-t- of
eachu will be considered.
.

m

•

1)

iSCl^^i^JVan^iari^".

(a

domestic explanation): This

view concedes that the
situation was indeed
revolutionary, but since
the PCF was not in control
of the spontaneous
outbursts, it was reluctant to join with political
forces, the destiny of
which it could not
control.
Thus Co„u„sits will only
seize the initiative in
contexts
where they are playing what
they insist is their
vanguard role. This
explanation is weak. One would
have to note that Co^unlsts
(in other
contexts) have been able to
coalesce with other insurrectionary
forces
when deemed to their advantage.

This occurred, for example,
in the

Cuban Revolution.

^^-^^^S^L^LS^IS]:}^!^

The Communists, having grown

reformist, are no longer a political
group that will make the promised
revolution, regardless of the
circumstances.
Somewhere, runs the argument, the PCF lost its historical elan.

by the far left.

This view is often advanced

Some maintain that the PCF abandoned
its revolutionary

impulse at the time of the Popular Front,
when it renounced its Leninist

origins in order to preserve the bourgeois Republic.
the moment of the Nazi-Soviet pact.

Others date it at

Some hold that the reformism of

the PCF first manifested itself in the 1944-45 Liberation era.

others date it at 1968 itself.
this thesis argumentatively

.

Still

My purpose now is not to accept or reject
It is an issue that will persist, and one

69

that preoccupies much of
the >,riti„gs of Tiersky and
Kriegel respectively.

It Is a theme that will
recur in this thesis.

For the .oment,

shall accept Tiersky's
formulation that the PCF has not
lost its revolutionary purpose and indeed
ren^ins a significant force
for political
transformation in France.
I

3)

Lack_^^a_re^^lutW

on firmer ground.

themselves.

This interpretation is

It is also one that is
advanced by the Communists

The point here is not (as in
explanation one) that the

Communists are incapable of making
the revolution, or (as in two)
that
they could not manipulate it.
Rather, that they simply did not
define
the May-June situation as revolutionary.

always held the working class decisive.

The classical doctrine has

Any group or class outside

the working class (and its vanguard)
could not make the revolution.

Communist analysis of the class struggles
in France saw in the spontaneous

movement of 1968 no revolutionary situation.

Admittedly, segments

of workers had linked up with the students,
but not for genuinely revo-

lutionary purposes; only to improve their relative
economic and social
situation within the Fifth Republic.

If the situation was not revolutionary, the PCF
was not willing
to scuttle its domestic alliance strategy, so
carefully nurtured since

the early 1960s.

22^

.

It concluded, probably correctly, that French workers

boviet perceptions, calling for broad class alliances, are
documented in Stiefbold, See pp. 3-5.

.
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wouxa not

political o. .evolutionary
ai.s to thei. economic
de^an.s
(even though so^e eight
million were on strike at
one point,.
Further-re, French capitalist held
preponderant power that could
not be shaken by spontaneous movements
that lacked genuine vanguard
support.
These views ste„ed fro. the
very logic of the "peaceful
transitiondoctrine.
As Tiersky points out.
the general strike and
widespread disorders were no longer "the key
™o.ent in strategy". The election
was
significant.
"By voting the left into
power, the people launch a process with a potentially
revolutionary

conclusion".^

At the same ti.e,
the Communists would do
everything to convert the agitation
into more

familiar channels of demand for
higher wages and new social welfare

legislation

In seeking an alternative
government program through a parlia-

mentary majority. Communists were
reenacting aspects of the Popular
Front policy.

Such a perspective required rejection
of the May, 1968

disorders as adventurist risks that would
cut them off from the nonCommunist masses, and assure them a loss of
potential allies.
4) Loyalty to the USSR.

(An international politics explanation).

The argument is that French Communists
were pandering to Soviet foreign

policy interesta, supporting the USSR's satisfaction
with the Qaullist
Tiersky, Journal of International Affairs
2^+

.

,

p.

202.

This view IS summarized by Jean-Pierre Visier, an
expelled
member of the Central Committee. See Le Monde June
,
7, 1969, p. 6.
The PCF line was roundly criticized from the far
left as leading to
the party's social democratization.

Government.

The force of the argument
derives from the PCF's Stalinist

heritage: that it had often provided
a knee-jerk response to Soviet

interests in the past.

References have already been made to
the Soviet

preference for continued Gaullist power
over the uncertainties inherent
in a government of the non-Communist
Left.

Stiefbold shows that the

French Communists grasped fully the
significance of the Soviet accommodation with de Gaulle. 25

gut the PCF, through the voice of Rochet

himself, had stressed that there should be
no illusions that the regime

far-sighted realism in foreign policy (friendship
with the USSR) would
induce Communists to call off their domestic
struggle against de Gaulle

personalist power.

26

loyalty" explanation.

At this point it seems best to reject the
"Soviet

There is no direct evidence to support it.

This

does not mean that the question of whether or not the
PCF is an appen-

dage of Soviet policy has been resolved.

It will be discussed in fur-

ther chapters.
5)

Unfavorable world balance of forces

.

This attributes PCF

behavior in the Spring of 1968 to its assessment of the international
situation.

Revolt would have been futile.

provides the rationale. 27
25

L'

27

Even if by some miracle the May revolt had

See her discussion, pp.

26

An essay by Andre Fontaine

12-13.

Human ite , December 11, 1957.

See Le Mond e, June 24, 1969.

Cited in Stiefbold, p.

12.

.

s
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triumphed ove. GauXU.., .he
Co^uni.ts „ere convinced
that the a.^
perhaps with the ^iX s.,,..,
,he CIA and the Pentagon,
„ouXd have
fo^ed in Paris a regi.e
reminiscent of the
Greek CoXoneXs.

This «as

the nightmare.

Such a scenario, said
Fontaine, wouXd have
presented
extre.e ris.s for the POP.
.ending a certain credihixit,
to this theor,
was the fact that de GauXXe,
ircnicaXly, and prohaLXy
hypccriticaXXy,
attempted on Hay 24th to Xink
the French Co»^ists
with the disturb28
ances

To summarize, the PCF did
not act in May, 1968 for
three .ajor

reasons
1)

The situation was not perceived
as revolutionary.

2)

Their domestic alliance strategy
based on a peaceful
P^^=^^^^
transition would have been
undermined.

28^

f

''"""'^ '''^

^^^^ Mitterrand said:
crisis' has not carried out any
acts
of an insurrectional nature, and
it does not deserve Pompidou'
xnvectives which seek to portray it
as
a s^versi;e organlza-

ihe PCF m this_serious
"ThrPcfL'^hif

Sv^.'
nave disappeared."

"^^^^

Le Monde

,

^^^^^d' ^he state would
June 20, 1968.

Soviets, too, were highly critical of
the Government's attemnt
Communists, although Pravda avoided any
direcf'
attack on'dn:ul'i°" personally.
In inspiring attacks on the
Communists,
tie tuiutl
^"^"^P^i^g
vain to isolate the PCF from other^
^ol.-^^^^
"'^f-''^ ""f
political formations
(probably a reference to the FGDS and the
Mollet
segment
the SFIO),
Pravda did not suggest that the basically
good
and the USSR would be disturbed by these events.
^^"^^^"^
pltlT.
Pravd|,
an unsigned article of June
5, expressed the solidarity of the
"^^^P "''-''^ ''^^
''^^ h^^^ °f "the French working classes.
LeMonde !termed the Soviet critique "the first direct
condemnation of the
Gaullist government's internal policy".
(See Le Monde June 6, 1968, p.
•

m
m

f

?°T^

,
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3)

Even without the above
two factors, the internatxonal environment
precluded their acting!

It is item three above
which must now be explored
more fully.

This requires a brief
digression to examine pre-1968
periods of possible

insurrection.

Revolution and the World Bal anrp
of Fore es
Earlier it was suggested that
certain critics to the left of
the
PCF date the reformist behavior
of the Party to the 19.u-^5
era: specifically, that it refused to
act on behalf of a revolutionary
alternative
during Liberation. Thus PCF
behavior in May-June, 1958 was only
a confirmation of earlier practices.

Communist

historians justify their behavior by
their evaluations

of the revolutionary possibility
as defined and limited by the
interna-

tional framework imposed on Europe
after the Second World War.

Thus

their reticence to act during the
Liberation period is explained by the
de facto spheres established at Yalta.

(See the discussion in Chapter Two.)

And, of course, not everyone accepts
the Communist assessment. Claudin

has argued that the Communist Parties
of Italy and France should have

carried out their revolutions in the resistance
years.

The frustration

of this revolutionary possibility in 1945,
he argues, was as historically

damaging as the betrayal and defeat of Lenin's hopes
for revolutions in
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Germany and Austria-Hungary
gary in iqift-iQiq
1918 1919 k
by social democracy.
In other
words, the mass Communist
Parties
^les ot
of Italy
Itaiv and
;.r.H
r
France
played essentially
the same role after
er World
W^-n II
tt=oj-j^i
world War
as did the Social
Democrats following
world War I. 29 (And by
implication, the PCF was confining
that

m

•

.

,

role

in 1968.)

In Claudin's analysis, the
PCF erred in accepting a
Gaullist

solution to the war and the
Resistance.

Even though the PCF dominated

the Resistance at the outset,
it allowed de Gaulle to
include other dis-

credited parties of the Third
Republic in the CNR (National Council
of
the Resistance),

Furthermore, the PCF failed to transform
the Resist-

ance into the Revolution.

In other words, the Resistance
should have

seized power, not the ersatz resistance
of London and Algiers.

The Communists justify their behavior
as a necessary action for

unity at the time.

Furthermore, the steer presence of Anglo-U.S.
troops

Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement; from
Comintern to
Cominform, Pt. II (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1975), p. 317
claudin
was on the Politburo of the Spanish Communist
Party for 18
_

years.

The point IS made that the Liberation
Committees and popular
militias formed everywhere after the Allied landings
were centers of power
with mass support, formed by a PCF then
playing a decisive role. Andre
Fontaine argues it was within power in parts of
France.
See his A History of the Cold War: From the October
Revolution to the Korean wiFlNew
York and London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968),
(Cited in Claudin,
p. 195.
Jacques Fauvet, now editor of Le Monde , termed these organizap. 325.)
tions the most pervasive resistance force in France.
See The History
of the Cold War , Vol II, p. 59.
_

1: .
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negated any chance for an
insurrectionary seizure of power.

Claudin further speculates
that an insurrection would
not have
led to a clash with the
liberating Anglo-A.ericans but
would have confronted the Western Allies with
a fai^acco.pli
.uch as the Co..unist
forces had done in Yugoslavia.
But, Thorez had no such intentions.
Returning to France from the USSR
in November, 1944, he obeyed
de
,

,

Gaulle's order to disband the
militias.

Thus the mass movement emer-

ging from the Liberation was
strangled, and European Communism
abdicated
at its greatest moment.
Nuances of the debate cannot be explored
here,
as they fall outside the time frame
of this thesis.

The essential

point is that French Communists, from
Thorez onward, have justified non-

revolutionary action largely by the

requirements of the international

situation
1)

The wartime need to support the Grand
Coalition.

2) The de facto spheres in Europe set forth at
Yalta.

3)

The presence of mass Allied armies in Western
Europe.

And there is no reason to believe that on this
score French
3

The dispute reopens inside the PCF in 1952, leading
to the
removal of Andre Marty from the Party and Charles Tillon from
-the
leadership
32

Most sources on the subject dispute the Claudin view here.
Thus massed Allied armies in Europe were decisive according to
Adam
^lam in The Rivals, America and Russia Since World War II (New York:
~
"
Penguin Books, 1971), p. 133.

.

.
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Co^nist

assessment varied significantly
fro„ Soviet perceptions.
fact, there is strong evidence
that they were conforming
to Soviet
wishes

In

It should be noted that the
early post war years under Stalin

mrked

vital period of consolidation
for the Soviet regime and world
Communism. As Marshall Shulman
emphasizes, it was an era when the
a

Soviet Union was eager to secure
its furtherst European penetrations,

despite perceptions of a hostile and
superior United States with a

firm presence on the Continent

This required the Soviets to seek a
period of peace-or peaceful

coexistence-,mtil there occurred a new stage or
advance in the correlation of forces

favorable to them.

This was the time of the

peace

movement, a large-scale campaign embracing all
groups and strata opposed
to war.

By convincing a wide spectrum of Europeans,
including Frenchmen,

of the Soviet Union's peaceful aims, they hoped
to undermine Europe's
33

In fact all sources agree that the Ivestern Communists
were
aligned fully with Soviet requirements.
Ironically, when the Grand
Coalition of World War II collapsed in 1947, the Cominform severely
reprimanded the PCF and PCI for yielding to legalism and parliamentarism
during this period.
See Claudin, Part II, pp. 384-386.
34

Marshall Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (New
York: Atheneum, 1959).
Tiersky also confirms that the PCF acted to
ferego the revolution in order to further the more certain gains of the
socialist takeovers by the Red Army in the East.
Thus foreign policy
was aligned with their new government role.
See French Communism, pp.
121-122.
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ties to the Atlantic
Alliance and the United State,
and preclude the
possibility of an armed Germany.

Any attempt by Western
European Communists to achieve
power
would have to await some change
in what Communists term
the "correlatio
of forces".
Hence the post-war era became
a period of stabilization
for European Communists, a
holding action.
Their Cominform-assigned
role was to weaken the Western
bloc to the extent possible,
but to
reject class struggle and
revolutionary politics, since there
was a

judgment that there was little
prospect for revolutionary action by
the
Western European proletariat after
the War.
As Shulman notes, instead
of revolutionary politics, there
would now be power-bloc politices.

Communists abroad were enjoined to take
a broad national line and seek
mass support.

This was legitimated by Stalin's
thesis that Communist

Parties uphold bourgeois democratic
freedoms, national independence and

sovereignty, "if you wish to be the
patriots of your country. "^^

This Soviet exhortation confirmed the
PCF's own experience.
had, after all, been most isolated in

19^+9

(It

when Thorez declared support

for the Red Army in the event of an East-West
war J

Now Western Commu-

nists could exploit nationalism, peace sentiments
and anti-imperialism
to strengthen the Soviet bloc, instead of
advancing the social revolu-

tion.

Claudin and others term this revisionism.
35

Shulman,

pp.

253 and 247-248.

For Shulman, it

7!

ernbodied the movement's adaptation
to the great transformation
in world

politics since the end of World War II.

The old classical theory, and

hope, that the working classes of
industrial countries would be the

vehicle of revolution had been repeately
frustrated by events, as
these classes began to enjoy the fruits
of bourgeois life.

It can be concluded that Communist
behavior in May,

1968, was

consistent with their entire post-war strategy,
deriving from their own
(and the movement's) assessment of the
revolutionary possibility in

Western Europe, given the world balance during
these decades.

France

remained firmly anchored to the Western sphere in
1968, as it had been
a quarter-of-a-century earlier.

The June Presidential Elections of 1968

Having analyzed some of the revolutionary possibilities in
France, we can now return to the unity problem.

The "dynamic towards unity", which originally appeared so hope-

ful in early 1968, continued to move toward a crisis that Spring.

Communists had hoped to regain lost ground in the June
elections called by de Gaulle,

23

The

legislative

Perhaps their responsible behavior

during the crisis would legitimate them in the eyes of the voters.
Even the Soviets made no overt judgements on the elections, but privately,

they were now describing de Gaulle as a man of the past, who
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lacked any grasp of working class
problei^s.^^

The June elections,

however, were a decisive defeat for
the entire left, and especially
the

Communists, who despite their good
behavior, remained identified with
the outbreaks of that Spring.
begun.

But the shocks of that year had only

For as Kriegel notes, what was memorable
about 1968 to the

PCF "was not so much May in Paris, but
August in Prague".
3S

Lejonde, June 11, 196 8, p. 2. Chinese commentary
attacked
both the Soviet Union and the PCF for
"extinguishing the flames of
revolution and for urging revisionist electoral
solutions that would
only lead to a disguised scheme for Rochet
to collaborate with the
bourgeoisie. Le Monde , July 7-8, 1968,
p. 5.
37

France , p.

The International Role of the C ommunist Parties
of
'
— Italy and

40.^

'

'

'

^

CHAPTER

IV

THE CZECH CRISIS AND THE FRENCH
LEFT

General Perspectiv es
Most observers correctly attribute
special significance to the

PCF's response to events in Czechoslovakia,
terming it the first asser-

tion of French Communist independence
from the CPSU.

And indeed the

Stalinist heritage of the PCF had burdened
it deservedly with a reputation for unswerving loyalty to the Soviets.^

Given this reputation,

some observers exaggerate all signs of
PCF-Soviet differences as evi-

dence of a rupture in relations.

But judgments must be made carefully.

A careful historian might note that
disapproval of the 1968 invasion was

not the PCF's first disagreement with Soviet foreign
policy.

One could

cite others:
.

The PCF now claims it conceived of the Popular
Front idea in 1934, despite opposition from the
Communist International.

The French Party lacked the initiative of other Parties, which
were less ouvriste , or perhaps had undergone longer years of illegality,
such as the more innovative Spanish, Italian and Yugoslav Parties.
See'
Donald L.M. Blackmer, " Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Commu nism", in Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds. Communism in Italy and
France
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

This is reported by Jean Kanapa, who headed the Foreign Affairs
section of the PCF's Political Bureau. See his essay, "A 'New Policy'
of the French Communists", Foreign Affairs , January, 1977, vol. 55, no.
'

2, p.

283.
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Following the Hitler-Stalin Pact,
Communist
deputies voted unanimously for
defense credits
when France went to war against
Germany.
Thorez in 1946 opposed Stalin's
view that the
Ruhr be placed under inter-Allied
control
He
also wanted the Saar placed under
French control, a policy the Soviets did
not support.

It is arguable how significant
these differences were;

none of

them persisted very long.^

T^e 1968 challenge to Soviet actions,
however, was of histori-

cally different significance: it was a
strongly articulated objection,
which, although modified, has essentially
been sustained over the years.
The actions of the left during this crisis
are at a crucial intersection

of international behavior and domestic
alliance strategy.

They will

now be considered.

Responses Prior to the Invasion

Throughout the Spring of 1958, the PCF, in the pages of the
Party press and in the deliberations of its leadership,
dealt closely
3

Fernando Claudin, pp. 317-318.

I have found no confirmation for Kanapa's version of the
Popular Front's paternity.
Regarding the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the PCF promptly
acted to realign policies with Moscow.
Disagreements over postwar
German policy were trivial in the sense they involved the same goal:
preventing German resurgence.
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with events unfolding in Prague.

Rochet, speaking to the Central Com-

mittee on April 18, observed an important
democratization of life in

Eastern Europe.^

While changes in process and corrections
of past

errors were entirely the affair of the Czech
Party, international soli-

darity did justify his touching on certain
common problems.

For the

public record. Rochet stressed that new dramatic
practices in no way

endangered the socialist basis of Czech society.
that he did have doubts on this subject.)

(We will see shortly

He went on to note that

Czech foreign policy remained firmly linked to the Soviet
Union.

Des-

pite some transformations, the nation remained in the
Socialist Camp.^

The Socialists, too, were noting events approvingly.

After all,

developments in Prague did have symbolic importance, and the Czechs
were even suggesting that their practices could apply in other states

with democratic traditions.

Thus Socialist deputy Claude Estier (a

member of the secretariat national )

,

wrote in the Mitterrand-edited

Combat Republicain that "the winds blowing from Prague must serve to

further cooperation with the Communists".

The meaning was clear: the

French Communists stood to gain dramatically from the positive image of
5

.

L Human ite
'

,

April 20, 1958, p.

5

and May 9, 1958, p. 2.

6

Rochet distinguished the situation from Poland, where there
was a threat to the socialist order and the alliance with the Soviets.
7
g

Le Monde

,

April 12, 1958, p.

Reported in Le Monde

,

2.

April 28,

1968, p. 5.

9
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the Prague Spring.

But it was the Soviets who grew increasingly alarn^.ed
about

"winds from Prague".

And the French Communists, in turn, were growing

alarmed at possible Soviet reactions.

In mid-July the five East-bloc

Communist Parties had notified the Czech Central Committee that while
they would not intervene in Czech affairs, they would not "accept Czech-

oslovakia

being led away from the path of socialism".

This would be

a threat to the entire bloc:

Our parties are not solely responsible before their
own working classes, but before the international
working classes for their actions.
This was a cliche of old-style internationalism, but it hinted
at the Brezhnev Doctrine to follow.

Rochet's view of internationalism held that each Party had to

determine its own policies, a principle well-established at earlier
international conferences.

But a "particular Party could express its

own views on this or that aspect of the behavior of another party, par-

ticularly if it was a question concerning the common objectives of all
parties

— that

is the international Communist movement",''"'^

Fearing the worst--a Czech-Soviet confrontation

^

Le Monde

"^^L

'

,

July 18, 1958, p.

3.

Human it e, August 7, 1968, p.

1.

— the

PCF took
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certain initiatives internationally.

On July 15 Rochet journeyed to

Moscow with Luigi Longo, then Secretary
of the PCI.

Apparently both

sought to discourage the Soviet leaders
from using force against Czecho-

slovakia, which would have violated
agreed upon norms of non-interferTwo days later, the PCF launched
another initiative and pro-

posed a meeting of all European Communist
Parties to discuss events in
Czechoslovakia. ^2

j^^^

^

^^^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^

^^^^^

^

It is clear that the PCF, which had
always had solid ties to the Czech

Party, was attempting to serve as an intermediary
in the dispute.

On

the one hand, the leadership wanted to caution
the Soviets against

seeking a military solution (on a domestic level
this threatened to

destroy the developing ties with the democratic left in
France), on the
other, they wanted to warn the Dubcek leadership against
letting the

situation get out of control, as that would provoke Soviet
intervention,

A week after urging a meeting of European Communists, the PCF

withdrew its proposal and accepted the Soviets' preference for talks at
11

In talks such as these with Soviet leaders the prestige of
Western Parties is high, particularly the PCI, which had just scored
some electoral successes.
The PCF's credit was high, too, despite the
electoral setbacks in June. See Le Monde , July 18, 1968, p. 3.
It is
interesting to note that Rochet's trip to Moscow was not without precedent.
According to Rochet himself, he journeyed there in October,
1964 to protest the manner in which Khrushchev had been removed.
See
Andre Lauren's essay in Le Monde July 28-29, 1958, p. 1.
,

12

come,

The Italian, Swiss, Belgian and Austrian Parties agreed to
L'Humanite , July 18, 1968, p, 1.

Bratislava between the Czechs and
other East-bloc Parties only.
(The
Soviets were apparently more
comfortable in dealing with ruling
parties
than non-ruling ones, as they had
more control over the former.)
The
immediate crisis appeared defused for
the moment, and the PCF re-

gistered its approval of the results
of this conference.

Much of what is now known about the
celebrated Duhcek-Rochet

meeting of July 19th emerged a year-and-a-half
after the event^^ ^i^h
disclosures embarrassing to the PCF.

The meeting reveals much about the

nature of the game the PCF was attempting
to play in those confused days
On a deeper level it is also an interesting
glimpse into French Commu-

nist operations at the international dimension.

Before examining the

meeting, a few observations can be made.

To understand the role of the French Communists
in these maneu-

verings, one must grasp Kriegel's notion that the
PCF functions as a non
state controlled entity inside the world Communist
system.

It also func

tions "as a potentially or 'proto' -state element within
the world

Kanapa apparently took notes for the PCF side. L'Humanite
^
editor Etienne Fajon sent copies of the minutes back to the Czech
author
ities in November, 1959.
It was charged later by Roger Garaudy that the
Kanapa notes might have been used to implicate Dubcek at a trial. See
LeJIonde, May 13, 1970, p. 9, May 20, 1970, p. 7 and L'Humanite, May 18,
1970, pp. 1, 5 and 6.
'
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interstate syste.".

Thi. world syste. is
not ™erel, a territorial
en-

tity. "but a .ulti-di.ensio„al
concept e^racing at the

sa^e ti.e a

aSlaiL^fjS^^tie., both ruling and non-ruling,
as well as

a broad
system of alliances that
ar reach out
nut- into
the national movements
in the
Third world." It is
.e^ership in this system that
enfranchises the
PCF (and other parties in
the system) to participate
at an almost
government-li,e level at these
international forums. Conventional
international law notions of
non-interference in the internal
affairs of stat es
seem to dissolve in these
new relationships.
«e have seen that from
its
very birth, French Communism
has mainrained its links
to the world movement, yet refining a part of
the domestic French political
system.
It

is this duality which leads
Kriegel and others to describe
the PCF as
a

hybrid of pre- 19
W French socialism and Leninism.

Out of this ambi-

valence grew the need for an
organization that could walk this
political
tightrope.

... to maintain its double identity,
the French
party has had to construct an
ideological and organizational apparatus designed to
compensate for ^ts
close relationship to the French
political system.
This unique structure has been
successful in preventing the party's "Frenchness" from
submerging
Its internationalism.

c. membership in the international Communist
movement is the historical and logical
basis for the
existence of any Communist party.
It constitutes a
practical corollary to Communism' s ideological
Blackmer and Kriegel, pp. 37, 39 and 54.

.
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goal— worldwide proletarian revolution.

The above should be helpful in
understanding the nature of the

dialogue that occurs in international
discussions among Communist Party
leaders.
To return to the July
19th meeting:

Rochet began by noting that a serious
situation had arisen of

concern to all parties.

And while the PCF had never interfered
in the

internal affairs of the Czech Party, a
solution had to be found.

"Such

is the spirit in which I came to
Moscow earlier this week and come here

today".

He went on to note that forces existed
inside Czechoslovakia

which could exploit a situation for goals
hostile to socialism.

Then

echoing the Soviet assessment, he urged constant
vigilance; the leading
role of the Party was being challenged:
The non-Communist press had the right to advance
its own erroneous ideas, but it was the role of
the Party press, the unions and the state radioTV to respond vigorously, so that false ideas
could be refuted and could not influence the

masses

Rochet was conveying the Soviet point of view, as explained to
him earlier that week: the Czechs were not responding adequately to a

long-term threat to socialism.

Turning to Czech foreign policy. Rochet emphasized that a

"^^Ibid.

,

p.

37
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deterioration in ties between the
Czechs and Soviets was
disturbing to
French Co^nists.
He conceded that while
the Czech party had pledged
its loyalty to the Soviets,
certain intellectuals had issued
declarations casting doubt on the decisive
significance of these ties.
This
did concern the PCF, since it
related to peace and security.

of us can forget Munich".

"Neither

He explained that a break with
the USSR

could expose Czechoslovakia to "all
sorts of maneuvers fro. West Gernnny
and the United States.

T^e relation

the security of Europe threatened

„

of forces would be changed, and
The Soviet Union and the Socialist

states could not allow such a situation
to develop".

PCF leaders

clearly knew the Soviets were prepared to
act.

After painting this gloomy scenario. Rochet
urged:
.

•

IS

The search for a "terrain of entente"between
Czechs and Soviets.

Tighter Party control over the press.

This is the oh/erse of what was suggested earlier. French
Communists determine the limits of policy by their assessment
of a relationship which they term the international balance of forces.
They
are precluded from certain actions in France because of
their geographical
sphere as defined by Yalta.
Similarly, they view the Czech predicament through the same lense: the bloc will impose its own norms,
limiting the transformations under the Prague Spring. For an interesting discussion on this theme see Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband,
World Politics: Verbal Strategy among the Super Powers (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1971).
They argue that U.S. behavior in its
own sphere provides precedents and justifications for Soviet behavior
under the Brezhnev Doctrine. Often the "crises are as symmetrical as
a classical ballet ... an extraordinary reversal of roles".
Smaller
states within a bloc cannot escape the jurisdiction of that bloc; force
will insure this jurisdiction.
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D.bcek thanked Rochet
graciously for hi. remarks
and indicated
his understanding that
Rochet was transmitting
the views of the Soviets,
Rochet denied this:
""^^ ''^^"'Sed with translating
Soviet '.m/'"
'
independence
x
^'"^^^^^T"' heard, and concluded the
sTtuat.-n
situation was serious.

Dubcek then said that PCF
fears of a break with the CPSU
were
unfounded, since the Czechs had
given no pretext or provocation
for
such a rupture.
He did not think Rochet's
proposal for a Euro-wide
Communist conference devoted
strictly to Czech affairs was
useful just
then, perhaps later.

The French Communists Respond
to th e War...w

P.n^j^^^^^^

The invasion itself, following
so closely after the turbulent

events of the Spring, placed the
French Communists in still another
crisis.

The Party responded immediately.

The Political Bureau expressed its
"shock and disapproval" on
the morning of August 21st,

noting that problems between parties must

be resolved by "fraternal discussions
and bilateral and multilateral

meetings".

There must be respect for the independence
of each' state

and party within a framework of proletarian
internationalism.
17

L'Humanite , August 21, 1968, p. 1.
The Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) also condemned the invasion
^FThat Hay.

8

V
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The Central Committee issued
its oun statement the following
day, repeating many of the
same points, yet different in
tone

This

led many to call it a retreat
from the original condemnation.

The original wording was modified to an
expression of "regret and disagreement
But it did approve the Political
Bureau's statement of the prior day,

opposing all interference in the affairs
of a fraternal party, a position well-defined by the Declaration
of 81 parties issued in 1960.
Despite the condemnation, the statement
indicated that French Communists

would in no way relax efforts to promote
unity in the movement.

They

would continue to work with all parties,
particularly the CPSU and
"would struggle against all anti-Soviet
provocations".

The PCF saw no inconsistency in its two statements

condemned the invasion.

.

Both

In fact, the latter statement of the Central

Committee went further, indicating the Party's basic
international
1

L ' Human ite

,

August 23, 1958, p.

1.

19^

Georges Marchais also denied any difference between the Political Bureau statement, "sa surprise et sa reprob ation", and the later
Central Committee text, noting " desapprobat ion "
"there is absolutely no difference. The second statement clearly indicated disapproval"
Marchais argued it was perfectly normal for a Central Committee resolution to expand its analysis.
The PCI had issued an even stronger statement, urging the removal of Soviet troops.
Marchais, however, ruled out any common action
between the two European Parties. But the two parties continued to
keep close contacts, as evidenced by the earlier Longo-Rochet meetings.
See L' Humanite , August 24, 1958, p. 2.

position: namely that it would
strengthen ties with all parties.

It

was this renewed stress upon closer
ties to the Soviets that enemies
of
the PCF were seizing upon, said
Etienne Fajon, editor of L_'Humanite.
Were the Party to "sink into
anti-Sovietism, the rallying point of all

regressive

forces for half-a-century , it would
cease to be Communist".

By late August, it was clear that the
force of the PCF's

initial objection had subtly been softened.

The Communists continued

to reject the specific Soviet action,
but would not loosen their funda-

mental alliance with the world movement.

They were now putting their

faith in the "normalization" process so touted
at the end of August.

_R

eactions from the non-Communist left

There was a general scorn for

.

the "normalization" by the democratic left groups.
a Soviet diktat to Prague.

It was considered

The invasion had now become a domestic poli-

tical problem within the French left.

After the invasion, Alain Savary

of FGDS went further, terming the events a moment of truth for Western
Communists.

"Only an immediate and unequivocal condemnation can save

their (that is the PCF's) relations with the democratic left".^°

The

Socialist International, to which the SFIO was linked, issued its own

denunciation, terming it an act of imperialism recalling Hitler's invasions.

Condemnations came in from Pietro Nenni and Golda Meir, as

the world socialist body urged an emergency session of the UK Security
20

Le Monde-,

August 22, 1958, p.

5

.
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Council

Guy Mollet took a more conciliatory line.^l

^^Ue denounc-

-

ing the invasion, he did see
major historic significance to the
French

Communists' condemnation.

Unlike many of his colleagues, he saw no

significant difference between the two statements
cited earlier issuing
from the PCF's Political Bureau and Central
Committee.

He saw no need

to interrupt the unity discussions between
his party and the Communists.

In fact, he welcomed a recent trend among
French and Italian Communists.

Mitterrand, however, did not embrace the PCF initiative.

The

invasion stemmed from Yalta, the classic whipping boy of
the Gaullists.
It demonstrated that the Russians were still tied to
the special

privileges of an out-of-date Yalta Agreement which had divided Europe.
The logic of this analysis led him to conclude that France had
to

"hasten the arrival of an independent Europe".

One could go on citing the various reactions from all quarters:

Thus the Youth Contingent of the SFIO termed the PCF attitude
21

See Le Monde
August 2^+, 1968, p. 7. Also see L'Humanite
of the same date, p. 3.
Contrast this with Mollet' s statements in
the early 1950s, cited in the previous chapter.
,
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•Wageous..

and a step that could
strengthen the process of
^2
unity...

^-^^^=^^^^-^^^^1^^

signaled its support

and satisfaction to the
PCF leadership.

As the weeks wore on, one
could discern .ore critical
attitudes
in the ranks of the
non-Co..unist left, especially as
the Co^nists

appeared to retreat fro. the
original force of their
condemnation.
The PCF was only temporizing.
Evidence for this was the fact
that the
Communists were repudiating the
Garaudy line, which had welcomed
the
pre-invasion innovations in Pra^e
Furthermore, the PCF was accepting
uncritically the post-invasion accords
between Dubcek and the USSR,
.

which were viewed as little more
than diktats by the democratic left.

On September 3, the Political
Bureau of the PCF issued a new

statement, which was somewhat different
from its earlier statements.

1)

It expressed a strong desire to see
the new Moscow-Prague

agreement of August 27th carried out satisfactorily,
putting the original Bratislava principles into effect:
namely that Czechoslovakia
22

If many Socialists were responding favorably
to the PCF condemnation, the Radicals were more aloof.
Maurice Faure and Felix
Gaillard saw no reason to embrace the historic
action of the PCF.
Thu
the Radicals were far more sceptical about the
possibility of left
unity than the SFIO and FGDS, See Le Monde August
29, 1968,
,
7.
p.

23

See the SFIO's resolution of September 5th.
While welcoming
certain actions of the PCF, the "retreat" endangered any
hope for true
unity.
See L' h'umanite
September 6, 1968,
3.
,

p.
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would uphold socialise and
renain loyal to the Warsaw
Alliance, and at
the same time pledging a
withdrawal of Soviet troops.

2)

It did not conceal a
basic PCF sympathy for the
continued

development of democratic socialism
in Czechoslovakia, as
originally
envisaged by Dubcek in January
of that year.

(At this point it had

not been revealed that Rochet
had been critical of certain
lapses in

Czech vigilance in his celebrated
meeting with Dubcek on July 19th.)

3) It reaffirmed the initial response
of disapproval with the

Soviet invasion.

It is not my purpose here to analyze
Soviet behavior in any

depth.

Nevertheless, one can state that the Soviets
made a trade-off

regarding Western European Communists.

To gain stability and orthodoxy

among East European Communists (who were ruling
parties), they would
sacrifice the prestige of Western parties
(non-ruling),.

In other words,

it was preferable to preserve ruling
parties, and take certain risks

among those parties without actual power: a sheer
calculation of advantage.

The Soviets probably sensed that the invasion would
be condemned

by Western Parties.

They had, a.fter all, been warned.

One can assume

that from the Longo-Rochet meetings in Moscow the prior
month.
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Earlier, Marshall Shul.an
was cited to the effect
that in the
1950S the USSR shifted f.o.
insurrectional, politics to
power hloc politics - and imposed this
nor. on all Western Parties.
The PCF, we saw
acquiesced in this policy,
leading it to formulate the
doctrine of peaceful transition.
In Czechoslovakia, the
Soviets were once again
engaged
in power-.loc politics.
This ti.e, however, they
were not endangering
the insurrectionary goals
of the Western Co„nists.
But they were endangering the very objectives
of peaceful^rans^
In asking that the

Western Parties approve of its
power-bloc .oves in Europe, the
USSR was
in effect condemning the
parliamentary strategies and alliance
policies
of the mass Communist Parties
of Western Europe to defeat.
If the
Western Parties were prepared
to make this sacrifice after
the war and
in the early days of
Cominform, they were no longer
prepared to do it
in 1968.

This

appears to be a fair reading of the
fact that virtually

all Western Parties condemned the
Soviet action in Czechoslovakia.

Why did the Western Communists
sacrifice their purposes to Soviet

power-bloc goals 20 years earlier and not
in 1968?

Probably because

they themselves could see the futility
of insurrectionary politics in
the 1940s.

The Soviet argument made reasonable
sense.

In 1968 the

Soviet argument made no sense, because
the Western Parties saw alternative and potentially achievable roads to
power, which would have been
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closed had they identified
with Soviet po„e.-bloc
methods in Europe.
Having rejected the
insurrectionary road, the Western
Parties could
not reject the parliamentary
road as well. This would
have left the.
with no strategy at all.

If the above reasoning is
correct, it still leaves
unanswered

the question as to why the
Western Parties did not break
totally with
the Soviet Union.
This is, of course, a basic
question of the PCF's

international relationship, and an
attempt to answer it will be
further on.

«de

At this point, some limited
conclusions can be drawn about the

effect of the Soviet action in
Czechoslovakia on the world movement.

The phenomenon of Eurocommunism will
be discussed later.

And

it is not being suggested that the
Czech invasion gave birth to its rise

(although its contribution will have to be
considered).

At this point

it seems reasonable to say that the
crisis in Czechoslovakia opened up

a new, third pole in the world movement.

(The split with China demon-

strated a second variety of socialism that
spoke to the less developed
states, which could assume certain risks that
an established power like
the USSR regarded as imprudent.)

The invasion of Czechoslovakia revealed a wide gap be twee
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the developed Western capitalist
states and the USSR.

clear

One thing it made

was that the USSR could no longer
embody the future for the

most modern, industrial states.
Prague.

This seemed to be a major lesson
of

It served as a moment of truth for
the Western Parties:

Soviet Union was no longer a model.

the

By the 1960s, the progress of the

mass parties of the West was being retarded
by aspects of Soviet
reality.

Maurice Duverger argues that the Czechoslovak
event had a
special meaning.

24

It showed that the Soviets were determined
to crush

any manifestations of genuine liberty, placing
the Communists of the
West in a new situation.

It was no longer unthinkable that Communists

could begin to share power (as, say, in Finland).

As social democracy

grew more gestionnaire , it became more open to a liberal communism
in
the advanced countries.

Given this situation, the USSR's international

position was difficult.

On the one hand, as a growing great power, it

required a rapprochement with the U.S. to further its own economic
development.

Hence it had to separate itself from the more revolu-

tionary posturing of the Chinese.

But since it refused any genuine lib-

eralization, it justified the birth of a new form of communism in the
West.

Duverger conceded a certain weight to the basic importance of

the USSR since 1917 in furthering a general advance of world socialism.

Without Soviet power confronting
24

See his article

m

the United States, capitalism, as

Le Monde

,

September 5, 1958, p. 4.
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e^odied

in the U.S., would be able
to expand increasingly.

CoTOists

The Western

understood, hence they refused to
break with Moscow.

this sense, he argues, they were
realistic.

In

Duverger goes on to point

out that Stalin transformed the
Soviet Union from a revolutionary

exporter of ideas into a citadel,
concerned chiefly with safety and
security.

And perhaps it had some further
lessons to teach the Chines e

and the underdeveloped states.

But it no longer had anything to teach

the Communists of the developed Western
states.

They were on their own

This stems from the fact that the Soviets
refused any liberalization:

Communists of the West were only allowed to develop
to a level that

corresponded with the level of development in the East,
which, he holds
was untenable in the long run.

In saying "no" to the USSR on the Czech

invasion, the Western Communists opened the road to a new
development.

Post-Invasion Fallout

After the dust had settled, the August international crisis

threatened Communist assumptions and purposes in four areas,

1)

-Foreign

policy, 2) Party unity, 3) domestic alliance strategy, and 4) doctrine.

Foreign policy objectives endangered

.

The PCF was now anticipating

these setbacks in Europe:
.

.

Hostile forces would intensify the cold war and
blame the Communists.
The Center and Democratic Left in France would
expoit the crisis and urge closer links to the
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Atlantic Alliance.
.

Germany would now reject the
Nuclear nonProliferation Treaty.

Indeed, there was evidence
to justify these fears.

The NATO

Council of Ministers had gone on
record against further Soviet
actions
in Eastern Europe.
The U.S. had issued strong
warnings against
possible moves in Austria, Rumania
and Yugoslavia. Michel Debre, in
the afterrrath of the invasion,
had told the UN that a "fatal
shadow-

had been cast over detente.^G

idency

^^^^^ ^^^^

^^^^^^^^

^ ^^^^^

augured a return to cold-war tactics.

But Communist fears of a renewed cold
war proved unwarranted.

Within a few months, Debre would note
that Soviet intervention within
its bloc was not a new phenomenon, hardly
requiring a renunciation of

detente

In fact, the invasion only temporarily
interrupted the Franco-

.

Soviet relationship. 2 7
25

At the Council meeting Willy Brandt and Joseph
Luns were especially concerned that Western Europe not relax its
vigilance to a Soviet
threat.
See Le Monde November 18, 1968,
pp. 1 and 4.
,

25

Le Monde, January 4, 1959, p.

27

1.

Shortly after the Prague invasion, Franco-Soviet cooperation
continued its advance, proceeding from the basis of de Gaulle's
visit to
Moscow in June, 1955. By January, 1959, a joint Grande Commission
was
established between the two states to deal with economic, technical
and
other aspects of cooperation.
By early 1959, France ranked as the largest Western supplier of goods to the USSR. Le Monde, January 5-5,
1969, p. 5.
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PCF fears concerning
Ge™an behavior „ere .ore
valid.
There
was a stronger basis
for fearing that Bonn
„ouid no longer sign the
non-proliferation Treaty. Bonn's
adherence had been a long-ter™
goal
Of the rrench Co^unists.
The invasion, and the
subsequent proclamation
of the Brezhnev Doctrine,
heightened
giiLenea tears
fears in r^^
Germany ,(particularly In
the CDU) of a Soviet
action beyond the bloo.^^

ii£S£22^I£L-itOlES^
within the Party.

The international crisis
opened a rift

Roger Garaudy, a member of
the Political Bureau

(P.B.) and director of the

CeHr^jLlt^^d^^^^j^^;^^

(CEKM), attacked the Soviet
action because it seriously
ignored the world
movement. 23 At the other

extreme, a

te^W^reWu^on^ around

Jeanette Vermeersch-Thorez
accepted the Soviet rationale for
the invasion.
Soon afterward, Vermeersch-Thorez
resigned from the leadership;
Garaudy was expelled in 1970.

^^^^^ello^ Kurt Kiesmger worried about
the USSR's assertion
Articles 53 and 107 of the UN
Charter authoriz'nT
an action agaxnst a former enemy
state.
He further argued th^^
non-proliferation Treaty had already been
violated by SfsovLts r
thexr xnyasxon of Czechoslovakia,
since the nuclear powers hid Sven
a
''^'^ '° non-nuclear powers.
These guarantees were'
SemoTr^K? "
,f

aJLd
?hf MM

.

^hf^^oj^ets
r

?hat
.

d\\\arVri:"i9L";^

The Social Democrats in Germany
could never intervene in Germany under
cover of

^--^

--^

^^Le Monde, August 28, 1968, p. 2.
The logic of his position
would have ultimately led to a break with
the Soviets.

.
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^ii^^^H^-^teg^J;,^,^
^^^^^^^^^^
generally had „eX.o„ed the
original .Veprohation".
(.he first signs of
appreciable change by the
French Co^unists towards
Moscow since 1920)3
But the PCP.S approval
of the later
..pseudo-agreement" „as viewed
as a
retreat.
In effect,
ef-Fpri-t-h.^
c
the Socialists were
compelling the PCF to choose
either unity of the left
or obedience in principle
to the USSR: break
strongly and publicly with
the USSR or return to
the ghetto.
•

-,

•

Later,

it will be shown that
the .arch toward unity
recuperated fro. the

temporary traumas of 1968-69,
as long-term factors
reasserted themselves

jjoctrinal

question s.

Amid the turmoil of those
months, it is hard to

isolate any dramatic doctrinal
innovations emerging from the
Czech

"anifest.de Champi^nv, the Central
Committee. s articulation of pemocratie avancee
followed the Czech invasion by
,
four months,
but it owes its origins more
to the Hay-June events than
to the August
31
invasion.

But there were stirrings.

For example, an essay in Nouvelle

Critique, a journal for Party
intellectuals, conceded that the entry
of Soviet troops into Prague had
cast do.^t on the ability of Socialism
30,

,

Le Monde

,

September 7, 1968, p.

1.

31

The

international.

iManifesto has more domestic political
significance than
It will be examined further in the nex?
chapter.
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to assure Lasic rights to
its citizens:^^ a

valid polUical insight,

but hardly novel to those
familiar with Soviet repression.

The

article suggested a crisis in
world socialism and spoke of a
need to
adapt to a new epoch. New democratic
forms were arising which called
for revised theoretical analyses.

No conclusions were reached,
but

the essay called for further
reflection.

More significant than any form.al
doctrinal rethinking was a

gradual restructuring of the Communists'
self -identity
of the Party's purpose and scope.
USSR.

,

a

nationalizing

Surely there was no break with the

The French Communists continued to accept
the decisive role and

historical validity of the Soviet Party in the
world movement.
the infallibility of Soviet authority had
disappeared.

But

The CPSU was

only the first among many.

The trauma wrought by Czechoslovakia can perhaps be
understood

if one grasps the nature and role of tho Soviet patrie
in the eyes of

French Communists.

George Lichtheim suggests that historically Commu-

nists fell heir to a revolutionary movement in
situation.

33

a

non-revolutionary

Since there could be no genuine proletarian revolution

in France, this hope was transferred to the USSR as the "fatherland
of
32„
A summary of the essay appears in Le Monde, October
4,
p.

2.

33

George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France (New York:
Columbia Univeristy Press, 1965), pp. 70-71.

1958,
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the workers".

The Soviet
SnviV-h rir^-r^r.
Union appeared as the
embodiment of a revo-

lution which France had
HQ missed,
missed

nrh^„
k
other observers
term this "the mis-

placed identity of the PCF" or
"the adoption of a myth not
its o™".
The point is that events
in Pra^e undermined
this relationship.^^

The Communists have not
resolved the nature of their
national
identity.
The Party is capable of
fully meshing with a national
identity of France, and then reversing.
Even after the Czech invasion,
Rene Andrieu could say:
(The PCF) is not a national
party.
Our doctrine
holds that the workers of the
entire world are in
solidarity.
Even if a nation is a historical
reality, it is for us this powerful
solidarity of
all workers in the world, and
this solidarity primrily manifests itself in regard to the
USSR, the
iirst socialist state.
_

Finally, it must be emphasized, French
Communists (like all

other Communists except the Chinese) had
traditionally denied an aggressive, war-like intent to Soviet policies.

This, a.fter all, stemmed

from the USSR's inherent identity with-and
membership in-the so-

called "camp of peace".

In fact, much of the PCF's defense doctrine

Jean Daniel, editor of the independent left Le
Nouvel Observateur, holds that the lower ranks of the PCF
are far
Stalinist
than the leadership.
Whenever the party makes large shifts, certain
cells and federations will resist, and the Soviet
myth remains quite
alive.
Andre Harris and Alain de Sedouy, Voyage a I'i nterieur
du Parti
communiste (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974),
p .'''i2M~.

^e

Ibid.

,

p.

44.

'
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was predicted on a peaceful
Soviet Union, a nation which
surely posed
no threat to the peace of
Europe.
This assumption, too, was
to be

undermined by the demonstration
of raw force in CechoslovaKia.
(The
implications of this will be
discussed in the chapter on
defense
policy )
,

CHAPTER

V

THE POST-DE GAULLE
PERIOD

MgjLle rspectlves and

P^_^nr^r^uj^^^^^^

In the year following
Prague, the parties of
the Left inevit-

ably grew preoccupied
with new circumstances:
the reconstitution of
the
socialist Party, the PCF's
ManiSsted^O^aai^
3,,^,^^
^
world Conference of
Co^unist Parties in aune 1969.
By the spring of
that year, the Russians
themselves were preoccupied
with conflict on
the Sino-Soviet border,
an event which heightened
the urgency of their
su..ons for a Conference on
Security in Europe. Divisions
in the French
left over Czechoslovakia
receded in significance,^ as
far stronger forces were pushing for united
action. On April 29th, de Gaulle
withdrew
from French political life
after 11 years?
,

Pompidou vi^ctorlous.
for the Left.

The June election of Pompidou
was hardly a victory

The newly reconstituted
Socialist Party, replacing the

^" 'P"'^' '''''
^ustav Husak
replaced 'Subcek™%L^s''^
Socialists urged the Communists to
speak
out
bu? thfprr
J
but
the PCF refused,
arguing that Socialists were only usiL
the c^».h
issue as a pretext to dismiss the
PCF as a poliUcaf partne?
ifjto^dx' April 21, 1969, p. 21 and April
2^, 1969, p
11

f

L

2

.

majority of Frenchmen had voted "non"
on de Gaulle's
referendum for reform. He then renounced
hii^andate.
A
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old SFIO, did poorly.

But the PCF
Per hdemonstrated
its resurgence
fror
the chaotic days of
1968 by gathering
21 percent of the
vote for its
candidate, Duclos.^

-cto.,

It will be useful
to examine the
1969 ei..^election and Pompidou
's
.o

aete^i^e t.eir

e«e«s

on PCP .e.av.or

developments within the
Socialist Party
arty. itself
„nH
Itself undergoing
a metamorphosis in the wake of
Defferre's
rerre s rlef„=t
defeat, andj ^
follow the transitions
that led to the Unity
Congress of Epinay in
June, 1971.
,

The Soviets themselves,
speaking through Pravda,
viewed the

^"-leetion^

3s a defeat for
Atlanticist strategy.^

Socialist''otdL'a?:rL^Son°Lffgi^^iM^

-

rejected.

Yet

The

'^^M^H^^^

::c?alS:e^"
iiie ijerx vote
?he=L1t^
/.

~~:
was so splmter^ed t-ha-t- -m^^
campaign was a
disaster.
The PCF viewed Defferre's
can did^P^
Third Force notions of
^ "^^^e to revive old
the Das^ ^hJ f^^^^^^^^
""^^ ""^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ce into
hands of the Gaullis^s
the
Thl
I
"^^^^^"^ °^ ^^1-'
success but dirrenLr^omLe
?rde
de r"fl''-"''
Gaulle
the realm of foreign policy.
He was after
"'^^^
liquidated thf aI
ge^ian War and opened
^^.""^ new alternatives to Atlanticism.
See Le Monde
May 2, 1969 n
''''
'^^'^'^ ^^^^ thiT-^'
FrLc^s indep;nd;nt fo'rei"
f^^^' Pompidou's
new Governmenrhfd I sH^hf
'^^^"^^^^ was named
Foreign Minister w?th Dfh^- "°-''\'°r'
^haban-Delmas' being
named'prime Minister
?he PCF^t'oo
Schumann's new'
role in the ForeJ^MinLtrf
To "herhe'"''''^"'
^^P^^^^^^^d the old Third
Force tendencies
tJe M R ^
earlier era: submission to the
United St=.t-.. !L
rearmament of Germany.
See L'Humanite June 2.,
1959! p 7'
.

T

m

^

"v"''

S

L 1
^

f

,

4
_

Thus the Europeanist Pohrer
(candidate of the Center) was nn.hi.
See Le Monde June
^969

to reinsert France into
its old NATO role.

"
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it would be wrong to
conclude that the Soviets had
si.ply ordered the
PCF to abstain in the
Po.pidou-Pohrer

run-off of mid- June, a strategy

which helped assure a Gaullist
victory.

It has been argued here
that

the French Communists, since
their origins in the era of Lenin,
have

learned (perhaps intuitively, and
without Soviet prodding) to conform
their behavior to a worldwide
conception of strategy.
The leadership
of the French Party, given its
hostility to all "Third Force"
tendencies,
did not require instructions to
see that the immediate danger
was that

France might fall back into its Atlantic
orbit, undoing much of the

Gaullist legacy.

This perception, and the behavior flowing
from it,

demonstrate a genuine and objective affinity
between the Soviet and
French Communist visions of the international
environment

.

And the PCF's

abstention did go a long way towards assuring
Pompidou 's victory.
this sense, it was

e

In

strong rejection of Atlanticism and a European

orientation for France.

However, there was a fear that the new Pompidou regime
would

move in a European direction that would be more receptive
to an enlarge,ment

of EEC or the entry of Britain.^

But these fears were offset

by the fact that the Pompidou Government essentially retained
its
5

Communists also feared a rapprochement between Petite Europe
and the U.S. stemming from the new post-de Gaulle leadership.
See
Le Monde , July 25, 1969, p. 11.

.
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Gaullist stance vis-a-vis the
Soviets
±«Lb.

Bv the
By
thP 1970s,
iQin. ^ one could
say

that the USSR and France
supported:
.

.

.

.

.

Similar positions on Indo-China.
A European Conference on
Security in Europe.

Israeli withdrawal from territory
acquired
quxrea
after 1967.
The new and historic Soviet-West
German
relationship of August, 1970.

An end to blocs in Europe,

Social_jemocracy prevails_mj3errT^

If the Communists welcomed the

departure of de Gaulle from the Fifth
Republic (viewing it as a further
reason for a renewed unity dialogue
with the Socialists), they had

almost as much reason to applaud events
in Germany.

In October,

1969,

four months after Pompidou' s election,
Willy Brandt came to power.
This marked the first SPD Government since
establishment of the Bonn

Republic.

The policies of the CDU had led nowhere,
in their analyses,

except to militarization of the regime.

Perhaps there would be a

Tournant a Bonn

5tIn mid-October,

with the USSR.
7

1970 Pompidou concluded further ties in Moscow

.

This was the Treaty of Cooperation, where the ERG
recognized
the World War Il-imposed frontiers of the Oder-Neisse
line and 'those between the two Germanys, and affirmed its renunciation
of nuclear weapons.
These, we have seen, were long-term foreign policy
outcomes sought by
the French Communists.
Of course the PCF wanted Pompidou to go further,
namely to recognize the GDR and to take positive steps to organize
a European Security Conference.

L'Humanite , October 4, 1959,

pp.,

1

and

3.
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It was hoped that the
new Government would
quickly sign the

non-Proliferation Treaty, and renounce
the "Hallsteln Doctrine-.^
Ten days after Brandt was
elected Chancellor (he had
just indicated a
readiness to negotiate with the
GDR), the PCF issued a
joint declaration with the DKP (German
Co^unist Party) setting forth co^on
views
on these topics. 10

For the French Communists,
the significant step

was the 1969 settlement between
the two German states.
to European security.

This was basic

The Political Bureau (B.P.)
welcomed the event

coming 25 years after the end of
the Second World War
a hope for a new beginning
in Europe.

-

-

which offered

It was now logical for France

to display a similar realism
and recognize the GDR„

One would also

note that this rapprochement between
Willy Brandt and Willy Stoph in

Erfurt had a symbolic significance
in that Social Democrats were talking
to Communists, which, after all, is
precisely what the PCF was proposing

inside France.

The discussion thus far has described French
Communist reaction
to the more significant international
events of the 1968 to 1970 period.

Where possible, this behavior has been
related to the PCF's links to
9

The Doctrine required the Federal Republic to
sever ties with
those states recognizing the GDR (except for
the USSR).
For the PCF
It was a further manifestation of Bonn
s fret ens ion to represent all
Germany.
'

10^

German Communists were a mere shell of the pre-war KPD.
It
was shown earlier that PCF international policies had
supported and cooperated with Communists in Germany as far back as the years
following
b
^
World War I.
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the Soviet Communists and
to its dialogue with
the Socialists.
It
Should now he clear that as
an opposition Party, the
PCF had very definite international policy
objecxives.
Despite their opposition status,
the French Communists were
capable of behaving as a
formidable political actor, invoking leverage
where they could.

Next

I

will examine some newly articulated
Communist strategies

for achieving power during
this period.

While the question may appear

domestic in scope, it has
international dimensions:
1)

The very advent of Communists
to power inside
a Western European state
would have international siginificance.il
^

2) Useful comparisons can be made between
French
Communist conceptions and those emerging
in

other key West European Parties.

Lejfanifeste de Champ_igny.

This document of the Central Committee
was

issued December 5-6, 1968, a mere four
months after Prague and six months

following the May -June events.

Here, the Communists set forth their

program for an "Advanced Democracy", calling
for

a

unity of the left:

an announcement of the Party's readiness
to work with all working class

and democratic forces.

11™

•

m

This was discussed
the sections on the Liberation and on
May, 1968, where it was shown that insurrectionary
strategy was rejected.
Later, the international significance of events in
Portugal and
Chile will be discussed, in that they affected thinking
on the left regarding peaceful strategies for achieving and sustaining power.

'

Ill

telMcee

«as not a Mueprint
.or socialise.

»

„3s

transitional in nature,
setting forth an
intermediate stage.
It did
"Ot i.pl, an end to
capitalist o^ership nor
to control of the
state
by the wording cXass.
Kather, it „as designed
to change the relation
Of forces between
classes and pxepare
prepare tne
12
the w.v
^
way towards
socialism.

In its specific
proposals, the manifesto
offered little that
was ne. in foreign
policy or domestic social
programs.
That had all
been set forth in the
February 2., 19S8, Declat2ticn__
„ith the
FGDS ten months earlier."
Apparently May, 1968 had
confirmed to the
Co^unists that the class struggle
had not been attenuated in
advanced
capitalist society.
What was lacRing then,
and needed now, was a new
and deeper alliance of
all forces.
The class struggle would
follow a

peaceful road.

This was only a reaffirmation
of the thesis emerging

from the World Conference
of 81 Parties in 1960.

But the peaceful road

was not just the parliamentary
road: it was the class struggle
in all

for^short

Ji,

of civil war.

Iftiie the

Februa'ry'vf 196"! p!'"''

all parti!s'or?h^

Communists

^ged cooperation

with

''""^"^ Committee, L-Humani -

'°

reaffirmation of the parliamentary road,
embracing
"''Santzatlons and trade unions.
'
It pledged

reinec^ f
that of the SFIO, which had earlier
confirmed its support for a transformation to a see ety with a socialist
character.
In Tiersky's ^ds
the PCF was expanding the base
of those it sought to be the tribune
of'
See his essay "French Communism
in 1976", Problems of Com munism
Tan"ary-February, 1976, vol. XXV,
38-t5.
pp.

~

.

112

all elemencs, they
continued to ^nc.ist
^"n^is^ nr.
on their own decisive
role a
reaff^tio. of thei. van^a.a
position.- rur.^er
i.,Uc..ioJ of
the new Cha^pigny
strategies and the suspicions
they generated on the
Democratic Left will be
discussed lat.:er
•

If the new program had
little to offer in terms of
new international policy, in what sense
did it have international
significance?
The important point is
that the PCF's embracing of
Democrati™cee

was reflected interntionally
in the sense that it

wI^^^^Z^^T^,,

thinking of other West European
Communist Parties, such as the
Spanish
CP and the PCI, the latter
of which would go on to
formulate its Historic Compromise.
Essentially, the new program was
a step deriving from
the new logic of the global
system and from some reassessment
of the
role of the working class and
its allies as driving forces in
achieving
power.

15

The 1969 World Co nference

If there was a new logic to the world
global system at the tiime
of Champigny, one would expect to see
it manifested at the World
14
L
15

Humanite

,

December 7, 1968, pp

,

5

.

and 6.

^^^2 ^2 not to suggest a concerted effort in social
policy,
ihe PCF and PCE, for instance, declared
their aim to extend the socializing of ma]or enterprises.
But the PCI's Historic Compromise had no
sucn plans to extend the public sector in Italy.
Jean-Pierre Chev§ne"lent, Les Socialistes, les Com mu nistes et
le s autres (Paris: Aubier
Montaigne, 1977), p. 200.

~

~
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conference of 65

Co^nist

Parties held June
6,

did not emerge at this
Conference.

in Moscow.

Nevertheless, the European

Unity

Co«-

ntst., despite other
differences which will be
discussed below, did
agree that the era was one
in which capitalise
.ight be isolated if
they could somehow extend
their own forces to the
right and integrate
their parties into the
nationalist reality of capitalist.
In France,
as we have seen, this
would require efforts to open
up a democratic
perspective and an alternative
government program, hoping to
gain power
with a parliamentary majority including social democrats.

The Soviet Communists were
not entirely persuaded by this
thesis.

At the Conference, Brezhnev's
speech scored social democracy's

role, particularly in the realm
of foreign policy, where it had
mortgaged itself to anti-communism
and Atlanticism.
The Soviet leader did
concede, however, that Western
Communists should be prepared to lead
a
joint struggle with other forces
willing to struggle against imperialism.

Another issue at the conference concerned
the nature of the
World Movement.

The Italians prevailed in that the
Conference conceded

that there was indeed no center to the
World Movement.

The old-style

model of democratic centralism, which once
operated globally, no longer

applied to the International relations of
parties.

Questions of prin-

ciple would not be resolved by votes among various
national Communist
Parties.

One might say that Communist Parties, in asserting
their own

sovereignty, were behaving
™uch in the nature of
nation states at any
world foru..
I„ a sense, the „B9
Conference was not enunciating
a new
doctrine, rather, it was
confirming the new reality
of relations then
existing between Communist
Parties at the dawn of the
1970s.
The fact
that the PCI refused to
sign the ^jor document of
the Conference, further confirmed that the World
Movement would, in effect,
allow an'internal opposition.
This was the notorious
factionalism decried by Lenin.
The PCI reused to submit
to the democratic-centralist
discipline of
an international body, under
the argument that such an
international
body no longer existed.

^SJIllJiff^E^nce^^

assessing the relations

of Western European Communist
Parties to the Soviets and to interna-

tional questions, one must note
certain perceptual and policy differences between the Western Parties
themselves.

Here, we are concerned

particularly with the 1959-1970 period.

Although, both the PCF and PCI agreed on
a general need for

unity of action, at least where it was possible,
the Italian Communists
went on to stress certain persistent differences
within what they
term "the international workers movement",.

Speaking broadly, it could

be said that in 1969 the PCI manifested a
deeper distrust of Soviet

policies and behavior than did the PCF.
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1)

?SSS^I,^^21^iste^.

The Italian Co™«„ists
did not chal-

lenge this basic Co^unist
perspective.

I„ fact, thei. lon,-te™
success depended on a
normalisation of relations
between the two blocs
Kather, the PCI feared
bipolarity - or the logic of
a bipolar concept
Of the world. But there
was a fear that a
U.S.-Soviet dialogue ™ight
lead to an ultimate bipolarity,
which would paralyze the
autonomy of
other states (and, by
implication, political parties)"

l2ter;PH3yjle,latlo^

2)

The PCI in arguing for far
greater

autonomy and independence at
the World Conference, went
so far as to
approve certain of the bold
initiatives taken by Czech Communists.
In
its view, developments in
Czechoslovakia concerned not just that
country, but posed problems of
principle to the entire movement.
This view

was not openly shared by the

3) China.

PCF.''"'^

The Sino-Soviet dispute was perceived
differently by

.^^^^Pf ^^P^^T^^^ °n bipolarity was spelled out by PCI General
Secret.r..
Secretary Luigi
Longo
his speech on the eve of the Moscow
Conference
See Le^Monde
May 29, 1959, p. i.
the 1969-1970 period, the French
Communists did not especially perceive this
danger in Peaceful Coexisten
ce. _i^ater we will see they became
quite emphatic that detent^ in no
way implied a freezing of the status
quo in Europe.

m

.

m

17
"^I^^.^^^^^h did not raise the Czech issue at the Moscow meeting
M
George Marchais,
now Acting Secretary General (during the illness
of
Rochet), explained this by noting that 1)
the Czechs asked that it not
^^^^^
^°''^d
interference in Czech affairs and
ot ppi^^"^'
<i} PCF participation
would emphasize common interests with other parties
not differences.
^.

'

'
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the two mass Communist Parties
of Europe.

The PCF at this stage
was

prepared to go along with the
Soviet drive to expel China
from the
world movement.
In fact, French Communists
had consistently supported
the Soviet side in the dispute
with China.

The point is that the PCF

firmly rejected "anti-Sovietism"
(although paradoxically, retaining
its own right to criticize
aspects of Soviet reality).

The PCI of course rejected
the idea that Mao was a new Lenin

and opposed Chinese efforts to split
parties of other nations.

would not support the expulsion of China
from the movement.

But

it

Rather, it

saw a need to seek out and learn the
objective causes of the Chinese

development.

Any effort to remove China would only
be an excuse for

the Soviets to reinstate the norms and
hegemony of the past in inter-

party relations.
Europe.

The world conference highlighted certain key
concep-

tual differences between the PCF and the Soviets
on the one hand, and
the Italian Communists on the other regarding
Europe,
18

The Italian

Some hold that this support arose from their own
irritation
with domestic Maoists operating to their left in
the 1960s.
But the
argument is not entirely persuasive.
The PCI also had a Maoist movement
to contend with, yet it was far more tolerant
of Chinese behavior,
Tiersky argiies that the PCF is a beneficiary of the
Sino-Soviet dispute,
since it gains international bargaining leverage with the
Soviets by
supporting their side.
Some argue that the PCF would continue to oppose
the Chinese line even if the Soviets reached a truce.
The point is
made by Francois Fejto, who attributes it to a private source
(and it
is of course ^highly speculative).
See his The French Communist Party
and the Crisis of International Communism, p, 192.
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Co^unists saw ..siealXy
progressive aspects to
European integration
although they refined
critical of EEC

domination by capitalist
forces

in fact,
.y 1..3, the PCI was now participating
in Co^nity decisionmaking.
The PCI even saw the
Co«n Market as a potentially disrup-.

tlve force in weakening
the U.S. domination of the
Continent?" The
French Co-unists, on the
other hand, viewed EEC as
a cover for American
interests and cold-war strategy.

Conmm ist-S

Relations

in

the Post-de Gaulle Period

Having reviewed international
essentials of the period following
the departure of de Gaulle,
it is now appropriate to
return to the dynamic of unity between the
two leftist parties in France.
Chapter VI will
discuss, the unified Socialist
Party, born at the Epinay-sur-Seine
Congress in 1971, and explore
the Prograrrune^^ which
emerges one year
later.
Intricacies of the PCF/PS dialogue
will be examined only to the
extent that they shed light on
shifting international perspectives.

^^^-^^^1^^1^11.1^^^^

Paralleling their unity dialogue

with the Communists, the Socialists were
also striving to restructure
19

See Blackmer in Blackmer and Kriegel,
pp. .19-21, which has a
good discussion of Italian Communist attitudes
towards the European
Community.
20

.

This latter perception, we will see, places the PCI view of
Europe somewhat closer to French Socialist thinking.
The SFIO had generally viewed an integrated Europe as an important "third force" between
the two superpowers.
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their own party, gathering
together the various
federations and clubs
that comprised the democratic
left.
And the need was compelling
indeed,
considering that in the Presidential
elections of 1969 they could
muster a mere five percent of
the vote.
Ultimate
uxLimare fb
Pq .n,
emergence as the
major electoral force in France
by
Lilt: mid-197011IJ.U
K
ij/uo win
y the
Will be
an important
sub-theme, explaining much of
the reciprocal behavior of
the PCF in
the ensuing years.

In Chapter II it was shown
that the PS was the heir of
a cer-

tain historical tradition.
ily

But not all segments of the
Party necessar-

agreed on the nature of this legacy.

Hence, one must always bear

in mind the heterogeneous
currents that flow within the Party
(even

after the unity forged at Epinay).

It will be helpful to identify

briefly some of the groupings, since
they will be referred to in

f,a-

ture discussions.

Thierry Pfister suggests three distinct
currents that were ulti-

mately grafted on to the old SFIO of Pierre
Mauroy and Gaston Defferre?^
The Mitterrand current

.

This group combines a radical and

Republican tradition embodied in the clubs of the Convent
i on des ins titu tions republicaines

(CIR).

It developed largely as a response to

'^"'

"Les Socialistes (Paris: Albin Michel,
1967), pp. 17-20.
Pfister is a journalist with Le Mond e and has written widely
on the
French Left.
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Gaullism, or what used to be
te^ed the GauUist coup d'etat
of 1958
and the personalist regime
that followed?^
2)

TheJ^ERES.a™t.

Rallying around Jean-Pierre
Chevenement,

Didier Motchane and Alain
Go.ez« CERES was once described
as a "party'
within a party"?^ In a sense
this is apt. in that it defines
its o™
doctrines, stages its own
meetings, edits its own publications
and in
effect operates as a monolithic,
lively and dynamic bloc within
the PS.
CERES began as a study group
of intellectuals during 1966 in
the 14th
A rrondissement

of Paris.

Its influence grew significantly,
and it played

pivotal role at the historic Epinay
Congress by throwing its support
to Mitterrand?^

CERES remains essentially a Paris-located
force, lacking any

real base outside the City, but is
is a force to be reckoned with.

Its

22

ma:or goal was to establish new institutions
with a
justice, but not necessarily to break with
'^j;?;5,':°^°^^^^°" °^
capxtalxsm.
Mitterrand's political insight
gmg majority encompassing the entire Left. was to conceive a new emer23.

All of whom are graduates of ENA.

Maurice Duverger, Lettre ouverte aux socialistes
(Paris~
Editions Alb in Michel, 1975), p. 103.
.

25^
Guy Mollet and Alain Savary had 46 percent of
the votesMitterrand and Gaston Defferre had 45 percent.
CERES, with 8.5 percent, was thus the balance of power.
Thanks to it, Mitterrand ber^ame
.irct Secretary in 1971.
Chevenement was placed in chargp of the
Party Program.
By the Grenoble Congress of June, 1973, CERES
comprised
one-quarter of the P.S. Executive Bureau.

.

12 0

internatioiial perspective.
„ill be discussed further
on.
notes, it adheres to a
Marxist ideology which
often
tarianisn,.

As Pfister

approaches secOr as Buver.er puts it.
"it see.s to reconcile
a .auchist^

temperament with a Communist
discipline".

Ideologically and strategically,
CERES seeks to transcend a
.ere electoral alliance
with the Communists.
Rather, its basic calling
is to heal the historic
rift of Tours: to reunite
the working class
movement of France.
3) C urrent autoge stionaire

This derives from the tradition
of

.

Proudhon, seeking a decentralized
society of worker management,
in the state and the
industrial enterprises.

both

Its roots are in the old

PSU, and today it unites
around Michel Rocard and the CFDT
labor syndicate

The Congress of Issy-les Moulineaux
in July, 1969 marked a first

stage in the gradual rebuilding
of the Socialist left, even though
Mit-

terrand's forces and the other currents
described above had not yet

been brought into the Party.

Alain Savary was named First Secretary

of the new PS, replacing Mollet's rule
of 23 years.

Much of the debate

at the time concerned the wisdom of
negotiating a unity agreement with

Duverger, Lettre ouverte
27
„

tne top
maintain.

.

,

p.

103.

^^^s is often termed "unity at the base, rather
than unity at
Socialism is impossible in France without this unity
thev
^
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the Communists.^^

Given these various currents
in the French Left, „e
can now
return to the
^Lue csociaiists
Son' ai i
dialogue
wxLii thp
=.r,^
Lne Ppp
rLJ: and
5 c with
examine points at
issue between the two
parties.
c~-t-c-

»

i

Many of the obstacles to
unity during this period arose
fro.
domestic politics disagreements.
For example, with their
Manifeste de
Ch£IBpignZ the Communists had shifted
slightly from their earlier electoral and parliamentary strategy,
arousing the suspicions of the
demo-

cratic left.

The Manifeste invoked a new,
and sometimes ominous rhe-

toric concerning the struggle of
the popular masses, suggesting
possible confrontations against the
power of the monopolies.
This led

many Socialists to ask if the PCF
wanted power inside a genuine coalition, or if it was merely seeking
a new relation of forces in its
favor

power with others, or power within the
Left?
for what purposes?

And if the latter, power

And there were other ambiguities in the
Manifeste.

It stated that subversion and violence
by "forces hostile to socialism"

would legitimate forceful countermeasures
by the new regime.

Unexpres-

sed was any definition of the true rights
of a minority under the fu-

ture regime. And what possibilities did
such a minority have for re28^.

Pierre Mauroy argued it was risky to negotiate with
the PCF
from weakness, when the democratic left was dispersed,
especially with
Mitterrand's forces outside the fold. Otheis favored immediate
unity
discussions.
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.=ta.Ushi„, UseXf someday
as
constitute the -suhversion

a .a.o.ity,

re.er.ed to.

what activities
These „ere reaXX, th»

«ul.

oM

questions that always
seeded to arise when the
"roie^ri^..
invoked, a doctrine the
Communists, oven
even today,
todav have never renounced.
,

The Socialists, in
elaborating their own theory
of unity
Claimed to seek only an
alliance of e,uals.« But
later, when the
communists hegan to note
steady Socialist successes,
they would accuse
the PS of seeking hegemony
within the alliance.
-

•«H2SS-!£_^".

in October,

1971, the Communists, now
under the lea-

dership Of Marchais, issued
their

2i^:H2i£2_P2PUlaire. entitled

J^osamme-l^jouve^^

"C^^

Unlike the Hanifeste,

it offered more possibilities
for a dialogue with the PS.

Its foreign policy positions
were not a major break with
per-

spectives set forth in the 1968
Common Declaration.^"

Nevertheless,

(Paris: Artheme Favard,
B''^9rTh,?T"' iCi*iiijiLi2.^aucAe
^lH^nce strategy was to obtain a' leading
"^"""""^
But dM^h

1975)
role

"^^'^'^

P^-^t^ss behave any differently?

Lazitch argues
^^"^
hegemony, but their methods of seeing
it
Since
considered all alliances temporary.
Communists
would
us!
their own methods to weaken their
partners placing their own people in
the camp of their partners (and
future enemies) such as Otto GroUe^h"
in Germany or Fierlinger in
Czechoslovakia. See Branko Lazitch
.'^"^^''"'"^"^^
<P,ris: Editions
tha?'-;t

?
Lentn

:

Mg^-gf:"l9.,Sf^:—
See Chapter III.

^^
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tne.e was e change of
e.pKasis. a .operation
i„ certain approaches
Por example,
ISes OecXaration caUed
.or an i„edla.e
withdrawal
by France from the AtlantnV
i.n,.
Par-t
Pact.
'Changerjlej^" „as softer
in tone
It oniy called upon
Prance to take steps to
disengage from the Pact
One can debate the true
significance of a modification
such as this.
But in analyzing Co«nist
pronouncements, one must
attribute some
Significance to even subtle
changes in emphasis.
The policy remained
the same, but its mode
of expression
exDression ^r^.
.r.^^
was softened.
Other foreign
policy positions, while
essentially unchanged, were
expressed in a
.ore reasonable manner: France
should not break unilaterally
with the
common Market, but should
strive to revise the Rome
Treaty.
Regarding
the Middle East, it confirmed
Israel's right to exist and
recognized
the national rights of all
peoples in the region.
These were all
positions which at least allowed
room for negotiation with the
PS,

which was itself undergoing a
major transformation in the latter
part
of 1971.

Th^ongress of

Uni ty at Epinay
j_Jun^2iZl.

turning point for the Democratic
Left.

fpinay marked a major

Here, Mitterrand emerged as

leader of the new PS, combining the
forces of the CIR, CERES and other
left currents, and narrowly overcoming
the old Mollet-Savary majority.

Equally important, the Congress called
for a Program of Government

„
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with the PCF, a basic
goal of Mitterrand sinee 1965.^1

Eplnay was not a forum
for enunciating new
foreign policy
initiatives, nevertheless,
various perspectives did
e.erge.^^ Contention
arose over the Atlantic
Alliance: whether Prance
should stay in it
withdraw unilaterally, or
work for the simultaneous
dissolution of
both blocs.

Mitterrand supported a mainstream
position (along with the
Savary leadership and Guy
Mollet as well as Mauroy and
Defferre),
urging the simultaneous dissolution
of the two military blocs in
Europe
To withdraw alone implied
neutralism, which was unthinkable,
since it
would leave France without any
defense policy at all.

CERES, and a

strong current within CIR, urged
a unilateral withdrawal,
assuming a
breakdown of future European security
talks.
(This was also the
31to Q

Ms

•

P^''!^ oriented the Party strongly to the left:

infusion

^

f

'"f

""'^'"^

°f
'

committing

^y"^-- Mitterrand ani

^""^y' "^"y °f ^hom were radicalFrank Wilson argues that on some
issues It r^oved even further to the
left than the p!f: autoges^ion
unionization of the military and a renewed
anticlericalii^^^'in^ resolution was narrowly defeated condemning
social democracy and calling on the PS
to withdraw from the Socialist
"
The French Left u_n der the Fifth Republic"
K^"
the "Two Decades— Gaullism" Co-^^n'e,
P^P^: ^^""^^^
!
SUNY Brockport,
N.Y., June 9-11, 1978, p. 24
32
Thus certain ritualistic postions of
the left were voiced
First Secretary Savary scored French foreign
policy, citing the "concealed war in Chad" as well as Government
tolerance towards Franco
Spam, Portugal, South Africa and the Greek Colonels.
See Le Monde '
June 13-14, p.
6.

""1
^ed by the
^h. upheavals of May, 1958.

soc^TT

3

'

^

.
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position

the Communists).

But the pfrfq
«ut
CERES proposal was
defeated- a

prior collective security
agreement in Europe
r^urope was a condition
h-.precedent
to any withdrawal
from the Alliance
dnce.
CERFS m^.
LLRES
ultimately
abandoned its
unilateral position.
.

Regarding Europe, there was
no consensus, but all
factions
agreed that certain
guarantees were needed if
the powers of the
Community were to be broadened.

As a result of Epinay,
the path was now clear
for a progra^atic

confrontation with the PCF.

Nevertheless, Mitterrand chose
th IS occa-

sion to define the limits
to the field of negotiations,
"
stating
g "Nous
ne changerons pas de camp "

The 1969 Referendum on Europe

Between Epinay and the signing of
the Programme commun

a

year

later, there arose an important
test of PCF-PS ability to work
together
toward common purposes in foreign
policy, despite allegiances to
rival
33
'^^ging a rejection of blocs
and alliances, the PS was now
J"^ where it had
in a position
to conceive a new defense policy
for France
and resolve the issue of nuclear
weapons. At this stage the new Par^v
had not yet begun to consider such
issues.

^

^""^^P?^^^' P- 379.
This was the dilemma regarding any
reconciliation of international positions
by the two parties: Lir
ultimate identifications with the different
camps of East and West.
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ca.ps.

The test ca.e fro™
Pompidou.

The

Gove^ent

had. of course
'
not overlooked these
debates on the left regarding
Europe and dlfferences with the Co-unlsts.
Thus Po.pldou was able
to place the t«o
parties in contention by
announcing
Referendim on
nn r
^ a ^ererendum
Europe
March of

m

1972

Both leftist parties opposed
the Referendum since it
amounted
to a vote-of-confidence
for the regime.

tially supported EEC and
could not vote

Yet the PS leadership essen-

'W'.

Hence they called for

ahstention.3^ After all, EEC had
been formed years ago; why
vote on
it now?
The Communists on the other
hand, decided on a "Non"-vote.

Abstention was hardly a rebuff to
the Pompidou Government.

It was

insufficient because it indicated
indifference to the masses of people
on what, really was a plebiscite.
How could the masses be neutral
on
what they were struggling against?^^
Thus .the Referendum became not only
35
."^ "^""^^ expansion of EEC, British membership,
and fur^?^^^d^^i"t-g^^tion.
Many viewed it as a device to undermLe ^h^H
mine
the delicate PCF-PS negotiations
then underway: a domestic poS"'^'"^
^^'^^^
^
policy

I

thpr.

InTtilt™

S--- f--^

35_

Socialist Party of this period had almost
a generation
thinking over the issue of Europe. The
old veterans of the
fJP
SFIO from the days of Mollet considered
the Treaty of Rome as one of
^""^^^^^
achievements.
The new generation susllrl"" /IrT^l^
pected
EEC of giving free-play to the penetration
of Europe by American
corporations.
For them, any action on Europe had to
be linked to the
content of the undertaking.
They would not yield their options merely
^
to build Europe.
.

37„
J:

p.

7.

or a summary of these views, see Le Monde

,

March 29, 1972,

.
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a

stu^Iin,

between the two parties
in their ais=u..io„s
towards
a Co_on Program,
but it beca.e a sy^olic
test of strength as well.^S

A full discussion of

Co.unist and Socialist
attitudes towards

Europe will appear in Chapter
VIII.

nevertheless, these debates
durin,

the post-Epinay period
are instructive.

They highlight the very
dif-

ferent perspectives through
which the two parties arrived
at political
decisions. And to .any, these
debates raised the question:
could the
two parties ever hope to
govern jointly.

There were two separate, but

related, issues raised by the
Referendum:
.

.

Entry of Britain to EEC.

Expansion of EEC powers (the issues
of French
sovereignty)

The Communists advanced four
objections to Britain's entry:

Sj^cions

of the reformist Lahonr P..^.

The PCF was naturally

sceptical regarding arguments that the
Left would be strengthened somehow if -the power of the Party of
Harold Wilson" joined EEC. Marchais
38

P°f"^ is that both parties feared any attempt by the
other ^to monopolize the terrain on the
Left.
Thus Mitterrand had from
txme-to-time said openly that he sought a
new equilibrium on the Left
to demonstrate that Socialists
could reconquer a large share of the
audience in France. And the Communists
would soon begin posing' the
same question: were their potential
alliance partners seeking to gain
power jointly, or were they seeking to
demonstrate their own dominance
in an intra-left rivalry?
Some of these issues are addressed by the
socialist Claude Estier. See Le Monde April
,
1, 1972, p. 5.
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insisted tnat entrv

o-F

•

^

reinforce the Atlantic

35

MXiance.

The POP „as p.ep„ea
to cooperate „ith
Socialists in Prance
(Who ha. heen essentially
ra.icali.ea in recent
.ears,. Bnt t^::;:::.
-t social democracy e^odied
in the Labour Party
„as another matter;
It remained deeply
suspect.

2'

Britain_a^^^^con^^

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
certain non-.onopoly
sectors of Trench industry
to disappear, creating
une.ploy.ent and dislocations
in Prance.
P.rther„re. Britai„.s presence would Place
demands on European
agricultural producers to
lower
their prices.
This would harm French
farmers.

3'

IhS.^P2£S£^L^OHE2PS»i5^

Entry Of Britain into EEC
was a

prelude to an integrated
defense system, integrated
nuclear weapons and
possibly even a sharing of
weapons with the FRG.
In Communist eyes it
was not far-fetched to
think that closer economic and
political ties by
Britalr^ to the Contin ent would
ultimately draw that nation closer
to

''"^ distrusted the
'
'
Anglo-Saxon a.ffiniry
i?y the
tne si-caned
so-called "special relationship"
with the [J S
'^^'^^'^
acc^pt^^StSh e;t;y n'
Tp^rtiaT^r^r^'°
P°^^^
°^ Germany.
See Roy Macridis
i
mil
(Englewood Clik, N.. /p.enSce^^n

ILTsTTs

'.^^^^^.^^^.^

.

unrealistic to expect the PS to share this
hostility.
Onlv the
Only
theT^Rpf^
CERES faction was hostile to British
reformism.
L'

Human ite

,

April 4, 1972, p.

5.

,
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Europe in rhe realm
of defense.

—

^^^^^^^^£j:^^^g^i^g£^^ernocrac yV
.

The
Ihe dP
n nConstitution
de Gaulle

restricted the prerogatives
of parliament ciiiu
and periodically
periodical
.
made
direct, plebis
citary appeals to the
public
public.
Pn^
+
But to the Communists,
these were pseudo
appeals to the general
win
will.
The communists,
claiming a more Jacobin
inheritance, saw themselves
as defender^^
renaero of th.
r
k.
the Republican
representai

•

awa. ..o. .a3o. decisions
o. state. .Ve..e.„«
.
Of re,Ut.a«o...
Since t.e regime a.so
.ept .ts citizens aioo.
^o™
the state, xt „as a
caricature of democracy
to offer the™ a periodic

-ght

to re.pond on national
policy questions, such
as entry of Britain

"here they lacked any
^'^
.cans to be genuinely
informed.

Despite their abstention
on the Referendum, the
Socialists did
42

See L'Human ite, April
19
1979 n q ,u ^""^
cited a Br itislTGBlJiF^^nt
Lite PanPr,,;
'"'^ '^^"^
tion.
In Germany, Fr.nz-Soseph
^°°P^^^Str^nl
f
of nuclear effort by
^^^^^
P°°li^g
^
Britain and
u^''°
the Bundeswehr with
^ave provided
nuclear we.non''*
^'^"^ "^^^ f^-^
that-ThTp^Idou Lveriment was cov't?
covertly promoting a new EDC.
See
^iLH]£!!£2ite, April
•

'

_

31,

1972''p!'2'" '''''' '°

'^"'"^^ Committee, in

''~y^

PoliticsrFl'ncelL's"o1°\?t^le'r'
_jnce ^Boston. Little Brown and

Co.,

^Humanite

I

"-^Y
1968), pp.

,

March

Ehrmann,
g-.u and
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not share these
perspectives
txves.
P

Ac, early
As
as 1968 they had
observed

Britain's retrenchment,
its revised woria
world role
role, and
.nH even a
loosening of
the historieauy .lose
ties to the U.S.: a
shiftin, towards Europe
Th.s. in fact, had led
the democratic left
in Prance to oppose
de

Gaulle's earlier rejections
of Britain.

Socialist opinion in Prance

.hcreasingly felt that the
old London-Washington
Axis, based on a
Shared political outloo..
military policy and financial
viewpoint, „as
weakening. Perhaps the U.S.
had at one time granted
Britain a certain
privileged position in exchange
for its political
support, as well as
its bases and protection
throughout the Co-onwealth.
But a shrinking
Empire and a weakening of
the Pound had undermined
Britain's value to
the U.S.'^^

^^^^-i^^^i2I^^l^£^^

The Referendum to broaden
EEC was being

proposed by a Gaullist Government.

But as Debre reminded everyone,

Gaullists had always been true
to French sovereignty, opposing
delegations of authority belonging to
national governments.^^ They had
always
insisted on the strict operation
of the unanimity principle in
supranational institutions. Europe would
continue to be based on governmental
45
pp.

1

and 2!^

^^"^ Dabernat's essay in Le Monde, January
14-15, 1958,

45
^^"^^'^
^^^^ of its
suDranat.•n^.^''^'
supranational essence, compelling his alliesP^^^S^^
to renounce the rule of
m^ority voting in the Council of Ministers.
See Le Monde, April 14
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agreement wherever vital questions
were at issue.

Thus the Po.pidou

leadership hardly needed lessons
in Gaullism fro. the
Communists.

But these Gaullist arguments
were not sufficiently reassuring
to the Communists for two reasons:
1)

National independence had always been
a rallying cry of the

Communists in the post-war years.

Reading ?CF rhetoric on the topic,

it often seemed exaggerated and
demagogic.

As an opposition Party,

they are not the policy-makers of France
(and they are a Party whose
own independence had often been
questioned in the past).^^
1972 they had a genuine stake in the question.

deliverance

.from

But in

Now they saw a possible

their traditional opposition status, a chance
to be

projected into a Governmental role.

As potential policymakers, they

would have to champion national independence.

An isolated leftist

Government, operating in a supranational' European regional
body, would

require full sovereignty to enact the transformations the
Left had in
mind for France.

M-8

Thus a broadened EEC posed a potential threat to

47

Of course they were often the derivative beneficiaries of
(^ullist assertions of national independence, as in the withdrawal
from
NATO in 1955.
48

The 14-member Commission in Brussels operates with supranational powers, representing the Community interest and animating the
integration process.
Far more powerful is the Council of Ministers,
where unanimity is still the rule.
Its ultimate approval is required
in decision making.
But the Commission retains a policy-initiating
role and strong inputs in implementation.
See Leon N. Lindberg and
Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in
the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prent ice -Hall , 1970),
pp. 82-98.
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their social program
for France. ^9
2) By 1972,

the PCF was beginning
to feel, pe.hep. with
a touch

Of paranoia, that a strong
Europe (and an enlarged
EEC, was a device or
a political maneuver
to weaken the large
Co^unist Parties of Europe. =°

By 1972, socialists,
too, were manifesting

mg

EEC.

disench.ant^ent regard-

A maiorltv
tha+- -i-k^
ity felt
relt that
J
the n
Common Market was unfulfilled.

It

had not served as a
counterweight to the domination
of U.S. capitalism
Which many had hoped for.
Merely to enlarge it into
a vast .one of free
exchange would serve little
purpose:
A majority agreed with
the PCF
on one point: any fu ture
Government of the Left would
have to retain
49

the

effectJ':f'siptL?L"Siror^;m::?rso!:t""^" '-^^^ investigated
^renceJ4:\^:L"rd°-p-:dLla^hI;

Z-

-^-^^^^

s :jf^i:-r

policy..." See his discussion
in Moderr?api?StL
Thfr^
-"'T"^''
Changing
Balance of Public .nH Pr^......
p^^er
f--fTT
(Oxford. Oxford University
M
P^^iiirTOTsTTyar ticularly op. 133-134.
I

spokesman

Roland Leroy spelled out the argument
.
.
in
a special
essay for Le Monde that the designs
of the Cen^rSs (suc^
as Jean Lecanuet and Duhamel)
as well as the U.D.R. were to
seek a
supranational Europe in the hope of
"reducing the innuence or^he
large^Communist Parties". See that
newspaper, Aprl 2" 1972 p 8
Tnis IS not the conventional
objection to EEC.' Usually 'co«is;s
;ttack
xt on economic grounds: as
threatening Europe and its workinrclass
or
,

:

^--^^^

:^J™ur\r;ro1uc^
in Ee

Monir!agr;l2;1f^^"^°^^^:/g

^

'^'^

—

-Lp
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freedom of maneuver
in rRr^r^.r^r.
carrying out^ xts social
planning and national-

-tions „i.M„

a

H.opean eo«nit..

P.r.aps certain pc„e..
.ig,,

delegate, to a Kuropea„-„ide
political autnorit.. To.
example tHe
European Parlia„,ent
might be broadened
with ' Pe=^naps>
,
perhans legislative
powers
to control the
Community Duaget.
budget
Bni- any
=
r
*
But
y
Left
Government would be
foolish to denv
it^^if
+k
eny itself the possibility
of extending the
pubU
Lie
•

,

.

sector,

I^^-^Wt::-^.

Shortly before the
Referendum, the Communist
s were
able to bolster their
campaign for a -no" vote
by adroitly revealin
(and distorting) the
"Hansholt letter-, an
internal EEC document suggesting that future policies! of th= r
policies
the Community would
have to envision
reduced consumption levels
in Europe." As Marchais
described it. this
was tangible evidence
that EEC would lead to
an international order
"here the consumption
levels and the well-being
of people would be
lowered, a "Europe of misery
and regressive economic
development", as
well as lowered population
levels.
This was the Malthuslan
solution
implied by Pompidou-s
£etit^Jur2,e_de^ts^
^^^^^^^
"as to rally as much
discontent as possible around
a "no" vote.
After
all. there were important
negotiations coming up with the
Socialists
inj few weeks on the Programme commun,
and the Communists wanted to

="88^=*'='' ^^at
'
puiicies would have
policies
hat to incorporate
',n'
"limits to growth"
had recently been popularized
by the MIT-Club
Rome
before the energy crisis of
197H, but it did call for
'

S

"

9

pp

"^randT"''

°° '

-^1-

future Commission
solutions thaistudy
?hL was
a reduced oonsump"
P"
.
'
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de^cstrate as much electoral
force as f
possible
j-uA.^.
tation of the memo was
patently
. a
^
P t.ntly tar^nV-,!
tactical and

in
In fact
ract, their
th
exploi•

demagogic, and one could

hardly consider it a sincere
reflection of their
international policy
-garding energy and consumption
policies.
Communist Parties in opposition will normally reject
austerity programs. Once
in power,

they
will, of course, restrict
consumption to serve any
purpose they have in
n.ind, as has so often
happened in the East Bloc
countries.

Results of the Referendum
were an^iguous, allowing all
sides to
claim victory.
The government could point
to a "Oui" vote of 68 percent
Representing 38 percent of the
eligible voters).
On the other hand, the
number of abstentions and blanks
were the highest ever recorded
in a
French election, prompting
Duverger to term it a victory for
the
Socialists. ^3

Communists described it as a defeat
for Pompidou's

Europe, since only 38 percent of
the French electorate were
authorizing
an enlarged Common Market,
which was less- than Pompidou's mandate
in the

Presidential elections.
the eligibles).

The "Non" vote was 32 percent
(17 percent of

On the other hand, one could not
term all of the "Non-

votes as votes for the PCF.^^

With the bickering over and the Referendum
behind them, the PCF
53,

Le Monde

54

,

April 27, 1972, p.

1.

See Alain Duhamel's analysis in Le Monde

,

April 25, 1972, p.

9,
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and PS were now free to
^
th^i^ dxalogue
renew thexr
on the historic progr«
SSjmxm.
Perhaps the lesson was
that the
thp r.
regime could be opposed
succe
fully, but only if there
was unity of action.
•

,

•

CHAPTER

VI

LE PROGRAMME COMMUN
It has .een sal.
.Hat the Co.™o„ Pro^ra.

proM.e. American ah.ndance, Scandinavian
cgdix Larianism,
esalitari
^nn crn,
c
Soviet
oviet pni
^^^-h-t
collectivism
,
and Rousseauian
-^ocrae,.
.33p.te the
.roaa appea. to a.X
.en, ,t
„„t a...es.
two .nternationa.
reaUt.es that „o..a he
„eh concern to .overn.nt.
the 1970s: the world
energy
th.
gy crisis and the
recession/inflation syndrome of the industrial
Westo
•

i

•

m

Nevertheless, it was a Key
document.

strategy of the

Co„on Progra™

ful coexistence- doctrine.

1„

Co™unlst eyes, the

was the logical corollary
of the "peace-

Under the conditions of
that era, the work-

ing Classes could now
achieve potential majorities
in parliament, transform the state from a tool
serving the class interests
of the hourgeoisle
.nto an instrument serving
the wording people.^ Many
non-Communists had
had doubts about the
genuineness of the PCF's
commitment to such a

doctrine: Could such a historically
authoritarian and revolutionary
movement pursue a democratic road
to power?
The far Left had doubts as
well: the very act o f seeking
power in the bourgeois state
confirmed

Fayolle.'iglalT""''
2

^

""""^

Tiersky, French Communism,
pp. 274-275
135
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that the PCF was opting for
reformism over revolution much as the
SFIO had done in 1905.

I2£li£3^alliar^

The Common Program was
hardly the first historical

attempt by Communists and
Socialists to form an alliance
directed at
governing. 3 One may reasonably
assume that the Frw^^opulalre
and
Liberation would continue to haunt
the negotiators of 1972.
There was,
after all, a deep hostility between
the two parties.

In the view of

the Comn^unists: social democracy,
wherever in power, was incapable
of

genuine systemic changes.

The social democracies of Austria,
Sweden

or Harold Wilson's Britain were
hopelessly reformist.

While there

were improved aspects of national life,
the villain, monopoly capitalism, remained untouched.

Furthermore, European social democracies were
anti-Communist,

and had, since the end of World War II,
essentially siobordinated their

policies to the U.S.

In fact, before and after the war, social
democ-

ratic international policies were at odds with
the Communist line.
.

.

3

The non-interventionist SFIO refused aid to
Spanish Republicans.
The SFIO supported Munich.
the Hitler-Stalin Pact„

The PCF backed

For the first time since Tours the two parties recognized
a
reciprocal existence. Earlier pacts sought to unite the two into
an
organic unity.
See Bournazel, p. 82.
CERES, incidentally, never
accepted the finality of the split at Toxros. The left must surmount
its differences if it is to ever incarnate the national will.
Chevenement, p. 19.
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rne PCF at the start
of World War II.
.

A Socialist Prime
Minister expelled PCF
ministers from the Government
in
_

1947.

.

French Socialists joined
with the British
Conservatives and Israelis
in the war against
Egypt
1955.

m

as Gaulle's new Government
in 1959.

More currently, the Socialist
International was perceived as
a
MensheviK axis of Bruno KreisRy,
Olof Pal„e and Golda Meir,
all dominated by the SPD in Bonn.
These Social Democrats were
designing a supranational Europe: a device to
defeat the ^ss Communist Parties
of the
Continent. They would work to
block any alliance of Social
Democrats
and Communists, whether in
France, or later in Spain and
Portugal.

Socialist suspicions.

The Socialists cited an equally
long

catalogue of Communist misdeeds and
crimes, dating back to Tours and
the
period reviewed in Chapter 1.
Within more recent memory, there had
been
the destruction by Stalin of
Socialist Parties in Eastern Europe.

Fueling the hostility was the Communist's
"vanguard" argument: the persistent pretense of serving as the
ultimate interpreter and guiding

force of France's destiny.
trine were clear.
France?

The undemocratic implications of such a
doc-

Might they not someday pose a threat to the
PS in

13 9

The Pr ogramme

co,u n

was not designed to
resolve these historic

incompatibilities, but to transoend
suspicions stewing fro™ the™.
As
Pierre Hassner noted, the left
could reach power in a
Sociallst-Co.^unist alliance "only to the
extent that the former would
go beyond social
democracy and the latter beyond
Stalinism".^ I„ elaborating the
Proran,, both parties had to transcend
their extremes.
Once signed, the

agreement continued to define the
left's position until the breakdo»>
Of talks to update it in Septeinber,
1977.

The document nowhere speaks of
socialism, although the PS termed
the 1972 Programme commun as the
beginning of socialism

by the PCF).

(a

view rejected

Thus the two parties at the outset
had a key interpretive

difference.

In spite of these differences, the
Program did anticipate a

Government by the left.
tract:

It invoked the device of a legislative
con-

if it won, the Government was pledged to
carry out the program.

_\e Monde, August 17-18, 1975, p. 5. A similar point was
made
by Maurice Duverger.
The alliance permitted the Communists to restrain the Socialists from becoming managers of
a less harsh capitalism
while the "Socialists restrained the Communists
from sliding into a
class dictatorship (such as that of their Soviet
friends)".
Lettre
ouverte aux socialistes, p. 12.
*
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Virtually axl left

.o™,i„„3

(e.cept PSU and the fa.
left) aahe.ed.=

During the 1972 discussions,
the PS was the „eaKer
negotiator
Having Just elected new
leadership, it „as husy
carrying out the renovations Of Epinay. CERES
was prodding the Party
closer to PCF positions,
^us the Socialists probably
^de the ™a:or concessions/ But
by 197.. the Socialists
emerged as the strongest
party on the left.
«ith demonstrable electoral
strength, they now challenged
the post-war
PCF dominance of the left.'
CERES would soon be edged
to the sidelines,
and the PS could now resist
concessions it .ight have
negotiated earlier'

reflects'j':e5:c;io;if"t^re"°\^''

'^""^'^ "^^^^

=^^-"1^

=^ ^iP^^P^^-^sJ^^'^r:'^^^
^^p^^:ir=^,

-ti

it

jn,

Western

tZ fZ

language that would keep France out
of the
to the effect that France would
reiect
sot neither.
In fact, the PS prevailed,

ITiLIZ T/^""
^""^ ^ statement
"^l^^'l'"^

''P'

-

slstlg ron ?
xLt>
its drsenai
arfenal in'^^f'c
its current'"T'
state.

^1"—

m

in"

7

p

,

.1t:e:n'S32\^nd"l93".

"

Program result reversed the electoral
pattern

'"^'^

^^^^^

^^^^^

^Marchais confirms this point.
By the mid-1970s, thp PCF was
complaining that Socialist strategy was to
strengthen it^ position at
Communist expense. Having done this, they
"then took their distance
_

fvTh
1978

99

rr^"
^"'"^''^^
5

'

See George Marcha is , "Forward to the
Lines set
^he Central Committee, April 26-28
^^P°^^
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In a broader context
^uiiLexx, the Common
Program

diaxo^e .ejected a new

n,oo. i„

Europe, a tha„i„, of
positions inter-

national!,.

It i. interesting to
note t.at t.e tai.s
.et„een SoeiaXists
a.d Co„unists in Prance
were occurring at the
very sa.e ti^e that
the

Socxal Democrats of West
Ce»any were tailing to the

Co^nists of the
People sensed a .ove^ent
in positions that
had been glacially
frozen for twenty-five
years.
Discussions towards the
,oint orogra. in
France began in Decoder,
1970.
But differences persisted
on international issues such as French
sovereignty and national
independence,
echoing earlier disagreements
of the 1968 period.
GDR.

Socialists afflrn,ed a commitment
to national independence,
but
also favored participation in
a European Community.
Independence was
compatible with partial surrenders
of sovereignty (if freely
agreed to
by a majority).
The current generation of
Socialists had lived through
a nationalism that had
torn Europe apart during the
Century. A new
Europe could bury that nationalism.

And. a united European economy

might better resist foreign
penetrations on the Continent.'

The PCF, too, affirmed loyalty to
internationalism, but the

proletarian variety.

Their priority was national independence.

EEC

was a monopolist enterprise; it
would create regional dislocations

within France; it was an economic weapon
against the Socialist bloc.
9

Le Monde

For a summary of Socialist views before the
signing see
December 2H , 1970, p. 10
,

.
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nation of large business
interests.

-

- -e

....

Both parties favored
the simultaneous
dissolution of hlocs
in
-rope an. a European
Security Conference.
Xhe POP „ent even
further
and tried to hoi. out
for outright withdrawal
fro. the .lUanoe
mainstream of the Socialist
Part., hr.
^ however, rejected such a unilateral
10
step.

The document that
emerged from the negotiations
in the Spring,
1972, was inevitably a compromise,
with some differences
resolved

others unresolved.

Common Program lan^age
masked

^ny

real foreign

policy differences between
the Parties, with both
sides retreating from
long-held positions.
For instance, the Program
softened the basic ^instream Socialist commitment
to the Alliance, Europe
and a pro-Israeli
posture. At the same time,
it glossed over the
essential anti-Americanism of the Communists.

14-3

EEC.

This was a sensitive issue.

The PCF always saw it
as a class

alliance (and one endangering
French independence).

The Cc.on Progra.
hoth parties to a policy
of participation in the
Co^nity
yet preserving their freedo.
of action to carry out
programs they dee.ed
valid.
France under a Left Government
would help build EEC, yet
work
to free it fro. capitalist
interests by democratizing its
institutions.
Thus a France inside the EEC
would retain its freedom of
action to
realize its radical, political,
economic and social program.
Such a
Left Government would invoke
all of the safeguards provided
by the

ccMtted

Treaty of Rome.

It would be free to define
and extend the public sec-

tor in France, apply its own credit
policies and institute its own
system of planning.
The French Government would continue
to be responsible to its own National Assembly.

Despite the language of the text, each
Party retained its own

interpretations.

Mitterrand, for exam.ple, went further in
his elabora-

tion of the Socialist Party Program,
stressing that the European choice
of the PS was primordial: that there
was an intimate link between the

European Construction and the advent of
socialism in France.
^^^^'^ Programme pour un gouvernement democratique
did not go that far.

d'

The Commu-

union populaire

While it recognized some changed international

realities, and conceeded that modern economies require
cooperation at
the level of production, such a closed economic bloc
as EEC distorted

Programme commun

,

Flarrarrion, p.

115.
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th.s .e,ui.e.e„t and
Blocked genuine Internationa,
cooperation.
The
PCP invoke, its rhetorio
o. national independence
and soverei^ty: iar.
^
scale capitalist should
not expand on the
prerogatives of the Trench
nat.on.
This sort of ian^age
is ,uite at odds
with the PS view that
socialist cannot be hased
on an outdated nationalise.
Co™,.ists would
not support a ..Europe"
designed to extricate
capitalist frot its crisis
Supranationality by nature
deprives a government of
freedot of action
to effect its program.

The Program states that
a Government of the
Left will be responsible for its European actions
before the French National
Assembly.

Both parties agreed (and
the Program stated) that
changes would be proposed in the Treaty of Rome to
democratize the economic and
social
bodies.
This called for a more
equitable representation of trade
union

representatives on the EEC body.^^

It called for general,
complete, controlled disarmament.

But the wording was general,
without violating basic principles
of either
Party.
As a distant objective, nuclear
weapons would be renounced by
France.

France would immediately halt building
new weapons and stop

nuclear tests.

While awaiting a world agreement on
nuclear weapons,

France's force de frappe would not
be destroyed, but maintained in its
12^,

.

Ibid.

,

P.

116.
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current state

(maintem^^i^^

The nuclear weapons
clause marked
iiidij^ea a PPF
tLF n^r.
concession.

At this
(1972), Communists had been
callina for
f
calling
a unilateral renunciation u„«x othe. nations
.oine. In.
.His sense, tHe socieXist
view

point,

^

m

the Communists reversed:
4r
in true fenn-;.^
Gaullist fashion,
they would hold that
such weapons were the
essence of national independence.

m

This would be stricly
national.

weapons would remain on French
territory.
(and Presidential) decision.

The

Tactical nuclear

Their use would be a national

tous_a^

strategy would be main-

tained, with France defending
against all aggressors.

The Gaullist

policy of non-integration into
NATO would continue.

liH£^P££2_^^£]Elty

Although Communists .identify with
the world forces

.

of socialism, they do view
France as outside the two

never made that leap.
the Western camp.

cam.ps.

The PS has

They still see France as fundamentally
within

The Communists failed to
negotiate a clause calling

"^ainstream Socialists and left Radicals would
not favor des^.
truction
of nuclear weapons.
As opposition party people, they
mLh^
"'"^"^
pledged unilate;al disarmament
^uieuL.
B^t he
But
L'nnever acted
''rf on the pledge.
•

14

The PCF urged that the entire mission of
the army be limited
defense.
Mitterrand rejected this

,
to ^
territorial
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for outright withdrawal,
^^The 3oxnt
ioinr Program did
call for the simultaneous dissolution o.
the Warsaw and
Atlantic Mii^nees.
i. .3.ed .or
a European Security
Conference, proposing
that the U.S. and
Canada
join
as two Atlantic
powers.

m

The Left Program was
also calling
ug ror
for a na.r.'.i
partial disengagement
in Europe, particularly
central Europe,
as well as the d
f , a::,
designation of
•

•

nuclear-free zones of Europe.

in other

„or.d,s

France would practice an
independent policy out-

side Of all .ilitany
Mocs.

Neither of the t«o European
alliances

oould serve as pretexts
for intervention hy any
state in the internal
affairs of another (a
reference to Soviet action
in Czechoslovakia)

for a U.S. withdrawal fro™
Vietnam, and a peaceful
settlement of that

were set forth.

Support was given to the QN
decision of Nove*er 22,

1967. on Israeli withdrawal."

both German states enter the
uie UN
uiN.

Regarding other questions, it
urged that
T-h called
r^=,n^^ upon
it
France to establish

non-aggre"l\^:rl?i:s\\rid"tL=\::d~ "^^^^^^ ^'^'^^
compromise phraseology that led many
to argue
ptr.''^
that thp
the Programme
com mun was vague and ultimately
unworkable
Mi^Lrrand sympathized with the Israelis,
the PCF with the Arabs
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ties with the GDR and
to recognize North
Vietna.
vxernam, c.„h
Cambodia and North
Korea.
Nothing was said about
China.

Failure of the

C ommon

o^ram

Thierr, Poster holds
that the hrea.do™ in
the Program five
years iater had iittXe
to do „ith disputes
over 30ciai poHoy or
the
extent of nationalizations
ons.
Rathor,
Rather, he argues, the
PCF abandoned the
negotiations because it did
not obtain fro™ its
coalition partners the
positions Of power and the
institutional
it was claiming in
various ministries.''"'^
i,

„tees

Most important of all, were
Communist fears of a new
equilibrium on the left.
During the original 1972
negotiations, the P.S.,
having just elected new
leadership, was weak relative
to the PCF.
'

CERES was pushing the PS
towards many PCF positions.
PS Which made the Key
concessions in the document.

at the breakdown, the
situation had reversed.

Hence, it was the
But five years later,

The PS wa. now demon-

strating voting strength, CERES
had been edged to the sidelines.

The

PS could now resist
concessions.^^

This conforms to the PCF vi^w
that the purpose of the PS in
17^

Le Monde

,

December 23, 1977, p.

lo.

18.

^"^,^^^61, L es Communistes (Paris: Seuil,
1968), pp. 81r.-.^-./r
r
CD
Led by Frank
Wilson, The French Left Under the Fifth
Republic ,
issued at the SUNY Brockport~ onf erence
5 ^^7-39

82
82.

.

It

I

signing the Common Program
m in the first
fir.=t „i
g
place was to strengthen
its
foroe to the detriment of
the Communists.
Each .ide in the negotiations had suspected the
other of hegemonism.
As far hacK as the
PS
congress of Unity at Epinay
in 1971 Mitterrand
had remarked that the
socialist had to he the most
representative Party of the
Left, that
they had to regain terrain
lost to the PCF and other
parties.
This
kind of language confirmed
PCF suspicions that the
PS had signed the
agreement to seek gains at
Communist expense, to challenge
the Communist's vanguard role.

In entering into the Comn^on
Program, the PS had to justify
its
behavior on an international
lev.l.
it too was a .ember of
a world

movement:

it had friends and allies
in the Socialist International.

For example, Mitterrand told
the Twelfth Congress of the
Socialist

International immediately after he
signed the Common Program:
Our fundamental goal is to
rebuild a huge
Socialist Party on the terrain occupied
by the
PCF ... that IS the reason for
the agreement.!^

This is a most significant remark,
uttered in Vienna before the

Socialist International, at a gathering
where were assembled Harold
Wilson, Pietro Nenni and others.
decades

Mitterrand noted that for three

.Socialists had appeared less powerful
than the Communists.

Now

it was vital for the Socialists to
rediscover their authenticity be.tore
19

Le Monde

,

June 30, 1972, p.

5,

«
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the people and build
a great Party in
France, "Of the five

.iuion

Communist voters, three
million can vote c;„„,„,._
Socialist", he added.'20

Not only did the Pirst
Secretary .eveal his
domestic strategy
but he told the delegates
(and enraged the PCF)
that a Government of
Left unity would see. to
strengthen the Common Market
and would remain
a faithful ally of
the United States.

Nevertheless, l.S. Conference
delegates were still sceptical
of
the Mitterrand strategy.
An Austrian Socialist
expressed fear of PCF
domination of the alliance. A
German representative noted
that such
an alliance would never be
possible in his country. =1 The
following day,'
the PCF registered its
"astonishment" that Mitterrand could
make such
remarks the day after putting his
signature to the Common Program.

The elections of October, 1974
produced large gains for the

Socialists and setbacks
LUdCKs for
ror -tho
the vrr
PCF.

bater, at an l.S.
confided to Helmut Schmidt,
we say it is the only means
marginal role".
Bournazel,

^This confirmed
Mitterrand's ploy
tv,,-

,

.

meeting in Elsinor in 1975, Mitterrand
"We do not say our union i a
ha^y one '
of reducing the Communist Party
lo a
?o'a
p.

83.

^y

^he Monde, June 30, 1972, p. 5. This was of
course prudent
Under Lenin's dicta. Communists consider
all alliances temporary,
socialists were always wary of Communist
actions against Social
Democrats
Eastern Europe.
_

m

Le Monde

,

July

1,

1972, p. 9.
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and unleashed a nine-.onth
controversy between the
two.^^
PS was Charged with
seeding a re-e,uilihniu.
on the Left.
1975 CERES had been removed

fron,

.gain
By

the

aalary

the Secretariat by
Mitterrand.

Each
Party was now challenging
the international links
of the other. Thus
the PS was tied to Brandt,
Kreisky and Pal^e; the PCF
tied to Moscow,
being out of step with the
more Euro-Co«nist PCI
and PCE.^"*

^^^Sl-tiSnal^ollcy^nd^^

Prank Wilson suggests that
past

alliances between the democratic
left and the PCF always
disintegrated
over international disagreements.^^
Five years after the signing,
it
was clear that there were
important differences cf an
international
nature between the two parties.
As Marchais expressed it:^^
23

.ea-d

;

Tpz ^.^t^^:z^^

-

h"
By the October elections tte reP
'^"'^^ "^"^ EuropeaS P:i cy of French
''r" International
anr^taliaT?''
C^-'-lsts",
Affairs Vol. 53, No. 3, pp.\o5
to m"
It would be a threat to
detente).

24„.

,""!^™<1 <:laims that when he negotiated the Common Program
section, dealing with international
sections
questions "Communists interrupSd
th mselves every half hour to
telephone MoscoW. la^taaa, Februarys,
25

policy towards Spain was completely at odds
with
i-h.^ of
^ K
that
both the PCF and the USSR. See Franx
L. Wilson, The French
Democratxc^Left 1963-1969 (Stanford, Cal.:
Stanford Unive rsity Pres s,
Marchais made these charges in a report to the
Central Committee justifying the September, 1977 break.
See Forward on the Lines
_S et Out by the XXIInd
Congress issued by the Secretariat of the Communist Group, European Parliament, p. 13.
,

,
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u^ope naa

been abandoned.

^ ^^^^^g^hening of ties between
the PS
T.TIpT
and
SPD, as well as the
adoption of a joint plat-

Democratic'

parties

French Socialists had veered
to the right and
^-^-^ by "alng
IttT.t''^'
other things, growing more
favorable to European military integration.

3)

4) When the PCF finally reversed
itself on the

issue of retaining the nuclear
strike force
It sharply opposed Mitterrand's
proposal for
a referendum on that issue.

Many of these issues will be more
f.Hly discussed in later sections relating to defense and
European social democracy.
The point
here is not to identify all possible
reasons for a break in the Union
of the Left, but merely to isolate
those of international significance.
There is one current of thought that
has not yet been examined.

It

holds that the Communists broke off
the Program discussion in September,
1977 on instructions from the USSR.^"^

The Soviet Union and the Union of the
Left

The Soviets saw a heightening of class
struggles in E urope
27

.

Lionel Jospin, a PS foreign policy expert, esooused'
this view
a series of articles in Le Monde
The Soviets, fearing a Left victory, instructed the PCF to break off the
alliance.
With the evidence
at hand, the theory remains unproveable„
See that journal during the
week following September 23rd.

m

:

^

'
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which called for
unity of actior.actxon. ^trade
.
y
unions,
should all work
together.

An interesting,
^
historian
.

I

M

v-n^rr^

authoritative

and socialists
socialist

discussion IS given
by the Soviet
-^'-'vier
•

oo
28

He makes the
distinction
-Lii^Lion that u
working with

v

•

.

co«nists

^

social democratic
parties is not the
i-ut; same a.
as loinma
^"^"g in -t-K^-:
their government.
Lenin gave the idea
legitimcv in q9
""^"^
"""^^
the KPO o«erea not
no. onxy support,
..t offered to enter,
under oert.in
terms, a new government
headed by the
SPD
A= the .
As
y cne bFD.
Comintern's uth Congress noted: these were
-e not t„,,i
truly workers governments,
but they too
'were capable of
objectively accelerating
^ the process of d
decay of bourgeois authority"
o-ty
He reminds that
the PCF never did
join the Popular
Front (although it
offered to,
to
^- u
in 193/,
k
1937 by
which
time the SFIO and Radicals rejected the
offer).
•

•

•

-J

1

1

m

v,

.

•

•,

.

m

•

,

The Soviet position
seems to be that Communists
can enter "progressive" non-^nni
governments if, and only
if, they retain their

_^_^^^°™al.st
28

Participatx:: b;^:o™n'i:ts1n°1hf
Go^'^^^^-^^

PSoblem/o^Hi^ lls

%T T'T

™^

'™

^-Wems of
non-Socialist Count-

th-t Ma?^l;^rEHi5lF^;d
working Class Parties
parties'''
in bourgeois governments, if it impaired their
revol,,M
not arise in the 18H8
revoL?lons burd •d'"'''''i"==
Generally, it was leoitTJ^rTlT^ '
''"'^"S the Commune,
government, but not
just any bourgeois
'^™i""°n^''y
Jover^ent
°^
""^
strongly
condemned Hillerrand tte
^
,
''''' ^"^"'^'^ ^^e Government
of General GalSet
aiiiret, who had
had^K'"""
been the executioner of the
Commune.

w

29,,

.

Ibid.

,

p.

12.

•
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pushed aside or beclouded
by the ioint
'
°^ the coalition government"
L
V these conditions,
iack^ng
they should go -Lzixo
into tne
the o
^
opposition '

™"

.

•

as in 1947,

The Soviets, as
should be clear by
hu r.
now, regarded the
possibility

Of a Left Government
in France ambiguouslv
i^iguously.

t-nal and foreign policy
reasons.

-Id

their

o»

•

T>.
.
This
stemmed
from both doc-

Certaiuly the Soviets
continue to

.Ode o. achieving po„er
as valid.

On the other hand.
they do endorse the
Lne "np3r«-F,n
peaceful transition"
doctrine
uucirine i-h^^
that «emerged^ with deStalinization.
•

-.-

.

.

The Soviets legitimated
a parliamentary road
to power,
l^e problem „as that so.e of
the Western parties
e^cpanded on the dictu™
and
evolved notions of
pluralism in the :9S0s that
went .ar beyond anything
the Soviets were
suggesting.
To su.^ri.e it in a
phrase: European
Communism created a foreign
policy dilemma for the
USSR:
•

^'''^ ""^^ reformist
ideas emerIV'^'^ging tn the^ Western Parties
could not be tole-

E^t bloc?35"^^«^°°

^hat could spread to the

^.::L^L^^aSnt:opV"^"

%Sng!-r:iS:
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On the other hsnH

-i-v,

-,

f

tolerated in the West
?t
West and underpin"
; roreign
fo"eI° policy
ooK™"'goals
of detente.
,

Hence the Soviets
u.,ed a middle road:
Western Co^nnists
should
develop^hroad alliance
strategies, hnt ne.er
renounce their leading

-es.
a

But ho„ does one
.ulld an alliance strategy
and

stUl retain

leading role?

Joint Co^unlst-Socialist
action was required in
Prance, said
leading Soviet leaders
Mi.hail Suslov and Boris
Pono.are. to Mitterrand
.n tal.s during the
latter.s visit to Moscow.^^
But there was a caveat
a few months later:
such political alliances
should not "dilute the
Co^ist Party into an amorphous
organization ... there should
5e no
•unity at any price' slogan",
said Konstaintin Zarodov."

^2^^i21^2££iSLiolioy^^

-™«™«,

^^.^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^

the Soviets (in their
relation to Western Parties)

31^

As Brezhnev said four vears
broad democratic trends ^nrUu^^l

.He

Co„ni3ts

l^t^-n

.e^^-.::!^-^-^

'^Newjorkj^

May

5,

1975.

^

n

u--,

""^^^^

-

...
--ians^..
Doming with

^

See Chapter IX herein.

.evolutirTllne^^dldL^^^^the^^SlI^

^

^
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repeatedly placed their
foreign
oreign polxcy
nol
requxrements ahead of
the needs
of particular European
class struggles
iggles.
And Hduring the
1970s, Soviet
dipXo.acy p..3ue. ..e
,oaX o. ac,.,r.„,
•

,ec.„o.o^

This ar,.e. ...
. p.„3perous, „on-.os.Ue

crisis that could
jeopardize everything
j/Luiiig.

eapUaUs™,
A

West
a Hu.ope in

rian. at. some of
glance
the

evidence reveals the
following:

During the Presidential
election of 19V. the
Russians put

•

the independent Saullist
policies towards the U.S.
and Germany.
The Soviets irritated
•
the PCF by displaying
special ties to
Clscard d.Estaing that
same year.
When Soviet A*assador
Tchervonen.o

Visited Giscard between
rounds in the May, 137.
election, the E.hassy
denied the visit had any
link to the French elections--Lci^Lions. It
it was
„a, merely an
e>=ploration of economic
questions..
But it evoked memories
of the cele
brated incident of December,
1965 when the Soviet press
indicated its
support for de Gaulle during
a campaign where Mitterrand
was running
with PCF support.

The Soviets were growing
skeptical about the Alliance
of the

certain socia"isfst1?es""f -iT"."""""
Le Monde. Sclober ^25
[sTl

'T

and lndo-c\-:a"-

rl°"

^-.o-re^ta-i-h-g tSlo^ K^t

35,

Le Monde

'""^^

,

May 10, 1974, p.

3,

^l^^"

^^ose with

°' '

^Jl^^^

'°

'
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Left in France.

Soviet spokesinen had
hinted
ii±nzea that wh
while parties of
the
Left might win an
election, they would
not be ^^^^
able to
^° govern together
for a long time. ^
•

i

There were signs the
Russians understood
that Prance held
too oentraX a strategic
position for the U.S.
to abandon it to
.oroes
of the Left. There
would be so.e .ove to
frustrate
^•^L^dLe It,
it as th
there was
^„
later in Chile.
•

Could Mitterrand, as an
heir of Noske
iNosKe and Ramadier,
R.m.Hu
be
trusted.
His true loyalty was
to the bourgeoisie
^euxbie and th.
a
the Americans.
He was
only making use of the
Communists
munists to pull
r^nn h-^a
his own party into
power.
.

•

one could cite further
evidence, as the 1970s
progressed, the
increasing distance between
the PCF and the CPSU;
the declining fre.

quency of Brezhnev-Marchais
uiee Lings, Mar^rh..-..
meetingsv
Marchais' absence
from the CPSU
25th conference early in
1976; the PCF's growing
outspokenness in challenging Soviet hunnn rights
violation, and the critiques
of Soviet
reality being voiced fro™
within the Party, as fro.
Jean Ellenstein.
36

pp. 1 and 9!^

Thllov'Sf n:;:d^th:^

tt^&f^-

well require austerity
.easuJes couple
gram proposals.
These nuirk nnr^^r^,n
spurring'an offensive fro^lhe

1"''

variance with Common
iy\\"v™L\°c"r;ith1'"
"'f
Pro-

righ'^

ro„taine""?hLXd'to"d

''"''^'^^^

""^'^^'^^ ^"PF-t,

^e^l^^ ^^^"S:^^- '\f^^

never allow Portugal to fall
to the othjr sWe.
38

Soviets were too discreet to utter
these suspicions onenIv
nr..
^^l
""^"^^ °^ journalistic accounts and accept
or reject the
ev.-d.n
evidence. ""T
An undisclosed East European
diplomat reportedly ^oJd
^£j^on^ that .'Marchais has finally grasped
that Mi?ter;a?d w'a^n'ted to
use him as a stepping stone..."
September 25-26, 1977, p. 9.
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.

in fact, the Soviets
seeded

Co^nists.

„.e

comfortable with the
Italian

Berlin^er.s Historic Compromise,

a policy of

unxon. progressively
managed to install Communists
into the hourgeois
state Without yielding the
leading role to the
Socialists,
furthermore.
the PCI was less provocative
to the U.S.^^

Some of the above is .ore
:ournalistic speculation than
hard
evidence of Soviet feeling
toward the domestic alliance
in Prance.
Por

see

it is perhaps decisive
and cumulative evidence of
Soviet opposition

to the strategy of the
left union.

One current even goes so
far as to

hold that the Russians, in
their displeasure, instructed
the PCF to
break off the Co..on Progra.
discussions
Others .ight say that the
Soviets hardly need to issue
instructions.
After all, the PCP and CPSU
"

bas^interpretation.

The USSR remains, to French
Communists,

39
""^^

charitable to the PCF's

strategv
7,
Union Hp
ij^auche
was not an agreement of Republican
defense, as In'iglT^
merely

an electoral accord, "but a step
towards unit; in the poKt^cal
struggle for Europe", said Georgio
Amendola.
In urging a Lmociatiz'd
^he views of the PCl' Se
Itiia.
P
Italian Party
official noted.
Le Monde, July 18, 1972.

He
tie
It

arSdlt\ZtT^
-^^
Te tall. ,J^\^h^°^y IS
i ^^ probably
;
should
be assigned

^

^^gg^^^ting "la main de MoscouV
^
PCF to scutsusceptible to proof either way, but
minimum validity. Even if the Soviets

^^e days were long past when they could
^^^f^"^^'
instruct tVrt
^n^trict
°^h'''
the French
communists to sacrifice in furtherance of -Soviet
raison d etat
Annie Kriegel attributes PCF stubborness in
1974 to its
acceptance of a new international strategy
drafted in Moscow.
See her
Une Nouvelle strategie communiste?"
Contrepoint
No. 17, November, 1975.
,
"
pp. 47-67.
.

'
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"la^atrie du socialisms"
^ii^
Ipftir+^n-

,

4=
th^ fortress
the
confronting the
L lie enemv
enemy.

^„ ^^^^

^^^^^

IS'^y

P
Earlier
.

•

^^^^

unity was no longer
compatible with boviet
Soviet purposes.
n,
During the
period of the Common
Program challenge to
Gaullism ^trench.
^ullism,
Communists
^
had to live with the
fact that the Soviets
xe^s essentially
essent.'.n
approved the
,

never publicly voiced
the fear
rear that the
th. u
West. would move
forcefully to
challenge a Government
of the Left in France.

^^^^^J^^El.^I^^_theLeftist Alii ance
we have yet to
determine whether
international realities
would
have allowed a leftist
government to continue.
Would the West have tolerated such a government,
or would it have m.ved
to de-stabilize it.

Such a question (or
speculation) cannot be
examined fully here, but
later events in Chile and
Portugal did place the
possibility of de-stabilization on the agenda.
Some tentative speculations
are possible.
Ralph Milliband suggested
two broad possibilities.^^
.

The new Government would
enact minor reforms
but no genuine transformations
to socialism.'
Ultimately, the reformist
movement would be
rejected: the old order returns.

Marxism and Politic^ fOvFor.ri^Uxford. nr.-p^^^
Oxford nUniversity Press,
83-186.
•

1977), pp.

.
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nature.

This would
arousP tho ^fro.
Lf---:,!-ity
conservative
fS?:::^/

under the letter
pos.iMUty, international
oapltalist interests
would move to de-stahi
staiiiiize +-k
the offending government
s^veinment.
a^^
e,
And,
argues Milliband, it would be the
Social iJemocrats
Democrats of other countries
that would be
the leading conservative
forces.
Not .erely the U.S.,
hut the
i

i

,

..Social

Be.ocrats of Oer„.ny and
Britain would try to hring
the offending government to heel".

The task here is not to
speculate over hypothetical
outcomes

only to note that all
sides had to consider the
possibilities. In these
pages. „e have referred to
(and generally accepted)
the .-Yalta.' thesis:
that neither bloc would allow
any portion to be abandoned.

If a

leftist France threatened the
entire edifice since World War
II, the
west could react.
Given this possibility, it
raised vital questions of
national independence and defense
policy.

^

CHAPTER

VII

DEFENSE POLICY

The issue of national
defense in World War 1
generated the hissplit in t.e Preno.
„or.i„, olas3 .ove.ent.
Co.unists, eo.oin,
^enin, rejected the
SPIO-s defense of the
hour.eois Rep.hlie, as
„as
in Chapter II.
Onl, in the 1.30s did
the POP for„late an.
defense policy, adoptine
the quasi-Jacobm
nna^,- t=
k
P
g
patriotism of the Popular
Front, ultimately
expressed in the Resistance.

-ie

Communists claim that their
defense policies derive
from class
relations, thus they confer
legitimacy on certain struggles,
„hile opposing others. Class loyalty
required a defense of the
USSR (or
the

And, during the early
decades of BolsheviK rule
the
doctrine perhaps had some
validity, because non-ruling
parties felt that
their existence was often
linked to the survival of
the vulnerable

^-i^t^tate^^w^

the USSR,

they risked destruction
as a political

^^""^
nationall^^nL^'^n'Ig^tlrCha'rl"
^'T'
Francois BiUoux was Minister
of National Defense
n"f"' m Ramadier's
Liberation Cabinet
Jean kj^anl f

-

post'^"^P^> ''sport to the Central Committee:Defense national!
D|f|nsg_
nationale. indepe_ndance^j>aj
^et de'sarmement
•

.
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Paris, 11 May,

movement:

f

struggle against
impeSu'sr
and peace, for
democracy social,' T"'""-^"
These fraternal ties
™Ite us -^-L^iT
^s^ ot all to the
Communist Parties. 3

7

1

TATrTT'

TO move .eyond the
jargon, then, P.ench
Communists held a dual
membership both within
the French
rench DolitnV.i
political system and
within the world
movement. As Annie
Kriegel points out,

.o;;mr^^^^^^
°'
Party!
const ?u?:'''^"^'
' Pr^'''"' ^°-°ll-y to Communism's
ideoloiica!
~ ^^^I'i-id- proletarian
revoiuSon
?i
^".^^^t sense, the movement
ennovs
^ijjuyb
an
2l^T:
absolute T>ri n-n-i -t^r
P^^^rxty which, given the
centrar.nH

?w

•

•

in^the^decis.on-™aking processes
of Se'prench

union, we'^LtldefiSyluhlt'L^rl™ '°
^^^^^^
^^e Soviet
defense". Marcel Cachin
The People's Front in Frl
r«
'
(New York: Workers Library
19357-£j-^^Ii22J^^^
Publishers,

^^'T'

POP ^.n/SnXsrs^u^;ry-March, 1975, pp. 54-65

^

'2:\Tr\i: ^iLTrsTc'^-'^-lers du Comm unisme.

Februa-

^
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The .Trench Section
of the

Co^nist

International" „y have
appeared as an appendage
of Soviet dipio^cy in
the earlier years.
Today, the organisational
framework is better described
as the ..Social,
ist Camp", according to
Kriegel.

....not simply a territorial,
but a multidxmensxonal concept embracing
at the

same time
the Soviet Union, China ^'lT.f
and the popular democracies;
Communist and
"'^''^^
and
lastly,
Lstl'v a'r
a dual system of alliances

L

-

-

labelled
~
alliance of Communist
and ioT'"^'^^^'^"
Workers parties with nationalist
movements
in colonial countries
as well as an alliance
ror peace.

the

Earlier, we discussed the limits
imposed on the Communists by
Yalta sphere, which Stalin and
Thorez well understood.

de_^

Thus the PCF supressed its
revolutionary impulse, while the
USSR consolidated the tangible gains of
the Red Army in Europe.
It was a geo-

political dilemma for the PCF.

The most it could do was work
to dimi-

nish U.S. influence on the Continent.

This, then, is a key thesis

advanced here: European Communists,
frustrated in revolution, viewed
success in the class struggle as
hinging on the reversal of the
5

This is the theory.

But thp

Fr.3+-

^'^^^''^"al socialist community
uegenerated "into a battlLround
nT
economic, geographical
racial interests
and
?L
ca^h"^
schism, diplomatic, and
'^'^'^^
e^en armed con^iie'r': ''rv^^^^
aspects Of capitalist
^3^^-international
o;;3r^1,\^,"^
•

.

.

.

L^sf

™

f

.
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relation of forces in favor
of the Soviet Union.

In establishing

priorities of defense, it
see.s neasonahle to suggest
tha. political
parties, in or out of government,
first define an outside
peril - and
then frame policies.
But „hat if each party in
a coalition identifies
a different perils
This type of situation
occurred in the post-„ar
years between the PCF and the
SFIO: each perceived and
defined a different potential enemy of France.'
And this created inevitable
divergencies on defense.
For Socialists, the Red Army
was the threat, while
the PCF viewed the Bundeswehr
or the Americans as the enemy.
Given
these disagreements, it was
difficult for them to frame a joint
defense
policy

on.

Italian Communists differ.

K

Socialism will not advance in

Eui^-

'"^ possibility of aggressive intent on
the part of 'the^U^.r'^'H"'"''^
^""^^
^ genuine shock when Soviet troops
:
PnLrfp
r
entered Prague.
It
destroyed
a key pillar of PCF defense policy
^he
myth of an essentially peaceful USSR.
See Chapter IV.
g

Thorez once said that if the Red Army had
to pursue an aggressor onto French soil, French Communists
would not resist. L'Humanite
February 23, 1949.
But during talks to update the Common Program,
M^ rChevenement that if the Soviets attacked France,
the
PP?""^
?i
K
PCF would be
the front ranks defending the nation.
Le Monde, Sep^
tember 25-25, 1977, p. 5.

m

^
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Before the war a si.iXar
confusion arose a„o„,
the parties of
the left,
socia. Be^oorats. for
exa^pie, assessed the
international
perii ,uite differenti,
fro„ the Co^nists.
To the SPIO Ha.is™
„as
not an i^ternatio^X
danger in the early
.ears.
The Co^unists, however, did view the
Nazis as a genuine
international danger bv
193.,
but only after the Soviet
£atrie was endangered.

To help sort out the
divergenoie<!
eigencies anH
and „„
complexities of defense
policies on the left,
^ef-^
t will
I
employ the foregoing as
an organizing prin•

i

ciple.

•

will explain PS-PCF
differences by their identities
with the
two different post-war
blocs.
Such a framework should
help to demonstrate varying attitudes
on the left toward such
issues as alliance
policy, nuclear weapons,
targeting, flexible response,
tactical nuclear
weapons, development of a Navy,
forward defense, and a
professional
army.
1

An overview of defen se requirei
nents.

France is sometimes described
as

The British Labour Partv likp the Qrm
armament policies against the
Ge'J^an'^L'a .''LthJ^^l
•

is

L

j

lerSs^rfin'^-

°PP°se an international danger. A good diseus^^'^''^^
the inter°°ar years
Adotf ?/°':k'"= °°
f

=

u.

:

.

service.
CommunLts sipo^ed^irin t^te' re^W ^
esting to note a historic role reversal:

TellT lt"s"Ster-

today, the Communists of Satneutralist-pacifist movements that have sproSed
in the ig^Os'"'^:^
^oeialist Parties favor stronger defenses.
ihe SPD and the British
The
^^f^'T'"
Labour Party are seriously split on this
question.

f
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.

nauonax Hexe.on,

.avin, .,..e ™ari«™e
...es. Canned, .Ua.tie
an.
Mediterranean, an. three
continental si.es, Pyrenees,
«p3 and KMneland.
Defense traditionally
focused on a powerful
Germany, a danger
usually „et through the
erection of a European
alliance structure."
.

Following world War II, the
goals and strategies
closely resembled the Classic outlook
of 1919: defense policies
were those of preserving territorial satisfaction
in Europe, retaining
the French Union,
maintaining a weak, dis.e*ered
Germany, and continuing the
traditional
alliance with the Russians.
Cle.enceau would have approved.
But it
was no longer 1919, and
post-war Governments began
to question the traditional alliance with the
Russians.
We have seen how France
reversed
itself, joining Germany
against the new power of Russian
imperialism.

Se--it5-«^^^

by the American presence."
But if the Atlantic

1815.
GovernL'nrh^rrLe'r"""^
See Jean-Bap?SrDuioLur
"?h,'n"^
in
Search o? France Stanlev HT'
bookr x963), pp.^"-3-37 and

m

"^^^
'•^^""'^

"

^"^f
'

kins Pressf;962)"°pp^l53gS-r'^',r'

trad^ko-al^^L^f if

Z^Z^^

back France' ™^ thrRu"h" ^ue^Itlfn"

^

hexagon of
frontiers,
PoU-^y since 19^5"

^''^^

"^^^^
(Baltimore: John Hop-

b^^tLin^lt^:™

^"^^""^^^^^

^""^^^S" Minister Georges Bidault actually feared a
Soviet takeo.....
^ T.
over of
Western Europe in 1948.
See U.S. Ambassador Jefferson
McCaffe^v's
cable to George Marshall, March
1948, in Department of __dj^e_^joreign
S ater^ore ™
Relations of the U.S. 1948 Vol. Ill,
629
_

.

p.
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rorces.

Communists, of

an
aoinde
H
independent
.

-u«.„g

conT^c,^

initiative, towards
defense,

nevertheless
"heless, xt was the
Socialists they were
as a domestic ally,
not the Gaulllsts.

^^^^-^^^^^iutlon^o^S^^

"

-

.

n™^c defense

"^th .epuhlic lao.ed any

dy-

concepts, particularly
when contrasted with
the .ore innovative Caullists or
the «re dramatic
ideas of the PCP.
Ihere was
vague discussion nf oc-h^ki
u
establishing
an independence
from the U.S., p,^3uing
a European framework,
dismantling
the
tae force
o
rorce_^^_frappe
de f.
and dissolving
all the Mocs in Enrope.
Much of this was the
wisht.1 thinkin, of
a
party in opposition,
rather than reali.ahle
policy.
But OauXlist polices were also vulnerable:
The attempted
An^lo-Prench-U.S. triu.virate
over MTO had collapsed,
the Paris-Bonn A.is
appeared dead. Prench influence in the Third
World was frustrated
oteu.
fl
A taullist
GauUn'^t France
f
seemed
only capable of reiectinn^- n^r,
*° ="Pranatlonality, non to
Britain, non
_^
•

•

-

^

^-

-P—

'"^^
of defensl'poii:"
^Andlhe'S's'^freo"';,
Thus Marines were landed
""P""" "^'^^ subordinations.
in ''^'^^on
! any
L^b^non .HtK
without
consultation with the
French.
De Gaulle's
Western Alliance :as rurned
^J"P-""e directory of tL
turned ToZ
down.
S
See Le_Monde, March
1, 1969, p. 2.

rejected "iTLrba^slclf
0I

n^^io::.""--"^

a^forc^de^^r^^t"^:

°"

™ty

issuel.

It

«as^~l^'.: -trr:iVbTa i^.
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to NATO.

Charles Hernn

^

q^^a

t

•

™

''''

-"^-y matters, attributed the failures
in G.„ui3t defense
policy to a Wd
wide gap between
P
France
s pretenses
as a world power
and the actual no
power at her dispo16
-X.
Her™ atte.pted to
.roaden the le.el of
de.ate to . .ore
...r.,

,

Z

—

--tes

"

—

-

^ore i„

conceptions of the .r.^-s
role in the nation,
all
surronndin, weapons
systems, hardware and
scenarios „ere

secon-

"

"

-

-e tradition of .a.r.s, „ere
Hardly pacifists,
hut the ar.y had to
he tranfor.d into
an emanation
=-e
flictmg the forces.

the "ghetto" .alaise
af-

in Noven^er,
1973, one .onth hefore the
Socialists Convention
B^^i2iHle at Bagnolet, Charles' nernu
Hernu'ss study
studv commission issued
its proposal: Prance could not
continue to reject the
Atlantic fra.e„orK forever.
Nor could it accept the
other extre.es of
neutralization or uni•

•

•

versal disarmament.^^
A Socialist
Soriainc^ Government
could only reach its
objec-

S2ldat:Cito^

72-76.

(Pa.is: Flammarion,

1975), pp.

17

U

"

-

"^"i^^^"
rand's Cabinit! 'was
""ter'probaWv the™' f°
""""^^^^^
spokesman
on defense
questions with n the'ps and
ii»Mili£££teur who carried
great weight with Mrtte^rand
iitterrand.
?oi'?h°"
For
these reai^ns his vielJTTre
ficant.
signi-
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^°

::::r

^

---^^^^^

p--a......

the Atlantic Alliance
cr the Wester^n f

""i™-

"

It With some general
referenroo
erenc.s +^
r
to Europe-wxde

nuclearized zones and
partial disarmament
rmament.

--'^ =-tion

''"her, he refined

collective security

de-

•

E.h
.
Echoing
the
Common Program

ot a citi^ens ar.,
or.ani.e. around
territorial

course, to preserve
the nation.s security
durin, the envisaged
transition to socialise.
follo„in, the formation
ot a Covern.ent under
the Common Program.

_Wuclear Weapons and
National Defe

n^

PVanoe "went nuclear"
in the sixties when
it judged the two
superpowers to he mutual!,
in^lneraUe tro. attack, or
unlikely to
attack one another.
However, critics on lett
and right soon challenged
the wisdo. and efficacy
of such a deterrent in
the hands of a middlerange power." But ™uch
of the debates over weapons
and deterrence
hissed an essential
Gaullist political point:
a forc^^^frappe was
Vital to advance diplo^tic
goals.
Defensive, «aginot-line
conceptions

;-^^^™tf»aMlity

Of earlier Governments to
pursue foreign policy

18

^^^^^"^
to deter a's^vie'^'attack^'This'"'"""'
-""ty
Plutons.
^'^'^^
see A^on^s ? e c-a
D^'St^"
°l
(Garden city, N.Y.: D oubleday
Fy-^^-'^HSlS^^.St^^
uuieudy ana
and Co.,
Co
Sl
1965,
Trans.
Ernest Pawell),
82.

Z

p.
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before the war." True,
the

ho^

couXa not provide
security fro™ a

Kussian attac.

hut it could secure
inaepe.aeuce fro. the United
State
Furthermore, sa.d so.e
Cauiiists, it couid serve
as an effective triggering device to compel
the engagement of U.S.
forces, shifting the
locus of war-making decision
from Washington to Paris."

^i^S-^^SHlMS^n^^^lear^^

Throughout the sixties and seven-

ties strong anti-nuclear
currents existed in the
non-Communist left.
The arguments advanced were
often moral in tone. But
there were pragmatic ones as well. Thus the
force de frapue seemed
impotent next to
that of the superpowers. A
few Mirage TVs could never
penetrate an

enemy's defenses.

Furthermore, France was highly
vulnerable itself.

Twenty-five nuclear-tipped missiles
could destroy everything within
hexagon,
civil defense was non-existent.^^

th.

19

attack us"^^''RnJ^i^'^'"''.f

^'^^ "^"^"^ "^^ ^ill defend if you

In other words the British
gained no

^attison), p.

diplomatic advantages
'

loo.

Som tL

^^^^ Ames

21

war-making initiative, see Grosser,
p. 103
By
Bv the 1970s
"^^f^^^g
1970s, ^rGiscard
was calling on France to rank as the
third-stro-^
"'^
est nuclear power in the world.
Le Monde
June 4, 1976, pp
iti5
.

Beregovoy of the SFIO held the weapon
to be useless.
One It
One,
it lacked
la^k!r^any second-strike capability.
Two, it was blind since
unlxnked to any radar and tele-communication
syst;m (these being ^^"^^
ted by the U.S. and NATO).
"'"^ operaHe urged that it be renounced.
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Graduau,, however,
between 13S8 and

™a„, on t.e nonCommunist left and within
Pq began
h=
the PS
to reappraise
earlier frozen noSltions.
Some of the classic
flss,,-^ arguments
=
against the foree de
frappe
were growing outmoded,
as new weapons emerged,
such
bomhers, nuclear suhmarines.
.Ibion missiles and the
Pluton.
Purthermore, de Gaulle's
election victories
ictories
iqr. and
. .o
1965
1969 could reasonably
be viewed as mandates
for the
th^. nuclear
t.,,^t
program, unquestionably
a popular
one with Frenchmen.
On December 18-19
1971 a. n.,
iy/1,
new proposal was submitted to the Comite_dlrecteur
the t^.b.
P S
wh
whichh said in effect:
^ of rne

TZZZ^^.r.,.

m

•

•

Nuclear weapons, a reality
for
could only be renounced
i^

^

we': nec'ssTr^'
France!

'

•

lo years ir. P..
the ^aJ;::o:,^:f 'L^J^^I
-i^-^-^^ly. Such weapons
middle-rank
power such as
^

°f --clear weapons by a
iTcllllTr'r'
constitute a decisive
asset from a diplomatic
Lsef
negotiation point of view?^

In other words, a Government
of the Left would formulate
its o.^

defense policies.

As Hernu and Jacques Huntzinger
were saying in the

early 1970s, a Socialist
France would require protection
against the
direct or indirect manoeuvers
from hostile blocs. One might
pay lip
service to a disarmed world,
but in the short run, France
under a Socialist regime would have to
retain the existing arsenal built
up
23

the origina!^"ul!ist"decSi:„"t:
"gf nu^tar^^^^L^aVpo^r^L^^l is It"'
was mtlttary.
See Stanley Hoffmann, Decline
or Renew al r'en'h foreL
Policy since the 1930. (New York:

ViklHTKess,

p.

298.

)
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cu.re„.s o. „eut.aXi..
..at had e.iste.

oX.

Which usually urged
unilateral di s armament.

SHO

an. the PS

in early 1072,
Jean-Pierre Chevene.ent
joined the debate- to
renounce the ho* was
de^.ogie and Irresponsihle
.
He advanced a classic

powers,

comparisons were .trictly
speculative, since strategic
purposes
were different.
Prance need only confront
a future aggressor
with an
.ntolerable risK.
(The PCP argued that such
a strategy might
invite a
preventative assault.

One could say that de
Gaulle's great nuclear legacy
was now
under less threat by policymakers
of the Left.
Hernu and his team of
experts were quite influential
with Mitterrand, and ultimately
would

prevail upon the PS to accept
the force de franpe

.

And the Co.unists,

too, we will see, later
reversed their long-standing
opposition.

Mitterrand's thinking on nuclear issues
over the years indicates
that he too was capable of
reappraisal.

Like many observers in France,

2^
P"'"''^ conference. Hay W, 197U, he remarked
that philo!
,,
sophically
and
morally he opposed nuclear weapons for
France
"But vou
are asking me the question in
197., and I am a politicaUy r^alistl"^
man .
Hernu, p. 2W.
Michel Debre" reminds us that Mitterrand
wis a
minister
the Mendes-France Government that
launched a felSbiSty
study on nuclear weapons in 1954. Le
Monde , January 13, 1973, p. 9.
•'

m
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he holds that the
superpowers have
sanctuari.ed tnemselves
themselves successfully.
But, xn any war,
Europe,

—

.

^

and surely rFrance
ranee, woulH
k
would be
y
ravaged.

^

oT;:;;:V^"^^
^

the superpowers.

^a^ge

-

The

the dete.e„ee
value

«^^Pon.v in the arsenal
o.

His point is that Pv,
France could not
inflict sufficient

on a possible
aggressor to prevent an

attaC. Respite these
cogent ar^.ents,
Mitterrand nevertheless
committed the PS in

-PPO-

f^^.^S

^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^

considerable tas., since
reintegration hac. into
NATO was out of the'
question.

in assessing his
nuclear views, one should
also note his evaluation of the disarmament
issue.
It was de Gaulle who
led France away
fro. a policy Of
disarmament in 1962.
Disarmament would have
confirmed

the U.S.-Soviet condominium
and perpetuated the
division sanctioned at
Valta.
Thus, says Mitterrand,
de Gaulle ij^ored
disarmament conferences
for much the reason he
withdrew from NATO: he
dreamed of an independent,

self-sufficient France, always
retaining basic links to the
Alliance
(and always clinging to
General

AiUerefs stra«sie_tou^^^imu^

ever

^1^^^;;^;^^^^^^;;^

mterfereT^

the essence of ttis

tion, but'noi'
p^^^'-^d::SoTe™ftLr:toc°r"
^'^'-["S stocks.
The
Z'?'"
i;^"
formula left the
basic
question unre-^nlv^H
I compromiL™^;„-:,^\:-„:,-t=^L"1e%^^^^
.

rr/°

.
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Gaullist

^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^^^^

autonomous role of
France in i-h^
it
the allxance
gave her a special
position

"^"^

r7-

-

^

^

~r

s„perpo„e.

.isoa.,

tl

'

initiatives in .isa^a^ent,
voicing oni, .topian
Slogans of general and
complete disar^^nt,
JJ^L
but Ignoring
i.norin. .
»
more practical
27
steps

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^1^^

Co»nist3

in rranoe, li.e
the..
se ...
in
^he soviet union,
considered that the advent
of .ass destruction
weapons
had wrought so^e basic
changes in doctrine and
had tunda.entall,

altered

international polit.es.
nolitiV^

c^k
such

weapons effectively barred
the possibility

Of war as a prelude
to world revolotion.

P.^ther.ore. they removed
the

likelihood that capitalist
states would war a.ong
themselves, as happened

^;^^^^^_-^W^These
26

weapons logically required
a policy of co-

.

Mitterrand's views are spt

•

-Fo-n-hh
article in Le Monde,
^^^^
December 14, 1977 nn i JIa
m
Of disarmament
ne^oS^tions'su"; af sL
rr^vLlLflL'^^" conspiracy
among superpowers. Hernu,
for example branded
SAfr I? an attempt by
superpowers to desimate their rec^n^^^ br^nLd SALT
the
territories as sanctuaries, fixing Europe
as the site^of
it should be noted
communists,
Select ^hirl.
' interpretation of arms limitation
'
among superpowers.
talks

f

'

A.Mtious"^SL\:i:~
impossible, he holds.

Mitterrand,
r'ender all genuine agreement

28

Leninist no^^L^ns'o^'^hTa.^UhTilf

t^^'

^^""^

^

:
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existence.

Given the reality of a
hostile capitalist Moe,
it was fully
acceptable for the Soviet Union
to possess nuclear
weapons.

However, it was not acceptable
for France to possess
nuclear
weapons, said the PCF.
Such at least was the policy
until the updating
Of the Prograin^e commun in the
Spring of 1977, when the Central
Co.ittee
reversed this long-stanaing
doctrine.
But throughout .ost of the
years
of the Fifth Republic, communists
opposed a key tenet of Gaullist
national
independence and defense policy.
This stand aligned the™ with
some
of the more pacifist segments
inside the PS who, we have seen,
always
opposed the bomb on principle.
Communists, however, did not base
their

opposition to the weapon as pacifism.

They variously employed these

arguments
1) The bomb would not act to deter an
aggressor.
Such thinkina
'
xgnored the true (or possible) manner
in which wa'^s unfolded! ^h^s
France could well be led into war against
29

its will.

integration of Trance into petite Europe might
transform

a n.t.•nn^^
national force de frappe into a European^^^^^

Nuclear weapons

could not be used against non-nuclear states.
This would outrage world opinion.
Nor could they be employed if French
soil was invaded: the French population
would be destroyed.
^,

.

4) Nuclear weapons were not more econom.ical than
conventional
in war, ground troops still had to occupy
enemy terrain.

29

Thus war might have followed from the Cuba
missile crisis
particularly when de Gaulle cabled Kennedy full support.
Or,' war wis
possible
Central Europe.
France could easily be drawn in because
she had troops in the FRG. Mere possession of the
bomb would not protect her from being drawn in.
These various reasons are discussed in
Pierre Villon, "Reflections on Gaullist Military Policy",
Cahiers du
"~
Communis me . No. 3, March, 1959, pp. 24-32.

m
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cation.
into a nuclear war. 30

^
VsZlT^sZiXtlTTr^ZlTf
transforming

^

P-™-

any conventional
attack

6) France's possession n-F
u
^
refusal to sign the
Government's
Ln-ProSJerat^on
^^^^"^^^^^^ tIT.I
^^^^^Y' would drive the FRG into
developing its own bomb.

The PC F and a nuclear

_

C.e.-rm ^r..r

item
xLttiu

six ahov.
bix
aDove requires a closer
•

examination.

One might think
xiii^ that
mat thp
PPP'.s obsession
k
the PCF
6
with the FRG
would lead it to the
Gaullist view: that the bo*
was necessary in solving the "German problem"
(na.ely by giving France
superiority)
But
the PCF rejected this
perspective. Rather, Communists
emphasized the
.

danger of nuclear proliferation,

m

1968 they were strongly
critical of

de Gaulle's boycott of
the Geneva Conference on
non-proliferation.
The particular, and often
explicit fear, was Germany: by
not signing NPT,

France would Induce Germany
to develop such weapons."
30

T"""

1975 r%n^™S^'?
tadi! tey'9, ?975" p 7!'
17

'°

Committee, Le Monde, April

" "non-firstuse pledge

bFTi^e".^

^

31
13.

The if:; c\"^;ir;

iTZT^iiiir,,^'^ 'iVsVAii:

h7co--i!:SitLs"™^-'

-

'i-

'

r

c-eir?hrs:ttic^-ne:r-

32

contention of Generals Baufre and Gallois
that the spread
of such weapons would have a stabilizing
influence was "out of touch
with reality", L'Humanite , November
.

14,

1975, p. 8.

33,

Respite the FRG's renunciation of nuclear weapons,
ther- was
memo

a
of I960 urging development of such
weapons.
L'HumaniJe
urged a modifying clause in the NPT: that
^
nuclear powers not employ or
threaten their atomic weapons against
states on whose territory there
namely those states wh ich did not want such
"°
wea non'
Soviets could not promise to spare the FRG
!
whichuuhad some 6,000 American nuclear
weapons on its territory.
L'Humanite, November 14, 1975, p. 8.

Rnn^
^H£desv^

^
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in 1S58 the

-Sn

the

Co.^ists

„3s

were asking „hy de
GauUe refused to

™.erst.„,.Me. sai. ..es
.orea.,

the.

not si,„ the

Moscow Treat, ha„„i„,
a.ove-^ou„. tests (this
„oui.
have bioe.ea Prance's
own aeveiop.ent of
the

forc^^^^,.

™otives in issa were „ore
complex.

GauUe wante. to retain his
optron Of supplying
nuclear weapons to West
Germany.
There was, after
an. a Bonn-Paris axis: the
for^^ejrappe represented one
of the
"ele.ents of Prance's dowrythat Prance was offering
in this nerriage?'
Ce

In the late 1960s, it
see^s, the

Co„unists were wary of

a

German plan, articulated
by Defense Minister
Pranz-.oseph Strauss, to
establish a European nuclear
deterrent force within the
framework of
"the Six".

Ih^JSIS^e

frappe le.iti^t_ed.

Despite the arguments cited,

Co^unists, as often in the past,
reversed themselves on
fense issue.

a national de-

After a .ajor review of defense
problems, the PCP in May,
'

^--"cally^^

gears on its long-standing
policy of opposition

proposed to the German War
College "^"^"I'g.
teLurf 'an
an organic cooperation between
the "ei'on
French nrmy
i-h= Bund
B
i eswehr.
Armv and
the
,
supgestinir scienti-fiV =„w » k

Z

SL^"pS~^^

.an ; ^5i:
tion of nuclear weapons through
the MLF proposal.

acquisi
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to nuclear weapons
in France.
FranoA

n

Unquestionably, the bomb
was today in
France a reality, and
did constitute
ture tne
the only
onlv Hdeterrent
.
for the nation
even if today it was
in the hands of
r rne
the class e.P
enemy - and pointed only
at socialist nations.
The PCP, of course,
„o,ad give these weapons
a
"new waning... retaining
the. exolusivel, on
Prenoh territory, pointed
^'^ ^-^-^ possible
agcrreqcin-PQ
aggressors. One could^ cxte
several immediate reasons
for the reversal:

—

-,

Military.

.

To assure the ar.y
that the sophisticated
bases of
di-antled.' The nuclear bu
ldup
had'L'd
'^""'^ ^^^lect of conventional
forces
France
*°,f
France^oould not be left
defenseless, as MarcSiJ'

Electoral. It « I, ,
,oliU..,,y popular step in the
upcoming 1978 legislative
elections.
Independent
defense was now a value
internalized and'mandaL
manaated
by almost all Frenchmen.

—

Diplomatic. Nuclear weapons
could be used to diplomatic
advan°'

^unSt'ar'gSr?!'

Germany.

There was no longer the earlier
fear that French
possession of the bomb would induce
the FRG to

seek Its own.

poiiScs
pontics.
-

n,.-T-^

^"^"^
PS to break
with°tr"''A":^''"
with
their Atlantic orientation,
preferred targeting
s^-^^^fe
policies^ etc.

^^""^P^ Report,

.

vision

Th

PC^r^ass baL

2lJ

dered the

op^ cit.

The reversal

shocked manv
Committee vote on telewas done without any consultation
with th
?h''r'n' ^^^^^ded its volte
face in that it consia year-and-a-half
F riHce Nouvel le
June 6, 1^77.

about—e-CiT^tral

issue

^

.

,

36

Le Monde, September 25-25,

1977, p. 6.
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Were the Co«unists really
reversing themselves on
nuclear „ea-

i.sues as weapons abstractly,
but within a political
context.
Perhaps
it nede sense to oppose
these weapons under a
right-wing government.
But why oppose the. if the
left achieved power, Why
yield a valuable
asset when you were about to
assume power. Most of all,
the Communists,
like many on the non-Communist
left, had a premonition that
a Government Of the heft, committed
to deep social transformations and standing isolated in Western
Europe - was inherently prone
to de-stabilization from abroad.
"Socialism in one ccmtry", to use
Duverger's

phrase, would require a potent
national defense."

The Communists attempted to
attach certain conditions to their

acceptance of nuclear weapons in any
future, hypothetical Government
of
the Left, that:
a) French forces remain i-ndependent
and its warning systems. 3°

,

unlinked to NATO

b) There be a doctrine of strict
deterrence.

Dissuasion

37

The left's analysis of events in Portugal
and Chile heightened fears of outside interference with
a Government of the Left.
38

French deterrent must not rely on the NADGE
air defense
and detection data supplied by NATO and the
U.S.
The nation must develop Its own observation satellites, radar
svstem, and surveillance
aircraft, plus a capability of orbitting observation
and communication
satellites.
.

^
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had to replace the

^trategi^de_^^

c) Weapons be kept
in their current
state- ^"'^
ones were not to be
'
perfected

°^
"button",
rather
tnan an exclusively
^han'an'''"?
.'/^^^^^
PresidPTi+-n=,i a
de Gaulle had it)/
Ha^cha ^ ^'op ^^It^a
"^^^^ included .ft
?L Chi fT'^'^"
-presentaJi^ea
of

f

ti%^\L

2T\'"^"'

"""^
Disarmament Talks (which
IhrSd'h"
she had been absent
fr-om for years) and
associate herself „,th the
SALT negotiations. tl

USSR?"*''

the

°' """-"SS'^-^^'ion be signed with
the

phrase'deSn^f ?o'us':.i::r" Huf™' h^'S'"^ ^""^''^ ^° -^1"''point ..i?iiiii-^rSi?^;s..
°° "--i
allies
Le Monde August

L rd

.

9,

,

40

1977

>

n

1
^.

This was consistent with th^ vor
^
parliamentary and cabinet role
^ "^'^^^
if
Fif^h R^P^blic
RenuhK
h
decisionmaking.
Mitterrand rejected this too rn?/ f
But
^^^^^^^
'
deprived
weapon of any'deterrent vSu;
the
"
in
""^'^"^ '^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
collegiality, he was p^eoared to
consultation by
the President and
Minlste"'' Le
^mister.
Le'T'f
Monde August 19, 1977 and
March 13, 1978.
^-

-Tr^-t-

"L^Sme

,
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Some Socialists were warv of ^att ^^-o^-:^
considering it an effort
of the superpowers to desicm^t.
'
•

Clonal, and on European
:LT"afd^i-/^"-"="-"-^
territory.

^unven

180

Tactical Nuclear Weapon.^Forward Defense or^ ^_^r^r^^^^^j^

Nuclear weapons, once
accepted^^ opened up a
^rther array of
questions for the defense
analysts on the left:
tactical weapons,
placement of .issiles in
Germany, targeting and
levels of response.

Classical Gaullist thinking
articulated by General Ailleret
em-

situations did not require a
.assive response.^^ They called
for tactical weapons at the division
level.
As General Fourquet, successor
to
Ailleret expresses it, there was
a need to demonstrate
resistance without invoking a "jeu de 1'
escalade ".^"^

And once one deployed tactical
nuclear weapons, it raised the

further issue of forward links to
the allies and NATO.

Giscard had

42

^^^^^ ^'^^
turn-around. Socialists
R
and Radicals
proposed a referendum on the force de frappe
question
The proposal was withdrawn but
revived at the celebrated Mitterran^Marchaxs summxt of September 22, where
discussions on the Programme commun ultimately collapsed.
Duverger called it illegal, no ting^hat
the
'""^
since 're fere ndumfonJy
appSe'a Jo"l
appliea
T^'"'-^
to laws dealing
with government organization or ratification
ricarion or
of
certain treaties.
Le Monde
August 2, 1977.
,

Communists, for example, rejected an anti-cities
doctrine- it
would convert urban populations into hostages.
The Kanapa Report p
Louis Baillot, director of the Party's
21.
Commission on National Detense, proposed a policy of targeting on an
enemy's scientific and industrial centers.
How one did this without also striking cities
was
not clear.
See Le Monde
March 8, 1978, p. 9.
_

,

44

Le Monde

,

April 30, 1969, p.

11.

^
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innovated with a forward
battle ^one xn
nr.
Germany, a significant
reversal of
Polxcy, as some on the
left claimed.

Ill£Jll£yiGallois dispute
Pute.

pTt w^.
It
was Pxerre
Gallois who popularized
"abso-

lute sanctuarization":
the xdea
r
idea th^^
that France
was untouchable,
unconcerned
with neigboring states.
Under
unaer such
snrh a
. policy,
^ t
the nation would:
*

.

.

IZW'"'"''^^^''
and
bombers.

submarines, silos
-^-L-Li^i,

Dismantle almost all other
forces.
Keep perhaps a few
thousand troops to
&Jard nuclear arsenals.

The problem „as, this
absolute sanctuarization
doctrine ignored
all limited war scenarios,
those calling for a response
below the nuclear threshhold. Under
^
under the
th^^ Gallois
r-^n^-;^ doctrine,
^
France might- indeed emerg e
intact, but under Soviet
sway or alone in a "Finlandized"
Europe.
•

Speaking for the Giscard regime,
Guy Mery challenged the
"abso
lute" doctrine as "neutralism".
Even "if all Europe collapsed
around
us, we could, never resist
the demands on us", said
the Chief of Staff

unthinkable, justified by no pollricai stake.
tical
stake
Hence French forces ""^l
of the future would be a small
armv
of technicians, outside the usual
military mould, hardly the so^t abL
to launch a Bonapartist coup
d'etat , let alone storm the Elyse'e
See
May

Isf 19

5,'pp.

!39^^^

Gall^

P aris Mat^h ,

under Giscard.

Instead. Mery proposed an
"enlarged sanctuary" or
forward battle doctrine: rather
than sanctuarize within
the hexagon if attacked
France should deploy
conventionally, or even nuclearly
on the soil of
allies (meaning the FRG).
While there would be no such
forward positions in peacetime, in actual
co^at, French troops would defend
not
only northern and eastern
frontiers, but fight alongside
NATO forces,
defending the front line eastern
borders of West Germany, if
needed/
Thus French troops deployed
along the Rhine in the 1970s
would have
shifted eastwards towards the
Weser and Elbe."'
The Left and tactical nuclear weanon.

these new doctrines?

How did the Left respond to

.

As a rule, their spokes„,en feared
any possible

entry by French forces into broad
conventional tactical nuclear warfare in Europe.

This was surely possible if Giscard
attempted to

reconcile NATO's xxexiDxe
-ppc^nnnQo
flexible response.

t>.^,,
^
They
opposedj strategies
of early

engagement, preferring an "absolute deterrence".

The issue was com-

plex, because French military thinking
regards nuclear weapons in two
45

^^^2 is based on Mery's address to students at
the Higher
institute of National Defense Studies, March
15, 1976.
See Defense
—
Nationale, June, 1976, pp. 11-3^+.
'
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At the time (1976) two French divisions,
totalling 60,000 men
were deployed just over the Rhine into West
Germany.
—Thp New York
—
Times, June 3
1976, p. 3.
,

Michael

M.

Harrison, pp. 29-30.

possible categories:

^ ^^£5tegie_^|emploi.

But When tactical
nucXear weapons such
as the Pluton arrived.
they created ^iiLu
pc, ^-f ^
ambie:uitT
j.gux Lies
or doctrinp
Th^ deterrence
a^-icrrme. The
function of
4-

•

Pluton. triggering the
strategic bo™bs hardened
into the Plateau dAlbion, had heen revised.
Tacticai nuclear weapons
were now seen as
"weapons of battle" in
a

stste^l^^^e^.

The Socialists objected:

lining Plutons with conventional

forces paral,.ed the
latter in their maneuverability,
creating the illu-

-on

that nuclear power could
serve as a for™ of super
artillery,

.ncreasingly

in NATO:

.e-

that Giscard lost

sight of the fact that
U.S.
strategy of rigoste^^raduee
was not one of deterrence,
but a strategie
lliffiiai - which could convert Western Europe
into a vast battlefield.

^^^^£L52iL«^^«!£02£i™-

Co^unists held that under Giscard,

the nation was altering
classic defense policies.

Classic

tous_^^

.^.^^ ^^^^^^^

sumptions about the threat from
the East.

General Aillerfs

^^^^^

^^^^^^^

Mery's innovations were sub-

tly shifting France' s defenses
from the Rhine to the
Elbe,^\ubordinating
Le Monde

^'"^^
card

MtI:

h

July 20, 1976, p. 7.
The Russians, too, were alert
innovations.
During Brezhnev's visit ^o G^sparticipation ^n^

Zr23,°l977r;rB:^
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the French ar.y to U.S.
forces, and .aking it a
.ere forward patrol of
the Bundes^hr.
Co^unxsts had no particular
objection to tactical

Pluton missiles, but Insisted
that they be based enolusively
inside
France, ^or years, the PCF
opposed emplacement of tactical
missiles in
the FRG.=° PCF Deputy Louis
Baillot even pointed out that
these weapons
were good protection against
Germany. since tomorrow, Germany
"could become the enemy of rxduce,
France eopecially
p<^npnT;qi i,. if
^ -f
y
a n
Government of the Left arrives
in power here".^"'"

^I^:^^£:^SIlli2I^^

Except for les territoires d'outre-mer

,

spokesmen

for the left generally hold that
national security extends only to the

"hexagon".

But in broader discussions of
national purpose, experts on

the left accept the need for some
form of force d intervention
'

.

Indeed,

France requires such a capability." And
the Communists as well, accept
.

.

this view.

53

The question, of course, is intervention
on behalf of whom,

50

.

.

interesting to note that a campaign had been
coordinated
with the tmy German Communist Party in
protest against delivery of
these weapons to Land Hesse. L'Humanite June
,
24, 1975, p
3
Specific modes of PCF cooperations with Parties
abroad will be discussed
a further chapter.
!^

m
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Le Monde
March 8, 1978, p. 9. Mery has recently suggested
replacing the Pluton with the neutron bomb. The PCF
rejects this as
a dangerous lowering of the nuclear threshhold.
The PS has reached no
decision on the neutron weapons. New York Times June
,
12, 1978,
14.
,

^

p.

52

.

This was a great lesson of the inter-war years.
Non-intervention in Spain did not prevent German aggression in
1939.
See' Jean Paucot's essay in Une Reflexion Ouverte p. 48.
,

53^

.

^

.

Louis Baillot gives the PCF view in Le Monde, March 8, 1978

p.

9.
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such a force already
exist., and is often
used in operations that
the
left opposes as neo-colonial
By i„e there was
an intervention force
Of 35.000 troops in Prench
spea.ing African states,
aii .nder „tuaX
.

arrangements.^^

In emphasizing the
privacy of the hexagon,
Socialists have not
overlooked the fact that
PrancCs strategic position is
at so.e of the

™ost travelled .ariti.e-.one
crossroads. .aKing the nation
vulnerable
to disturbances in the
world. Any realistic defense
policy „st consider that France depends
highly on the Third World for
key imports:
.

Petroleum from North Africa and
the Persian Gulf.

.

Uranium and other minerals from
Gabon.

.

Phosphates and cotton from North
Africa.

.

Wool from Australia.

Outside of the Third World, France's
major suppliers are the

United States and the USSR.

Jean Paucot, writing in the 1976
study commissioned by the PS,

20, 1976, p. 15.
And these forces are quite
active.
Thus 400 paratroopers were sent to
Zaire to defend Shaba Province.
Jaguar ^ets have attacked Polisario
guerillas in western Sahara"'"^
^'^^ ^° aid'^overnment forces opp^s ng'
rebe°L'
. rr^f'^
'^'^''^
New Yogk Tim'e_s
of
May 21, 1978,
Ma^fl
1978 p. 19.
For evidence that France is acti ng "officia
"^^^"^ States", see Jack Kramer, "Our
^"^^^^
S^^n^h
flench r'"'"'^!^^
Connection
Africa", Foreign Policy . No 29, Winter, 1977-78,

~

m
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argues that Prance has
only two

.a.o. choices." Either
the nation

"accepts a satellite status
to the American Empire,
or, it un.erta.es.
withm a European framework,
to
Lu defend
aerena the
thp independence
inHo
^
of certain
Third Worid states, namely
those with a riparian
location on the Mediterranean, those in the
Indian Ocean and certain
suh-tropicai states in
Africa". Paucofs study
goes on to argue that the
superpowers can generate and support local
conflicts by sending in ar.ies,
weapons and technicians - or act to destabilize
regimes.
Prance is directly concerned
by this: in fact, risks
of confrontation are greater
here than in Europe.
Prance's vital need not to
be cut off fron, supplies and
lines
of communications, leads it
to support the independence
of peoples
of these regions against
all oppression.
,

Further Defense Debates on the
Left
We have reviewed some of the
important debates of the period,

indicating how a Socialist-led France
hoped to navigate between the two
blocs, avoid wars of remote interest,
lead a nuclear (or non-nuclear)
defense, defend the sanctuary, conduct
limited war or possible inter-

ventions abroad.
"Sliding back to Atlanticism".

By now it should be clear that

all segments on the left embraced the
idea of an independent defense
55

"L' Organi sation generale de notre
defense ", in Reflexions
Paucot's essay is by no means an official "party
pp. 41-48.
line""'
But It IS of interest and significance in
that

it expresses a general
point of view reflective of mainstream thinking
within the PS

-
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the Old rallying cry of
the Gaulli.ts.

along with others, leunohed

a

But in «v., the
Co^unists

campaign acousing the
po.t-de Gaulle-

GaulUsts (namely Pompidou) of
"sliding back into NATO".=^
The evidence
consisted of such facts as
the regi.e had discarded
tou^azi™ut targeting; it was accepting
the "graduated response"
doctrine; French
units had joined witn
with NATO
::.r,^
NAlO ;qirair and
naval maneuvers in the
Mediterranean,
n

and defenses were
ere relvino^
relying r^•n
on h-k^
the equipment
of the U.S. and NATO for
nuclear alert facilities.

This time, the PCF had evidence
at hand.

And as Kriegel notes,

It is the duty of any Communist
party
.o. to influence the foreign
policy of a particular
country
the manner closest to the interests
of
the socialist camp as a whole.
In recent years," the
French party has seen itself as a
watchdog, working
to keep open the variety of options
favorable to them
by which General de Gaulle guided
French diplomacy 58

m

Thus Pompidou (and later Giscard) was
guilty of reinserting
France into NATO.
Le Monde,, January 13, 1972,
pp. l Ld 6.
The Socfalxsts tended to remain aloof from
the Marchais-Pompidou polemics
Le

of defense the disagreem.ents between
France and virtually every other
being reconciled".
"French Foreign
Policy
PoScv"°fn Foreign Policy in World Politics
,
p. 112.

m

57^.

bee the dispatch in the New York Tim.es
"France's Forces are
quietly renewing ties for NATO" May
21, 1978, p. 19.
"These arrangements exist", an unnamed French defense
official is quoted as saying
of course we will have to deny their
existence in the Chamber of
Deputies".
_

58

France

:

_

,

p

.

——

The International Role of the Com munist Parties
of_ Italy
and
~
__
__
y
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Whether or not Kriegel
is correct
correct, it returns
us to the formulation stated at the stari- r^-F -hkstart of this chapter:
that the PCF had a
certain
Identity with the Soviet
bloc
Hr^w^
bloc.
However,
unlike the PCF, the nonCommunist left was ever
alert to rne
the nistoric
histor.V hdanger posed
by postwar Soviet preponderance
in Europe.

'-^^^^^I^^^^^^^

One group which has
directed its

analysis to many of the
questions reviewed was CERES.
This faction
within the PS (weakened
or neutralized by Mitterrand
at the Congress
Of Pau in 1973) accepts
many of the Gallo-Communist
formulations that
have already surfaced in
this discussion.
.

France requires a national
deterrent if it
IS to transcend the
dominance of the

States over Europe
protectorate.
.

-

United
and escape being a

One whose defenses are
entrusted to another
can never remain free in
such matters as
trade, monetary policy or
foreign policy.

So far, nothing much new:

these formulations have the
ring of

conventional Gaullism.

Pans

as they had Prague.

See Le Monde, December 10

1970

n

T

H.'.

esse^^SIir^.i.eci by the'Yai::'f?;me;ork"
AS
the Soviet threat
L^^^h'el^vief
th'r: t°^'^"
appeared to recede during the vea-s
of detent'^
pendence from the dominance of the
U.S.
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CERES also accepts the
Marchais view that Regime
policies of the
1970S strayed fro™ basic
Gaullist precepts. 1„
p„,i.„,,,^ ,,3^^^,,^
brand of reintegration
revives the
Lne possibility
Dossibnin^,, r(or commits
"apocalyptic
-sks") that France will have
to fight a war in Europe
she would do better to stay out of.
As Jean-Pierre Chevine.ent
views it, fiance has
"lost its margin of
^neuver stemming fro. an independent
defense".
Mery and Giscard effectively
repudiated de Gaulle's legacy
of 15 years?"

Roundly criticized by the
CERES spokesman is the doctrine
of la
sanc tjarisation eiargie.
elargie- th^-tr-nr^r.^^
that France can intervene
in any zone whenever
the national territory
appears threatened.

Giscardian doctrine has removed
all rigorous significance
from
the concepts of deterrence and
sanctuarization.
The root error of
Giscard was to design a strategy
engaging in actual warfare. Such
a

strategy is based on two pillars:
a) Tactical nuclear weapons.

b) The presence of U.S. forces
in Europe.

Ideas summarized here are from
"Strateg ie de rupture et inde-

^^^^^-^^ipl^"^

-h-h constitutes-O^ii^^^W^ffe^l^^

le

4_ communistes et l e^^utres. It was also a communication ^o
thrp^
to the
Comite Directeur of the PS on November
7, 1975.
61

Ideally, deterrence requires some definition
of what Chevenement terms a concept of non bataille
(ie a criteria of when not to use

ws3.pons

/

•
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The supe.po„ers do not
intend to e.ploy thei.
st.ategio weapons.
But they would invoke
wjvc theater^
Liiedrer nn^i^
nuclear weanon<5
tk-,-^
weapons.
This requires them to

call upon their aUles
to strengthen
conventional forces."
Giscard
acquiesces in all this
because he is wedded
essentially to the ..eriean

bilization.

The role of Prance is
to Join, to the extent
if its ability, in maintaining the
status quo.^^

In Chevenement's applied
Marxism, a confident rulin.
class, secure in its future, does
not allow its vital goals
and choices to depend
on others.
A problem arose because
the bourgeoisie of Western
Europe,

having experienced two world
wars, developed valid self
doubts about its
own viability.^
fact, since 1936 Prance has
been living in the hope
-*

m

conventional war broke out in Europe
^uiope, xne
ccthe IIu.b. would have
u
sufficient
time rn ro^^io^+
""^""^^^
tactical
weapons
would devastate eIZI II
Chevenement cautions against. Ibid.,
336
c;

'<

.

p.

^""^ ^i^^i^g^^ ^ould apply the
same policy to Portu.al in'l9?rd
tugal
^^^""^It
1975 during
the revolution.
Or they could agree with other
credits^advanced to^taly cofS:.:;f
u o'n^^he
eS::Ln'°:rthe'%cf f^^ participation in Government.
Subordinations
.
such a.
a' this
th?f .are hardly
an independent role for France.
In fact thev
could one day be applied to France
itself.
And France would be compelled
°" " -iddle-rank power ( une nation moyenne
if
)
effect 'neffect,
h'"'"'
Giscard
accepts the Kissinger formulaH-on:
conceding onl v "regxonal^responsibilities" to Europe, while
reserving global lu^Ss to

m

^

^^^^^
interesting point: that Lenin's concept
Of international
'"^r"'''?of
politics, which envisaged warring capitalist
states,
never foresaw the arrival or ascendancy
of a single capitalist superpower.
Put another way, Lenin did not forese^lhiT
Europe (or the capitalist world) would be vassalized to the
U.S., a subordination resulting from World War II.
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the protector .as
.M.te.;

-ass, sa,s CHev.ne.ent,
sees
Europe.

„

'

UnUe. St«e.

^3

i.s

..e PrencH r.Xi„,

^ture un.er the win, of an
..erican

ia not a nation the,
are .e.en.in,, .ut
t.eir own privileges,

"here does this analysis
of CERES leave the Left.
Can it fra.e
a defense polioy.
Chev^ne.ent notes that foreign
policy has always heen
the .ajor arena of
confrontation between Socialists
and Co.unists.
Historically, Co^nists could
only conceive of the advent
of socialise on
a world level: they
relied on the achievements
of socialism as realized
in the USSR.^^

Before signing the Programine

coT.T.un

.

as we saw earlier in this

chapter, the Socialists had not
conceived any new framework for
national
defense outside the liMts of
the established international
order (that
is, the dependency just
described).

The PCF, before its signature,

could only envisage progress
towards socialism stemming from
some reversal of the relation of forces
to the advantage of the USSR.
Neither of
these two perspectives required
France to conceive of policies indepen"^^^^

°^

The Programme commun gave no special
priority

to national defense questions,
contenting itself with general declara-

tions of intent.

But the logic of the Program did
compel reevaluations

55

They only favored French interests if
they did not contradict
general objectives of global strategy.
This was the classic foreign
policy subordination imposed by the heirs
_

of Tours.
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the concept, of defense
held by the two Parties.

Por instance
it
put sociaUs™ on the .ore
i.ediate agenda in Trance,
hrea.ing „ith the
doomsday notions of socialis™
which haunted the eariier
Xeft.
The two
working-Class parties were
thus compelled to reconsider
their own
strengths and to endow an
independent defense policy for
France, if
their rhetoric about a
"Europe of workers" was to
rise above pious
Sloganeering.
The ability of the two
Left Parties to ha^er out
a

joint
defense policy was largely
the ability to assume
effectively the
national destiny.
Success would signal a historic
^turity, overcoming

divisions that could not be
healed in 1936 and 1946.

Reading Chevenement in the more
detached light of today, one
cen see that he was unrealistically
optimistic about the ability of the
two formations on the Left to
transcend their world views. Super-

imposed over the historical split
in the working class movement
was
the division of Europe into

blocs.

The Parties in France could not

resolve this.

In the 1970s, the Communists

of national independence.

appeared to be leading proponents

To the extent that the Party
separated it-

self from the interests of the Soviet
state, it was able to revise its
classic opposition in principle to nuclear
weapons (a legacy of the era

when U.S. strategic dominance perhaps
justified this propaganda line).
In other words. Communist thinking evolved
in France to the extent that

.
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or u.b. diplomacy.

—

Rocard and
thp pc;
l_the_PS.

only briefly
herp
^^y nere

7

Another tendance inside
the PS
_

; o
^
is
represented

""^"^^^^^"^
*°

- to h
^° be

exDlored

by
icnei Ror^r^H
Kocard, an important,
y Michel
though

----- -

-.e...p.

ot
; the National
Secretsion
d
secretariat, Rocard
's roots reach
h^-^v ^
reacn back
to the old SFIO
«en
PSU
„e
^
^^^^^^
one t.at is hopeXe.s.,
„.«,3t.„eea
t.e superpowers."
.oear. sco^s
the for ce de frappe
hecmi^^
because it serves more
-Fr>^+
as a factor
making for vul=, i-

^

-

-

,

nereMnt.,

, ,3,^^^.

powers. ..t hardl,
n.elear enemies,

^^^^

•

^^^^^ ^^^^^

Oespi.e these .e«cie„cie3,
,e

stxll sees the nation
playing an international
role.
Basic to the defense Of Prance (or an.v
socialist state, such as
Vu.oslavia or Vietna.)
a
defense
.3
policy capable of denying
intolerable provocations
fro.
other states.
The l»ediate task,
according to the for.er
deputy, is
to protect against
two for.s of war: blockade
and ground invasion.
The

for^er^^^e^^^

^^^^^^^^

disii.edlTdL^rSt\^d"by"pje^\rc^iu°:is::'
67^
Le Monde

,

September

3,

1970, p.

n.

--'"^
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powered attack submarines.

^'^^'^''^^^^-^^^^^^^^^^
ChUe, ,ax. .He ce.e.s a.

A.te. .He coup in

.He Santiago War

con^e^e. .o. tHei.
ecpUcity

in

over iOO o^ieers were
i^piiea.ea.

CoUe.e „e.e arrested
a„a

Mien^e^s Popu.a. Unit,
Movement
THe iesson was no.
ios. on .He .e..

.n rrance, „Here i.
revived widespread
discussion and deHa.e on
.He roie
Of tHe .r.,.
advoea.e3
o. a new sociaX order
.3
in .He i.vOs. reacHin,

toward power in .He
s.a.e, i. was onXy
prudent .Hat .He Lef.
consioer
the Ar.y.
Bu. .He Lef. Had always
considered .He Ar„y in i.s
oaXoulat-ns. in fac, .He one
ou.s.anding innova.ion in
defense .Hinking
conceived and origina.ed by
.He Lef. was .Ha. of tHe
"nation in ar^s'the idea of .-every
citizen a soldier".
Historically, .His concept
reaches bae. to tHe Revolution:
to assure .He defense
of a free nation, all
the^ns of FVance^ere to be enrolled
in her defense.'" THis
was the
58.^

Not missile-firing suiDmarines
si]'hm3-m'noo
before they even leave thl^^
an enemy's anU-mLsIL de^^n^'^'-M

October

grSo^

p

9.

tk
t
The latter
are vulnerable
^^^^ -^^^^^ never penetrate
" ''^"'''"^

^

I-Jonde,

69„

retired recruits 'an'd'of'ficer^'.''^""™"'
°™
repor.s back
the p !
the

rSi'ary

poin.-of-vil;

^""^^

Que^.i^nford''".'-"^'

o?"r^°ure\'e^l::e™r!^^'°"

some reservis.s,
"1^ periodic
^''^"^"^^

70

ITell

argu^::";H:;1;ciaH:?:^^urd

iden?ified wi^h th '1

"^""y

™ru';::;trdef:n:int'

°'

o"n?y
'

Sre« reformist: when they
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Classic .acoMn formulation.

The Co^.nists, as
self-p.oclai„ed hei.s

of this tradition,
e*ra=ed the doctrine fully."
Socialists, too
consider it .asic, yielding
such notions as ar.in,
the people, and
suppressing permanent,
professional

armies."

Historically, however, the
doctrine posed certain
problems for
the communists, since
it collided with that
other „ell-kno™ Leninist
formulation, rejecting all
defense of the bourgeois state.
The probl em
Of reconciling the dilemma
was much like squaring the
circle (probably
explaining many cf the policy
shifts, reversals and
contradictions in
policy described here since the
time of Jaures).'^

A corollary of the concept as the coup in Chile seems
to sug-

gest

was that of the Army (that is a
professional army) as a possible
74
repressor.
This theme surfaces often when
spokesmen from the Left
-

^""""^ seeking to destroy the
^
army, as our enemies nretenci
we wxsh .to gxve tne nation the
army it needs a^d to assure to
?t^?he'
conditions which wiS free it
from'^h:
from
the '.^''^'^'^'r
impasse (created by the present
regime)". George MarchaL
Cahiers du Communisme . No! 12, Dece^er,
'''''
li vv!
•

,

1

n°!'

p.

J^Some currents in the PS leaned toward a mobilisation po pulaire^ whxch they felt could replace
nuclear weapon s in halting an
aggressor: Jaures synthesized into some
romanticized Maoism.
.

.

73^,

1920s the PCF rejected all militarism.
In opposing conscription. ^l^^
It was in effect rejecting the "nation
in arms"
Challener, pp. 165 and 207.
74

That a rightist professional army might try to
prevent them
from governing.
Better to have a large army of working class conscripts.
The Programme commun calls for six-month
service for all '
suggesting the citizen soldier theme.
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discuss defense policy.

When the PCP in 19V5
abandoned the classic
formulation of the
dictatorship Of the
proletariat, so.e Party
.e^ers feare. that (assu.xng Co^^unists ever
achieved power) they would
he leavin, their new
wo..ers. state without
any .eans of reacting
against activities of the
bourgeoisie: that Co^nists
would he yielding up their
repressive appa
^atus and exposing themselves
to counter-revolutionary
risKs, hecause:

^"^^^ renounce their
;ia;^T^''f
plans
for domination and for
their privileges
They will attempt a
recovery through illegSi;;*
subversion and violence
(making use of)
an
possible means within the
staff apparf t^; ^among
"^^^ constitute an essential

eLmenJ^'s^^y

Hyperbole aside, such a view is
widely held on the Left. Furthermore, there is evidence
that it is not entirely without
foundation.
Thus Jacques Isnard, a
strategic affairs editor for Le
Monde set forth
,

evidence to document the Army's
role as an anti-popular force.
•

The army as a possible means of
last reso rt against
revolution
tor example, during the dist urbances
of May 1968, de Gaulle withdrew
to Baden Baden
(where France maintains a military
base across the
Khme) for reasons never made clear.
.

me"

'

Cahierr.'
"-aniers
du r'''^'^-'
Communisme.
76

_

democratique au socialisFebruary-March, 1975, p. 187.

Andre Fanton, who succeeded Debre as
Minister of Defense
never concealed that the D.O.T. (defense
operationelle du territoire)
could be used as a means of preventing
renewed incidents such as the
crisis of May 1968". Le Monde July
,
25, 1973.
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are! tJ^T^J^^^^f^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
evidence, followed in
close
det^i-Th
detaxl
by ti.
the military authorities.
•

Furthermore, the actions
of various ,nt,tary groups and
-volutionary^'e^Se^

S

"(

ch

along with anarchi!ts pacifists
cnists,
n
and members of the CDFT.''

The Left has focused
not only on the potential
for domestic
repression by the Army, but
it has also generated
discussion of the

serious morale problems,
particularly

neglected during the de Gaulle
years.

among conventional forces,
long
J.P. Chevenement describes
a

strong feeling among
Socialists in France of a
malaise in the Army.'^
Many of the youth consider
it a waste of time.
Chevenement maintains
that the Army should not
be cut off from the people,
as sho», by experience in Vietnam, Israel,
Yugoslavia and Switzerland: a
nuclear
deterrent has little meaning if
not supported by a popular
deterrent.
As another Socialist, Jean
Marceau, expresses it:
77,

be Monde, October 17
iq7^
ik
t
jt
Old one: thiFlh^French
Army"isTcon ;iv bXe're^^^
repressive
^i^ ^o^c':
force to be
used in possible domestic subversion.
.

Z
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Le Monde, November

arrangemenTT^ch

a f^: ho'^r's'-^'H^"''

9
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i

"evetrP^ench::^ ^ho
'°

"^^^"^"^^

T

^

nu

o

d be'

inle":"™'a"2;:i!"
be

'^^

mobSiSd

in

anti-praetorian
ideas of the
Ideas
tL'pcr
PCF, which also favors brief
military training for all.

l-T

^""^

t*"^
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Defense concerns all citizenc;
abstract activity cut of^
in i.".
^^d
reserved for speciaUs^f
^f.^"-^^^
^
^^i^Y
activity,
The
ine car^it^i^.l
I
capitalist system
has divided men's hearts ^nH
spirits and has smothered
any sense Sf persona]
responsibility.
The task of Socialists'in
a
perspective of workers
self-management is to in
some way recreate these
conditions and ^^^^^re
JesSre the
spirit of defense in our
people. 79
•

^ V

The critique from the Left
goes so far as to suggest
that
through malaise and inertia,
Prance's territorial defense
has been overlooked, the nation remains
as vulnerable as it ever
was in 1870 or
^°
19^0.

Marceau's specific recommendations
to the National Secretariat
call for a regional defense-in-depth
to meet all risks of
aggression,

infiltration and occupation, especially
to thwart sabotage in the
infrastructure which might paralyze vital
installations.
This requires a
capability to oppose parachutists and
light infantry.

Civil defense

is vital to protect the population.
1)

All citizens, of all classes and sexes,
must

Marceau was Secretary of the Socialists'
Commission of
National Defense.
See Le Monde , December
,

3,

1978, p.

n.

80

According to one Communist source, lack of
a large reserve
army led to the defeats of 1870-71
and setbacks in the early days
World War I. Communists invoke not only
Jaures, but their own' experiences
rallying resistance in World War II. See
Pierre Villon

m

ilcuTlitZ Z%tl2:'

Co^unisme/No.

3,
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receive defense training
for six months.
Cad.es would then he
sc:t;e;ed fo; s x
months, and then spend
si>
ally,
close to home.
2) Administratively, territorial
defense

"ould fall under the
Ministry of DeSns e
But civil defense
would be entrusted to
local ministerial
departments.

It could be said that
many of Marceau's
formulations are a oix

Of the practical and the
Utopian.
izen

He believes,

for example, that cit-

responsibility in defense can
only succeed in

is decentralized.

a

structure that

This requires a redefinition
of hierarchical rela-

tionships and traditional
modes of discipline in the
army.
Ideally,
(as most -nation-in-armsadvocates urge) a people's
defense force
would be based on a proximity
of residence.
Service should be done in
a territory that is kno™
and loved by the recruit.
Military environment should be an open one,
supressing the barracks-like
qualities of
the past.

Sale of weapons abroad

.

In concluding this review of
national defe,
Bnse

issues, we look briefly at the
controversial question of arms exports
by France.
France remains the world's third
largest supplier of weapons
exports.
The Left has generally been
critical of arms sale policies,

particularly where sales have been to
states whose regimes it opposes.
In one parliamentary debate
Communists charged to Defense Minister
Debre"

that since its inception, the Gaullist
government had sold weapons to

.
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Spain, Portugal, Greece
eece, Brazxl,
Rr^^ni
d
Pakistan and South
Africa.
Furthermore, these .eapons
.ere used against
liberation .ove.ents in
Angola
Mo.a.M,ue and Cuinea-Bissau
Oe.r. defended such
actions h. pointLg
out that France was
often solin>.H
solicited as a supplier
because she "did not
attach political conditions"
in her sale of
weapons, as other powers
dxd.
The Caullist Minister
.ade the further point
that France's ar.s
•

i

^

.estic sales.

Thus without exports,
the nation would he
deprived of

its truly national
defense.

National independence was,
of course, the

familiar rallying cry of
the Communists themselves

Despite some of the egalitarian
condemnations directed by France
against South Africa, sales
by France to that nation
and Rhodesia have
expanded over the years, filling
voids in that market left
by those
U.S. and British suppliers
who had honored UN-i.posed
economic sanctions.
Over the past five years,
the French have sold
nearly half a billion dollars
worth of arms from Alouette and Super-Frelon
helicopters to
Mirage ^ets - to the South
Africans... 83
L Human ite

.

November 30, 1971, p.

2.

82,

economy.
^^PP^^"^
Some 200,000
persons are eZ.lL 1" weapons
^^Pg^d
systems of one sort or another in
the
ITtTr^T
nation, according to Edward
Kolodzie j , in an oral report at the
S^N?
Brockport Conference Two Decades of
Gaullism, June 9-U. 1978
P^T
Policy,
•

f'^ench

l?^''^^^'
M
K
Number
29, Winter, 1977-78

Connection in Africa", Forei^ni
p

152

^

-
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After Liberation, nearly
the entire French ar^s
industry was
Piaeea under Covern.ent
eontroi.
But today, it is
ohar.ed by the
n.sts. it regains dominated
by so.e of the ™ost
capitalist industries
in France.
Thus virtually all
aircraft are build by
Dassault-Br.guet

Co™

Pushed under

the Gaullist Government
in 1951 with the creation
of th e

^^i^^StiHiiOniste,^^

^.^^^ ^^^^^
^ ommunists have been urging
nationalization of the ar.s
industry, including
Dassault and Matra.
Their arguments are generally
posed in ethical
terms: that the existence
of such power in the hands
of private arms
merchants is "a challenge to
public morality"/'*

France is also an important
supplier of arms to West Germany,

ranking second, just behind the
United States.

As Helmut Schmidt noted,

"we have imported 18 percent
of our armament from France in
recent

years".

L Human ite

,

November 30, 1971, p.

2.

85,

Le_Monde, October 26, 1970.

That very month DebrS concluded
fLcs worth ^f Laponf
To
to t^eTeT
the Federal Republic, including
Lance missiles and naval equipment.
1.2 billion

CHAPTER

VIII

COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS
AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

Historical Overview

Afte. the „ar, differences
over the construction
of Europe „ere
P^^ofound, dividing the
Left throughout the
decades/ Oespite aix pretensions to internationalisn,,
„e have seen that
the Co™u„ists staged
out an eariy defense
of Prance's independence,
posing as a nationalist
Party, „hile Socialists
(along with the MRP,
Radicals and other centrists) consistently
e*raced the European idea.^
These differences
were not fatal and
„ould not necessarily prevent
the two parties fro.
governing together
er, afte-n
^
^ii
atter all,
8
a
similar gap existed between
the
Gaullists and Giscardians.
•

^^^^^^^221^11^1^^^
references to a united Europe

•-,

The early founders of
socialism made
.

^

Followers of Saint Simon and
Fourier

idea into their socialist
concepts.

Auguste Comte

^See the section on the
Referendum on Europe in Chapter
V.

-h--

^^^^
greatnes!'aLie'!' iLltlZr^Tttll
transposed 'to the level of Europe.
Duroselle, pp. 346-347

f

^'^^^^P^ dans 1 ideologie soci^lS^e'^R^''^'''^' r"""
^o ngres Extraordinaire sur les
^^PP°^^^
problemes
furoSenf
n^uropeens, Bagnolet, December
4"
lb-

L

16,
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1973, p.

—

'

-
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P-*,o„.
notion

in eX..oreti„, a
x:E,;r2£._Peder|, insisted
t.at the ve.y

nationaUt, „as an
a..tra«io„ .UXe.

obscurities an.
-=uraiti.s.. .eoa.se it ai.
not .e.i.e .o. nat.e.
in .act, .iso.ssion
Of a European .i^ension
in t,e .ra„e„or.
o. socialist ^etho^s
an. action
persisted within the entire
re Social
tc,^ t.^
bocialist
International up until the
major
schism in 1918.

Despite all the internationalist
language, nationalise
continued
to constitute a potent
factor in the integration
of peoples in pre-1.1.
Europe.
«e have already seen
the .road national elan
manifested hy socialists rallying to war
in 191..
It see.ed clear that
the state had
not been replaced as a
for™ of social organization.''
Even in the ManifS£to, Marx had said that the
proletariat had "to constitute
itself as
the nation",
hater, the Bolsheviks would
claim to have raised class
struggle to an international
level.
But they too never renounced
nationalls, when it was instrumental.
And so too with French
Co«nists.

Always sensitive to the charge
of betraying their loyalty to
another
power, they have been quick to
assert their national patriotism.^

P^^^/P'^' '^^'•t^" productive and technical aspects
of capitalism
caDir.H^rSi^^'
had managed to transcend the
limits of the nation .tate
But why should the Left rally
to that type of Internatio'llL.

Employing Tiersky's scheme of the
four poles of French Com™,
nism, one could say that the
nationalist pull was strongest when
?he
Communists were enacting their "Governmen;"
role, as during l^iberation
Lberation
and the period of the Tripartite
Government.

^
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Ihe postwar^years.

Given this natinr^^i
national perspective.
Communist behavior
becomes easier to understand.
The
ihe PCF
POP H..
described. integration
from the
outset as a device to
extend U.S. hegemony
over Europe.
The close lin.
between the construction
of Europe and the U.S.
aid made both suspect ^
And When the early
spokesmen for a United Europe
invoked the danger of
a Soviet takeover,
it only confirmed to
the Communists that
anti-Sovietxsm was the driving motor
of the European construction:
formation of
an anti-Communist bloc.^
Kriegel argues that French
Communists opposed
unity of Europe not so
much for national reasons
of patriotism, but out
of their time-honored
loyalty to Soviet interests:
•

The existence of a powerful
Europe alongside
socialist
,, represent
Ttate.'L
states
would
a distinct disadvantage
^
to the socialist camp.^

The Schuman Plan and all
functional integration schemes
were

_

Thus the Marshall Plan was
not disinterested aid

_

ested aid

Vlf
ly"

™

nv.

^

h°"ever. were taken in by the myth
of disinterin 19it6 with Secretary of

^
Blurfn
1" fa^t. signed the accords

f

de^"!:ss?;"'?:h-'°«'d.h"'^-"'
"'"^

^ut^eTtllerfr^;::

IX

EuropS:nr«\°ana'

^"^"^"^

"To construct Europe requires
the rallying of forces in each
nation around Governments that can
reduce the cLmunists to impotence"
'^^^''^""^
Rassemblement, March 20, 1948, organ
of the Gaullist RPF.

Kriegel, The Communist Parties of Italy

and France , p.
57
Wh.^^''^^or not her attribution
Whether
57.
of motive is correct, the ins ight
IS accurate
In fact Communist

gains have been most spectacular when
Europe was disunited: namely during
the two world wars.
See Adam B.
Ulam, The Rivals (New York: Penguin
Books, 1975) p 217

'
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seen as betrayals,^ "eoonoM.
Munichs" that would
de-industrialize
France and strengthen an
aggressive Germany. 1° The
Pleven Plan for a
European Army (EDO was also
opposed during the Thore. era.
After all,
the Defense Co^unity only
extended fro™ the logic of the
Coal and Steel
Community.
The SFIO, on the other hand,
largely supported EDC." At
the time, many considered
it an international "third
force", a counter-ight to l-entente atlanrigue."
Partisans, such as Guy Mollet,
felt

way rule'out^^Jr^o
"^J'Tf " of a French capitalists would not in any
the possibility
Franco-German war. History demonsSa^ed th^^
the period
"''"""^^^
the
war
wdi ±zse±r,
itself saWL'H
said L'Humanite
"''t-", May
M°""17, 1950,
p.

3.

""^^ ^^^^
"economic inferiority complex" regardGermany
Duroselle, p. 347.
France's weakest firms would be Kcrxfxced to those of the Ruhr in the
name of the "European Idea" Jaccues
create jobless French workers,
compelled to expatriate themselves to
'^^^^'^
^--hS en
"''i^^
^^ancfet la'^r^""^^i:H£l^2ILEuro
pgenne: Positions 1950-1975 : Ruhens P.-. t.
l^f
n n

T

ing_

-

1

L Humanite

,

July

8,

1963, p. 8.

'

11

To reject the military community would
endanger the entire
European edxfxce, the SFIO argued. France
would be isolated in Europe.
Nevertheless, Socialists split on EDC in the
crucial 1954 Parliamentary
vote. 54 voting for, 50 against.
Opposition to German rearmament assembled many of the same political forces
that had rallied to the Resistance:
Communists, neutralists, Gaullists and nationalists.
Alexander
Werth, France: 1940-1955 (Boston: Beacon Press,
1955), p. 177.
12

.

This formulation did not persuade the PCF.
If Truman, Acheson
and even Eisenhower (the latter head of NATO)
supported the European
Army, it was unlikely they were urging a
"counterweight to U.S. influence
The ease with which France later approved the
Western European
Union (W.E.U.) suggests a greater fear of supranationalism
than' of a rearmed Germany, according to Sir Bernard Burrows and
Christopher Irwin,
The Securi ty of Western Europe (London: Charles
Knight and Co. Ltd.,
1972), Chapter 11.
Burrows was former British Permanent Representative
to NATO.
.
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that the soviet threat
.o„ .learly out>,elghed
the danger of a revived
Ge^any. I„ f..,, rranoo-Ge^an
cooperation would help Mod
Germany
into the Western camp.

Ultimately, the Communists
would relax some of their
fierce
opposition to .-Europe".
Tactically, the POP was seeding
new alliances
and furthermore, it could
not deny realities on the
Continent. But the
basic hostility would always
remain: a capitalist entente
could never
serve Prance and its working
class.

The first break in European
Communist opposition to EEC came

with the Italian Communists xii
in xauz:.
1952

"^^

Th^
ppp was more cautious.
ine fLt

Only in 1958 could Rochet note
that:
.

European integration, though
dominated by
monopoly capitalism, was a reality.
The
struggle was to democratize it.

But Rochet denied that any construction
of Europe would ever
13^

.

.

Originally, the PCI opposed "Europe" as
a perpetuation of the
on the Continent.
But by 1962, economic inte.ratLn
seemed
--^rol that development
har^essx^rino'^^VH""'''socialism.
A year later the CGIL opened an
oS?ce .t PP^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^
H
Brussels,
over the opposition of the French
'
CGT and the
^hf ?Soviet-controlled
World Pederation of Trade Unions.
Today,
^""^^^
internationally integrated economies, so
^ ^ ^''''^
that socialism cannot be built in
one country, but must be built transnationally.^ R.E.M. Irving, "The European
Policy of the Prench and Italian Communist Parties",
International Affairs Vol.53, No. 3, July 1977
^^"^ earlier that this issue also divided
the PS from
Pppvc with the
CLKhS,
latter opting for a "socialism in one country"
approach
Ki
blocs

Lv f

??~-^^

T

It/ J

.

'
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develop an independent
Continent outside the
1^
superpowers/^
Furthermore
the structure created
at Brusselc,
.
Brussels was undemocratic
(from a PCF pointof-view^ since neither
the Communist Parties
nor lahor unions of
Prance
Italy had received
representation at that time,
despite their de''"^
mands for a voice.

The

Co»unists rejected any transfer,
of sovereignty to what

they considered a super
entity of monopoly
capitalist.
SuprenationaX^ty would not he an
effective road for achieving
socialise a.ong the
advanced nations of Europe.
Supranationalisn, would not allow
for the
simultaneous passage of six
or seven states into
socialism." And
finally, there was the
economic ar^ment: free
circulation of goods in
Europe was only freedom
of action for monopolies.

-

lit,,

"'^'"^

the means of 'p'ro'ducti^rLl'^nf
See the essay'hy

-hom

•

^eTcilnX^^^^

^^-P^"'

°!

m

Sue Ellen MrChariton,
P'
^^^ed
The French Left ^nH p
^^^°P^^" Integration, Monograph Series No. 4
world Affairs, nUniversity of
Denver, 1972 n 5 7

in\^^^T^^^

L

16

Human ite

.

January

8,

1968, p.

3.

.

^"^^

reject Eur^-c"i:mu'„1:fh^c^L^fr^L;1n\e*pr:?:d=t\2™S:":
Of supranationalism. Private
intervie^r^ebJuaryls,
1979?

""-""'^

-

^^'•-"y
Britain
^PO-^tant, the Communists argued, to pre!
serve ?he
^"^<=P«"^'^"'=^ °f <=^<=h "orking class moveSnt in
those
statL wherf
states
where strongest.
Pierre Joquin in Le Monde, March
9, 1968
p
to go

sociaUs?'°"i?
,

'

7

™"

exL^enceln'
existence
in our era".

Le Monde

.

SSHtFThat will
February U, 1970, p. 8.

^ass out if

Jean Claude Poulan, "Le Parti SFIO
et integration europeeneV
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T he Socialiste and

Europ^

Frc„ t.e start of the
post-war era. Integration
was considered
urgent, the onXy „eans of
reviving Europe." .nd,
economic union ™ar.ed
a step towards
political union
ion, that nit-nn,.^
ultimate supranational
construction.
The SFIO was not obsessed
with
ixn tne
the national
national sovereignty issue
as were
the Co^unists.

Nationalist isolation, in
fact, was a condition to
he
avoided.
The only condition
Socialists insisted upon in
accepting a
European construction was
that it .e ..democratic",
meaning that representatives Of workers groups
sit on the High Authority.

During the 1960s, almost the
entire non-Co„unist Left
continued
to favor remaining in EEC,
although some had lingering
doubts about the
direction toward which the Community
wtito movinc
was
moving. ^° <;o™=
bome currents on the
19^

rival

on-hc.-;^^

4-u

:Srt:

t'

•^"-"^6"^
.

since it would be a greater
-^^^^^

^ItL"1n;.na:°a"^^'t"-

But the babour Pa ty was^^ofl

ZtToVZTieltol "^rr

To^ZX^^^^^^^^^
Parliamentary

ins i'""'^T''
re-^^bf ^FIO devant quelques
'^'T
problemes inter-

VerdLr/?ah r\" ^Hist'o
nationau
narionaux
x" , p.
d
qv
97.
Verdier was a Secretary of the SFIO in
1946.
20

^^^^^^^ currents on the democratic left:
the
old-line SFT^n
P^°Pl^ definitely supported a supranational Europe
in
order to
^^^^-l-n^PSU and CERES were more distrustful,
par-

?IcuLJL hf

^^^^^^-^ DemocrltL

M?t?:r^"H'K°\'
Mitterrand
backedr^^^''
a united Europe, but disliked
the varietv
hloJ!
'''^^
European
^°
'const^ul
tion
tLn could
o'uld be used
us d'f°^^'to prevent a Socialist Government
from carrying out
Its goals of democratic planning.
See Ellen M. Charlton, p. 30.

%
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democratic Xeft had always
opposed .^eauoratic
eapitaU... And burea.
catic capitalism (or a technocratic
variety, seemed to he the
dominant
model for European integration.
This undermined some of
the enthusiasm
for EEC inside the Left.

'Jl^-S^llSIl,!^^
Europe for .any reasons.

The Socialists favored
the construction of

Historically the Party had an
internationalist

vision, with aspirations that
derived fro. the brotherhood
of .an. And
democratic socialism had strong
historical links to Western Europe.
Then,
too, there was a conviction,
described in the preceding chapter,
that
closer cooperation between the
nation states of Europe would
make war
less likely.
There was also a pragmatic
conviction that there would be
tangible benefits to France in
industry and agriculture. The
slashing
of economic barriers could help
develop Western Europe's prosperity ^2
.

Then, too, as we will see, there
were Socialists who resented the
domin-

ance of the superpowers.

To them, EEC was a realistic
means for France

to remain aloof and independent
from the Soviets and America.

Finally

some held that socialism could only
be built within a European framework.

France could not do it alone, since it
was a problem of
Ibid.

,

p.

conti-

30.

22.

integration as
^""^
ri
^ States
United
of Europe, much as the
uniting of Germany. Others had less
nomic integration alone a legitimate
23

a means toward an end, namely the

Prussian Zollverein fostered the
lofty notl^^^^T^^idering ecoend.
Duroselle, p. 349.

Thus there was a close link between the "struggle
for socialism and the struggle for Europe", said Report No.
2 of Les Socialistes
et 1 Europe, issued by the PS Congres Extraordinaire
on Europe, Bagnolet
December 15-16, 1973, p. 69.

~~
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mental dimension. 24 An exponent
of this view is Rocard.^^

Given these attitudes. Socialists
strongly criticized de Gaulle
for having blocked and retarded
the fusion of the European
Community.
Socialists re jectde Gaulle's famous
formulation of a "Europe of nationsThe unity of Europe was impossible
among sovereign states operating
in
a framework limited to
intergovernmental links.

Rhetoric of this period sounds hyperbolic
today.

Gaston Def-

ferre spoke of a "socialist continent"
operating throughout an indus-

trially developed European nation, a model
distinct from American

capitalism or Russian collectivism;
24
^^""^y
13'^° ^ debate opened up on whether socialism was
possible
a national framework - or did it require a
European context
Robert Furon's Mouvement objectif 1972 took the
latter view: the existence of Social Democrats in Britain and France
was a plus factor in
advancing socialism. Others rejected the Social Democrats
of other
countries, since many were not working to overcome
capitalism, but to
integrate into it.
Several PS federations sought to adhere to this
movement, but ultimately, it remained autonomous. Le Monde
March 6, 1970,
,

m
.

25

"We seek to join rhe interests of all European workers, in
steel, autos and farms, who demand a common solution.
This must be imposed on the capitalist states. A socialist regime in France will have
the task of proposing solutions that will allow for joint
planning and
the establishment of Euro-wide public sectors, imposed by the
joint
pressure of all states". Le Monde May 28, 1969, p. 5.
,

25

Thus de Gaulle was particularly guilty, since he placed the
executives of ECSC, Euratom and the Common Market in positions of dependence to the heads of states and ministers of the various governments.
Socialists also challenged his arrogant refusal to deal with anything
haying the remotest supranational nature. See Rapport General au Con gres Extraordinaire sur les problemes Europeens (Bagnolet) December
~
15-15, 1973, p.

13.

211

.tel.st

Giscardian „odel would
be aligned with the
U.S.
Only a socialist Europe oould
distinguish itself fro™
the American identity.
Maurice Duvere-^^r for
8-, -Fn-r. example, saw Uttle purpose in
struggling for an
autonomous Europe if the
creation had the sa.e design
for society as
the united States.
It would only lead to
an Atlantic entity
directed hy
Washington.
Why not have the r^uropean
Euronean ^t.±..
states one-by-one join
the U S
li^e Hawaii and Alaska.,
he as.ed ironically.
That way, they coul/at
least enter in U.S.
Presidential elections and
receive directives fro.
a Secretary of State,
rather than fro. an
Arnhassador in Brussels.

Inte-

gration would he a better for.
of decolonization than
le_protectorat
'

^iBSHfle.

ently

Better to be Texas than the
Philippines.

Duverger meant that only a
socialist Europe could develop
independof the. U.S.
But he doubted that the EC of
1975 could build social-

ism in France, considering that
the Community (particularly
the SPD and
the British Labour Party)
opposed the PS-PCF alliance of that
period.

Thus the Marche commun and the
Programme commun were incompat27

Grosser, French Foreign Policy under
de Ga ulle

Duverger, see his discussion,
p.

139.

p

137

1

.
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ible: member states could
uxa not -rpn^nfreject p^^
Community rules considered
cont.ary to their basic interests.^^
Only a Socialist Europe
could be gen-

uinely independent; there
was no superpower to which
its society would
then correspond.
But in calling for a
socialist Europe, Duverger
rejected the social democratic
model of the FRG and the
Labour Party
In the short run, any
strengthening of the European
Community would
render socialism in France nearly
impossible, because an authentic
Eur^
pean Community would compel France
to restrain progress towards
socialism, awaiting the day when its
other European partners could
.^^
catch up

One helpful way to understand the
variety of socialist concepts

regarding Europe is to identify the many
positions that surfaced at
Party forums. Earlier, I suggested
that many socialists sensed a
malaise inside the EEC.'^ 1973 was a key
year; the PS staged its Congres

Extraordinair e at Bagnolet devoted to France.
after the signing of the Programmme commun

.

This came only 18 months

and Mitterrand, now First

Secretary, remained committed to the European
idea.

But there was

dissent within, particularly in CERES.
29

logic is close to the PCF view: that the EEC would
never
allow socialism.
He rejected a troika of Mollet, Schmidt and Harold
Wilson.
A socialist Europe required leaders of the first
rank, such as
Mitterrand, Brandt and Bevan
Ibid., p. 142.
.

3

The sluggish socialism of the Nordic states would act as a
brake on socialism that was in full ardour in France.
Ibid., p. 143.
32
^See the discussions in Chapter V noting the generation gap
in socialist and democratic-left thinking regarding Europe.

213

2;^i!in~^2SitiH2.

on Nove^er 1,. .SV3,
Mitterrand proposed

sending representatives
around to other European
Socialist Parties to
coordinate concents
cepts.
Rn-t- >,-;^
But
his proposal received
a lukewarm majority
fro™ the Executive Bureau.
Mitterrand attached great
significance to
the plan, and a week later
he asked the Comite_Jirecte^
to arbitrate
the issue.

If he lost, he would resign.^^
Europe represented a major
issue Of principle. He had
gone to great lengths within
the Socialist

International to press
tress his
Hts ^7^^,.r^
views, ^nurturing special
ties to both Olof
Palme and Bruno Kreisky.
The Party, he felt, could
not merely rely on
the European initiatives of
Pompidou or Foreign Minister
Jobert.
it had to launch its own
initiatives.

Rather,

Nor did Mitterrand want to
allow

control over these Party policies
to be taken over by rival
tendencies
within the PS. 3^ Mitterrand feared
too much factionalism within
the Party
on foreign policy issues, such
as Europe, nuclear weapons and
the Mid-

dle East.

The Party risked being defused
into a morass of currents,

33

r'

^

proposed representatives were chiefly
pro-Europeans-

,

latter of CERES

Le Monde, November 17,

1973. p. 10.
Mitterrand and
^^1^^.^^" ^^at year to settle differences with the
Labour Party,,
pI"7 ^^IT""
which was resistant to a supranational
Europe.

34^.

Mitterrand's stature in the post-Epinay PS
was high.
He did
want his mandate on foreign policy,
and probably had no true intention
or resigning.
35
t^^s'^ ^ fi^f" stand the prior month on
the October, 1973
Arab-Israeli War. Many in the PS felt the impotence
of Europe in world
attairs.
During that War, the two superpowers effectively
settled the
issues.
Europe was mute, manifesting this impotence.
Mitterrand was
seeking to change this.
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P^eve„«„,
^ ^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^

put his own leadership
on the line.^^

-re

™ovi„, sig^incantxy
towards a .ore European
posiUon t.an at
the t..e Of the signing
of the Prog.a..e co..„n
1972 '7

m

the crenohle Congress
in

continued.

„73, an.

The construction of

dition for Socialists in
Europe.

E^ope

at Bagnolet, the

„o„ent™

„as now descrihe. as
a precon-

Indeed, the

Co«nity required
What the left often ter™
a renewed social
content, but Mitterrand
was
prepared to carry this out
through his good ties with
other European
Socialist heads of state
(an approach sure to
arouse the suspicion of
Communist alliance partners).

After much internal dissent,
several factors brought the
PS
to a consensus on the
European question. Certainly
the oil crisis of

Autu^,

1973 and the lack of unanimity among
the "Nine" were factors

co ^elling the Party toward
a firm stand on a supranational
Europe.

And

'

36

The PS works under difficult
conditions, and the /^^^ership
leadershin
^^'"^
Coordination is poor
noor^
ThI
The
activities
of CERES
often generated hostilitv
rJr.
nostiiity.
Two years after Epinav the Partv ti^c
J.
ascending, yet still riven with
tendencies.
ic. o^^
IS
often overburdened.

^

37

P^og^am called for participation in
EEC, but a-democra'''''
'^'^ GoverL^n?
'
woui'd'retain airo%''''°"''H''
'^^^'^ ^'^'^^
^^^^^^^^
--al
'
't^

tizn-na

transforLSons!

°-

38

"Decisive action toward socialism cannot
be made within a
national framework", said Mitterrand.
Le Monde . December l^ lSa!
p.

215

one .,oul. not
underestimate the

e«ect of Hitterrana's
earHer threat

"social de^ocratiC vie„
on Hurope: a return
to the ori^inaX
conceptions
Of the oi. SPiO. even
oXd veterans, such as
Hoiiet. raiiie. support
.or
Mitterrand for the first
time since Epinay.^^

However, „e

„st

underscore one key difference.

The original
postwar Socialist impulse
toward a United Europe
stemmed largely from
fear of Soviet and
Communist power.
But

in the 19703 the impulse
toward

Europe emerging at Bagnolet
was more anti-American
in tone: Europe had
to be constructed to
resist U.S. influence. In
Mitterrand's specific
analysis, the necessity for
Europe stems largely from his
critique of
America, which is chiefly
economic in nature. Mitterrand
describes a
U.S. system of free trade
as one which operates with
its o«, internal
coherence, and has an external
tendency toward expansion.
This expansion often contradicts European
interests.
However, a nation (such as
France) cannot simply withdraw from
this American system of free trade.
It must enter another system.

In other words, socialism
cannot be

established in France under autarchic
conditions.

Furthermore, a so-

cialist France designed on a purely
national basis, would expose France
to the risks of a Chilean style
coup.

Europe.

The foregoing analysis argues for

Mitterrand goes on to reject the
CERES-Duverger-Communist
39
40

Le Monde, December 18,

Ibid.

,

pp.

8,

9,

10.

1973, pp. 8,

9

and 10.
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analysis that EC still
regains a capitalist
project.

The attitude of the
U.S. to«ara Europe
has also changed.

Amer-

icans tavorel unit,
durin, the earl,
reconstruction and cold-„ar
.ears

But toda.

the construction o.
Europe is .eared as a
rival in the

economy.

^orM

^S^^SiiteSEtion^Jor^E,^^^
^^^^^
a re.nvigorated
European

"democratization"
.

Cc-unity. Socialists repeatedly
call for

tk^ term xs
The
vague.

neo-capitalist Europe of nation
states^
LctL^b.
so^e Of Which are sketched
out below.

a

What is their alternative
to a

Measure, hnave been
k
ueasures
put forth
By no .eans complete,
this

UsL

some of the specific ideas
and proposals French
Socialists have devised
for the EC.

2}±S2iS^l^LPa^n^.

i„

^

str„g*ened Commu-

nity, with broader powers
transferred to the supranational
level. Socialists would want to enlarge
legislative powers of the European
Parliament in Community
decisionmaking.
Such a Parliament should be
empowered to vote on t he EC budget.
The Council of Ministers
should be

so

theya:!^oftt^\L^«irt\%irLi?i?:?ijn: :nn^s^":f:r^ent:
42

At Bagnolet, Robert Pontillon
hailed
^.^^.^^ the
luc rdcr
fact rnat
th^t tne
th^ nq
a
US hhad
now come to -Ff^^-n h-k^ v-cn
"P"" =°'"Pstitor to be reckoned with. J G
Ouin "?he
K
^°"alist Party and the EEC: Attitudes and
Polio es
?971-197^"
"°
n°tes
also that th e pTre- t
""^^""^
'°
^
'="''°P'=™
sumers during the 1973
^^vf oil. crisis forming multi-national
negotiating
blocs.
Europe should negotiate on its
own, without
•

7

U.S.

inferferenL
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required to consult

U

™o.e than is .urgently
the practice.

To enhance
the stature of the
Parliament, they favored
elections hy direct, universal suffrage, and the
granting to the Parliament
of powers comparable
to a sovereign parliament .

EB££SL^2licy.

'^^

Decisions on energy cannot be
separated from

political choice.

They are not technocratic
issues, but policy issues
to be defined within the
framework of democratic planning.
If the
people of Europe have all the
facts, referendums could even
be employed
on specific questions.^^
Within the EC there should be
more coordination
to deal with questions of
supply and research on new sources
and forms
of energy. Speaking broadly,
the PS seeks a greater energy
independence
for Europe, and the esrablishment
of new relations with producing
nations,
favoring those whose political orientation
is closer to that of the

French Left.^^

Monetary policy.
nence of the U.S. dollar.

Policies would no longer support the
preemmiFormerly, the U.S. was able to maintain
its

deficit balances through this preemminence

.

Socialists would urge a

common European unit of account and common
exchange reserves pooled with
a central monetary fund.

This latter plan is not that different from

Bagnolet Report, p. 26.
Socialists favor all proposals to
change the current institutional balance between
the European Parliament
and the Commission.
See Robert Pontillon in the above report,
p. 21.
L

Unite

,

February 23, 1979, p.

Bagnolet Report, p.
Bagnolet, p. 25.

10.

9.
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the Giscardian conceptions,

^^^^^^^^1^1121^^
ti.e-wo.n Whipping hoy of

Thesefi..sare,of cou.se,

Co^nist

the

analysis.

But Socialists, too,
have
had to contend with the
advent of multinationals
to Europe,
so.e
ways, they a.e an important
aspect of the anti-A.ericanis.
just referred
to.
The problem, in their
analysis, is that capitalist
exploitation
now transcends the national
framework.^^ The resulting new
form of enterprise, with its centralized
management, essentially lacks
any accountability.
Many are, of course, American,
and they add a new dimension
to the problem of concentration.
The Socialists (who have
spelled out
their nationalization policy
in the domestic portion of
the Common
Program) speak about developing
a European public sector
and expanded

m

planning under the control of the
workers.
Agriculture po licy.

Socialists call for greater participation

by farmers and consumers groups
within the European Fund for Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee (reOGA)
to provide for representation
by farmers' organizations.^' They would
also seek to change and redirect cer-

tain Community policies, including
a reform of CAP, involving regional

problems.

Agriculture is viewed as a Community problem.

The U.S. view

that the CAP is too protectionist, is
rejected. ^° To date, the major

Pomg

Le

et la Rose

48^
^
he Pomg
et la

,

August, 1978, p.

,

December 23, 1973.

8.

.

49

Rose

.

Ibid., August, 1978, p.

Qum,

p.

217.

11.

.
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burdens on financing agriculture
have fallen on consumers
through higher
prices. CAP has not benefitted
the smaller farmer, only
the larger
producers

^^^^i2££atized.^^^

^^^.^^.^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^

are designed to provide
greater voice and control to workers
organizations.
The goal is to promote
Europe-wide labor legislation,
covering
such questions as equal pay for
men and women, questions of
vacation
time, as well as basic protections
to migratory workers abroad.
Socialists also seek the development
of less favored regions of Europe.
A

goal is full employment.

Socialists also call for a strengthened
soli-

darity of the labor syndicates of Europe.

Beyond the agenda sketched here, French
Socialists seek to ad-

vance prospects for socialism throughout
the EEC countries, establishing
some form of unity of purpose throughout
the European Left, in both po-

litical parties and unions.

oration

The hope is to build a transnational collab-

of socialist forces: the pre-1914 cry of uniting
the workers

everywhere in Europe.

Inside the European Parliament, Socialist depu-

ties were a prime force for elections transcending
national boundaries.

They were urging parliamentary groups to form and function
without the
51^

Bagnolet Report, p. 21.
Such a project is not as easy as it
sounds.
The British Labour Party, for instance, is split on the
question of Europe, and it is far more suspicious of
supranationalism than
French Socialists.
Links between the PS and the SPD worsened when the
SPD established relations with the Gaullists, even going
as far as sending representatives to Gaullist conferences.
See Le Monde, February
^
6-7, 1972.

«
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control of national
parties
"^

But th^.
OUT
these were goals,
o-nsi ^
r^^-tnot accomplishments,

The disenchantment
on the democratic
left with the European
enterprise came from those
- ii,e CEKES and
PSU - „ho increasing!,
saw
Europe developing strictl,
on capitalist and
technocratic lines. Integration only seemed to
encourage the penetration
of Western Europe hy
U.S. capital.
The EEC was not
encouraging national planning.
(The PCF '
Of course, accepted
these interpretations.)
The PSU, in opposing
this
for. of integration, did
not reject the principle
of integration.
The Communists Reverse
on "Europe "

The PCF opposed Socialist
European policies throughout
the postwar years and up until the
1970s as class collaboration.
But in the
1970s the ftrtybegan to take
note of new realities.

al

Certainly elector-

strategy had much to do with
the shifting of gears.

how the PCF wooed the SFIO
towards a leftist alliance.
it

We saw earlier

At this point

is necessary to examine
in more detail reasons for
the Communist re-

versal

It would be too simple (and
cynical) to attribute shifting

Communist attitudes towards European
integration entirely to tactical
electoral motives.

There were some definite evolutions
in their analy-

sis, stemming from changed
circumstances in the international
political
5 2^

process.

Communists went further, rejecting the
entire integration
^t^grarion
Charlton, pp. 71-72
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configuration.

By
^iic mid-=;i
v^.'^o
uixu Sixties,
y the
even, tho
even
tne v>nv
PCF k-j
,
had been rethinking

earlier positions and
noting certain international
developments that
were positive fro™ its
point-of-vie„.
P.o„ 19.8 to ISV., one
oould

"

note:
.

A stabilizing of the
cold war; start of detente.

.

A completion of French
withdrawal from NATO.

.

Start of the monetary crisis,
which heightened
European suspicion of the
U.S. role.

.

Progressive settlement of the
German question.

.

The enlargement of the EEC.

.

The signing of the Programme
commun

'

iri972''55°^^^^°''

°^

.

existence of the EEC

The leftist unions in Europe
were also seeing the need for

growing cooperation on the Continent,
despite their

ideological

53^

declared that withdrawal of France from
the Atl,,tnV Alliance
All
lantic
and Common Market were not conditions
precedent for an
^°™nists and Socialists. Humanite-Dimanche October

lS!'l963"

.

^''^^^"g

period, 1959, Jacques Denis and Jean Kanapa
colla•^^'^ Pour- ou contre 1' Europe
setting forth PC? posi//
tic^T
rl
tions.
The official line continued to call for
an end to blocs in
Europe and the holding of a European
security conference.
Kor..t.H

,

55^

Brezhnev said it was a reality, that the
USSR had no intention of undermining it.
Le Monde , March 21, 1971,
And two years
p. i.
later, Soviet Academician Inozemtsev noted
that an independent Europe
undertaking friendly relations with the USSR and
the U.S. would be the
most^likey model for the 1970s. He saw no threat
from European integration.
Soviets describe European integration "as an
attempt by monopoly capitalism to reconcile private economic
and productive forces
which had overcome national frontiers". 1952
thesis of the Institute of
World Economics of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences. See Cahiers d'Histoire
_

p.

110.

'
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^Xtlnationexs and .He increased
Integration of European
economies.
The various Co»unist
Parties were also

recognising this need
(despite

eari.er resistance to
participating in EEC forums,."
Eor a brief period
there was a coordinated
Europe-wide
vvj-ue ^Lrategy.
f
strate»v
k
At Strasbourg,
the PCE
and PCI forned a
parliamentary group,
hut it was

nificant,

not always able to define
joint

1970S the POP also saw

a

^re sy*olic

Co^nist

positions.

than sigBy the

need to broaden contacts
with other European

political forces: socialist
and Christian as well as
Co^unist.
not want to be isolated
within the EEC.

It did

Despite all of this, the
fundamental hostility to integration
remained.
However, it was only in 1978,
when the Union of the Left
began to disintegrate, that
French Communists could again
openly express
their deep-seated fears of the
integration of Europe.
They made these
56,

Le Monde

July 26, 197H, p.

„•

PCF In it=
worriiT^t preserving it^ d;mi;antTheinfluen
e over hi ?Lde
'^'^^^^
*°
"e
Ixamp : Sitalv's
y'"^"
iraiy s
CGlT
LblL, rrr*which was already
^
oartici
rvn
tinrr
^^^^^'^iP^^mg
CFDT,

.

6.

m

,

-Tr.
EEC organs.
As early as 1959
th«=
n
the PPT
CGT sat on a consultive
comiBittee dealing with the free
mLration
of Labor
See Charlton and the European
Con^munity ^^drceriy
Quarterly
No 40,
no.
40
^
November-December, 1970, p. 24.
.

,

Le

Mo.J 'jZT.

T^T

in the Parliament.

58
"^^"^^ earlier should not be
overlooked: the PCF
,„,^« ^ . V^^
suspected
that a strong, enlarged Europe was
a political device to weaken the large Communist Parties of
Europe.
The supranationalists

'"'^ ^^^^^"^^ ^'-^-^
national framework

"^^eek

successes an
II obtained
be
ob?a1neTth''
'h' a
through
for the French or Italian peonle"
'
Jean Buries and Georges Cogniot,
"Pour la veritable Union Europlene"
Cahiers d'Histoire , p. 118.
_

'
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arguments

wuSthf'T'

^''"^

compete

ine entry of Spam,
Portugal and Greece, with
their
cheaper products, would
endanger French farmers. 59

^^^^

situations where
on na^ionaf^nT
tional independence. Currently,
EEC had been operating under a unanimity voting
rule. A majoritv
could not enforce its will
against a recalcitrant
But this situation could
ch^^e
Change.
The fear was that enlargement
of EEC from
nine to twelve would lead to
a majority-rule form of
decision-making. 60

suorana^""

f ^-^^^°™^<-g would encroach

Some Doctrinal Issues Confronting
the
Communists on European Integrat ion

French Communists, recognizing a
popular attachment to the European idea, have always been defensive
about what appeared to be their

retrogressive nationalism, especially
considering their original Marxian calling for internationalism.

Communists had long been charged

with defending an outdated idea. of
independence.

Development of a

modern economy required overcoming not only
social division, but the
archaic national divisions as well.

Why shoulld French Communists be

59

Nadine Bourdin, PCF official, in a private
interview
February 14, 1979. Also see L Human ite July
30, 1977, p. 3.

'

'

,

xhus the old argument: decisions affecting
France will be made
Brussels, Madrid and Bonn.
There was also a fear that with an enlarged EEC, French capitalists, seeking the most
rational places to invest, would seek out the cheaper labor countries,
developing facilities
in Spain, Greece and Portugal.
Since Spain was Fascist for 40 years,
It lacked the advanced labor conditions of France.
Industry's search
for cheap labor would heighten the jobless crisis in France.
These were
domestic politic reasons used to justify a PCF international
position.

m
_

-
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blind to the original aspirations
of their founders?

The problem was to reconcile
traditional Marxian international-

ism with the more current
insistence on a national France.

Critics of

PCF policy could, for instance,
cite Engels hiniself:^!
It is your great compatriot,
Saint Simon, who
foresaw that an alliance of the three
great
western nations - France, England and
Germany
would be the first condition for the
political
and social emancipation of all of
Europe.
This
alliance, tied to a European alliance,
will
forever end the cabinet wars and ethnic
conflicts: I hope to see it carried out
by the
proletariat of the three countries.

One of the founders of "scientific
socialism" is actually

calling for the unity of Europe.

As in many doctrinal disputes, all

sides are adept at invoking the founders.

Communists concede that for

both Marx and Engels an alliance of European
states was indeed an idea.
But, such an historical undertaking could
only be enacted through the

efforts of the proletariat.

In many ways, it is a "cart-horse debate",

as we saw with Duverger.
.

.

Do you unite Europe first and then struggle
for social change within the new framework?
Or is it first necessary to do away with
bourgeois rule?

6LEngels

is quoted here by Charles Fiterman in his essay "Pour
une Europe independente , democratique et pacifique", Cahiers du'
Communisme , April, 1968, pp. 14-18. Much of the analysis in this section
derives from his essay.
Fiterman does not provide the source of the
Engels quote. Clearly it is addressed to a Frenchman.
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5

French Coininunists clearly invoke
the latter interpretaion of
Marx.

Charles Fiterman, for example,
argues that Communists have never
challenged the need for close links
between people, and would indeed
seek to build a stable human community
transcending national frontiers,

which would allow full development of
productive forces.

Communists do, then, claim a long-term commitment
of gathering

together human society.
talist framework.

But they doubt it can be done under a capi-

As Fiterman expressed it:

(The nation remains) a historically and socially
durable phenomenon deeply rooted in reality.
(And it) remains within a national framework that
the popular masses continue to sense their needs
(and interests).

Communists legitimate this national idea by citing

iMarx

himself,

who, after all, had urged independence for Ireland and Poland in
the

Nineteenth Century.

But the argument is not a simple Gaullism; it is

posed on different terms.

For them, the "economic and social content"

of a particular arrangement remains controlling.

As they see it, the

current Europe is designed strictly to maintain the existing capitalist
arrangement.

A supranational Europe, enmeshed in a social democratic

or Catholic Europe, would frustrate their ideas for social transformatioai.

Guy Mollet had once urged that a European Community be invested
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with the sa.e powers as an
independent state.

This was vital if it was
to channel citizen group
efforts toward the general
interest.

Jacques Denis and Jean Kanapa
challenged this view." Hcllet
was
proposing a state independent
of social classes, one that
ruled as the
arbiter of conflict and as the
guarantor of the general interest.
But
in the analysis of the
Communists, the Governments of
the "Six" (or the
•Nine") were hardly guided by
the general interest," since
in Communist
eyes, they too served capitalist
interests.
Such governments inside a

community framework could only form
an entente of capitalist
interests.
Community institutions could never
be more independent of class
influence than the national institutions
comprising them, making it illusory to believe that a political
community with joint planning could
in

any way challenge capitalist rule.

Socialists confused planning with

socialism.

The nation was hardly an outdated
historical concept, said
5

2_

They had written Pou r ou centre 1' Europ
e?, some important
excerpts from which are in C ahiers du Communisme
No. 12, December,
-Laby, pp. 126-135.
,

In the Marxian scheme the state is never
independent
social classes, being an emanation of these
classes.

o.f

Planning was not the issue. The Communists of postwar
Europe
now accept the fact that capitalist economies
and institutions can accommodate themselves to a modicum of planning.
It even provides predictability.
But when the constituent governments of EEC design
a
political-economic community with a common plan, it will not have
a
socialist orientation, but would offer policies emanating from
the
classes that dominate the individual states.

«
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Kanapa and Denis, but
regained a „ode™ reality.

The idea, evolving

over centuries, had developed
speciHe .ar.s of cul.^e,
language and
pontics. Even if the
nation-building process had
accidental, arbi-ary aspects, it still e>^ressed.
a unity.
Nations first forced chiefly
to unify markets and
customs unions In certain
regions.

trend was toward
inter„ationaU.ation of these markets.

Today, the

But this phe-

nomenon had not led to the
decline of national reality.

Thus the nation

fined quite modern

state framework had not been
overcome, but re-

as a potential for progress:
the national Idea,

born at the time of the French
Revolution, continued to represent
a
goal for Third World nations.

The European Parliament and the
Left

This issue, and the question of
direct elections, also raised

both political and doctrinal problems
among the various groups we are
examining.

In the mid 1970s structural changes were
proposed in the Euro-

pean Parliament.

The EC had authorized direct elections to
the 410-

member Parliament for 1978, to be ratified
by member states.
55

m

With

Even
the East-bloc, national realities persisted.
Even if
integration was the goal, strict precepts of
national sovereignty persisted.
Supranational institutions are not imposed, but
integration
IS carried out through international
structures.
_

_
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the plan, voting would occur
under national parliaments.

Co^nists

at first attacked the plan
as a Giscardian scheme
of supranationalis.,
leading to domination by NATO.^^
Two years later, the Party
again
latched one of its abrupt and
dramatic policy reversals:
such elections would not be categorically
opposed; the method of voting
was not
^"^
the problem.
The Problem is the rights
and powers of the
Assembly.
We do not want it to overstep
the
Durisdiction of (national) parliament(s) .68

The alliance politics of wooing
the democratic left surely

played a role in the policy switch.

But not all segments of the
demo-

cratic left agreed with the Trains
tream-Mitterrand acceptance of direct
6B

Le Monde, December 5, 1975,
p. 3.
Kanapa cautioned that
France would become a "province of
the European Empire of monopou'es"
LJumanite, January 1, 1977. Also see Roger
Trugman "Quelqui aspect;
du contexte international-,
C ahiers du Communis^:
,

.

m

essay
e^sav'in ?e
Moni
t'
L^Monde
January
11, 1979, p.
universally elected Assembly would have

JanuaryrS^sf

""'^"^
^ee Michel Debre's
8, where he warned that a
"virtually unlimited powers".

67

interesting that CERES followed the PCF lead.
Generally,
PPR^^
^^/ltraditional social democratic
CERES ^
opposed
formations in Europe.
The
""^"^^
singled out as class collaborators.
The
zeal
l^''^
u
with which CERES harmonized its views
with :he PCF is discussed critically
Lazitch, pp. 82-87. Recall that Mitterrand
had broken his
alliance with CERES (developed at Epinay) at
the Congress of Pau, in 1975

m

^^L^^^Humanite,

April 18, 1977, p. 4.
There is evidence the reversal came after discussions with the PCI.
Stiefbold, p. 85. Marchais'
true concern was the December, 1974 Declaration
at the Summit of the
Nine
Competency of the Assembly will be enlarged, particularly
by
the granting of certain powers in the communities
legislative process"
This, he held, contradicted the Treaty of Rome,
a view also expressed
by the French Constitutional Council, a judicial body
with review powers
remotely akin to the U.S. Supreme Court.
.
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elections.

So^e interesting
opposition a.^^ents „e.e
advanced
Duve.,er, „,o .eared
that E.C „ou,d .eco.e
a tec.nocrac..
deprived o.
any popuxar .ase. one
„.ic. eouid su..it Europe
to a ™a,orit. tor^ed
ty

^"^^"^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-^^^^^^^^
The

^road prohle. „as that
institutions „ere heing
created in Europe he.ore
a genuine co^unity
of «n existed.
Such a .ethod of voting
in an institution that laced
significance today, conferred
on it "a democratic
legitimacy that it would
only possess in a co^nity".
By the nature of
things, it would i„pel the
Co^unity in a supranational
direction, always providing the
"appearance of democracy... since
it would be confused
with rule by a majority.
Eegally, national organs of
state power would
be diminished without being
replaced by any effective
federal force.
EC. after all, e^odied
no genuine European collectivity.
Fro. a policy
point of view, public power in
Europe would be dispersed.
And lacking
vigor, would be overwhelmed
by the growing private sector."
Perhaps, he
conceded, a union of Europe was
required for the long-term
development
of socialism on the Continent.
But in the coming decades, a
strong
Community would foreclose socialist
possibilities in Europe. The only

collective consciousness existing in
Europe persists within the frame-

at,,,
atus

P^'-^ersion. he was arguing, would weaken
the state appart„ the t
to
benefit of the federal apparatus, the
latter lacking anv

I

fZiTj:i:'tl^l7'r.- P™*""-™^
e^f
socialistes ,
cra t c^ciarr'^ r^"

refect Vhich „ould etble^pn^ate

D,iverger's interesting discussion
r.
For him. a'truirdemopp. 1.3-1.6.
^" ^ =i"gle country, or i^ would
never be established.
neve'brLlablishJd
T
^^^f^^^^^^
Ironically,
the issue of '.socialism in one country.' opposes the PCF and
PS much as it historically once divided
the
J

Bolsheviks after Lenin's death.
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work of nation states
^Les.

Thn.
ihus ito undermine natinn;.!
national consciousness
^
would
destroy the only
fo.ce that could
uxa resist American
A.
domination.
,

•

CHAPTER

IX

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE

LEFT

IN FRANCE

Shall eKamine only specific
facets of Soviet relationships
to
the French Left.
Much of the broader subject has
bean explored elseI

where/

Throughout the post-1968 period,
the PCF is moving away from
orthodoxy, gradually assigning
a primacy to domestic affairs
over inter-

national commitment to the bloc, yet
never renouncing its Internationalist identity.

The Soviet Communists and the PCF

Earlier, we affirmed two basic formulations
regarding the pre-

dicament of French communists.
A) That having fallen heir to a
non-revolutionary situation in

France, they transferred hopes to the USSR:
the USSR became the "embodi-

ment of a revolution France had missed".^
B) We also accepted Shulman's formulation
that the postwar

Stiefbold.
Chapter II.
2r

It has also been examined in this thesis

^
Lichtheim,
pp. 70-71.
that Tiersky speaks of.
•

,

See

.

This led to the "misplaced identity"
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Co«u„i.ts

in Europe

(given the above) had
to substitute

politics tor revolutionary
poUtics".
order to influence Eovernmentc;
governments along
=,io-n.T

..„bloc

The revolution was put
aside, in
iImes

that best furthered Soviet

(or block) foreign policy.^

To work within these
limits, and carry out item
B, the Party

had to preserve its:

" ^^Sggyrgense:

still appearing as the
en*odi.ent
or carrier of revolutionary
purpose.

2)

Patrioti^visa^

still appearing as a political
formation advancing French
national purpose and
independence.

These two major strategies imposed
three subsidiary strategies

and doctrines:

^^-—f
\.

InternationaUsm.

Upholding and justifying
^^"P^"^ repeated tarnishments , such
as Khrushchev's speech, the Prague
invasion, or the
Gulag" revelations.

'+)

Union of the Left.
With the entrenchment (and legitimacy) of the Fifth Republic, they
had to work toward
a domestic alliance with the democratic
left against
Gaullism, despite a clear Soviet preference
for the
latter.

5) Peaceful coexistence.

Supporting a Soviet accommodation
with the United States, yet without foreclosing
any possibility of changing the European status quo.
Detente
should in no way imply a new Yalta or superpower
duopoly.

Clearly, these five strategies created dilemmas
and outri ght
3

Some might argue the PCF substituted an anti-fascist
perspective for insurrectionary politics during the
Popular Front.

.
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contradictions for Party doctrine
and jjuixcy.
policy
earlier

Manv we hhave encountered
Many,

How does a political party:

„

*

*

.

.

.

.

^'^^1 S^^^ ^-^dible support
'^'''I-'^?"'
liberties required for any
alliance
-^-i-xduce
lltl t^
with
the T'''"^''^''
democratic left?

?^^h^H

supporting virtually
all
a?r?ore?c^
foreign policy goals of the
Socialist Camp?

Justify pluralism within the world
movement, yet deny
It withm one's own national
Party?
Ally with reformist social democracy
and still retain
revolutionary, avant garde objectives?

Maintain identity to a bloc (and
world movement) which
was effectively, although not
openly, rejecting a
revolution in the West?

Resolve the dilemma implied by item
four above?

One could go on citing further dilemmas.

Tiersky has designed

a framework which makes no attempt to
resolve these dilemmas, but does

demonstrate the unusual adaptability of French
communism, by identifying
what he terms its four faces or aspects:
Government, Tribune, Vanguard
and Counter- community

To give an example at random, the PCF might oppose
EEC in its

a) "Tribune" visage

supporting the interests of French
wine growers and small peasants.
:

"

b)

Government" visage
protecting la patrie and
national independence.

c)

"

:

Vanguard" visage
promoting bloc aims (or Soviet
diplomatic interests) which are defined ultimately
as radical and revolutionary.
:

.

One can advance various motives
to explain foreign policy.
One might opt for "c" above,
rejecting
iejKccing "a"
^nH
a
and "k"b" as demagogic.

But

motive is inherently subjective.'^

.

The dilemma of revolutionary .o.l.-

The PCF's dilemma over it.
:s revo-

lutionary nature in many ways derives
from the Soviet dilem.ma.

While

the CPSU must appear revolutionary
to justify and preserve a
leading

role in its movement, this stance,
it has often been pointed out,
conflicts with the USSR's acknowledged
interest in detente and its wish to

acquire trade and technology from the
West.

Nevertheless, during the

1970s the Soviets did not ignore opportunities
and unrest in Western

Europe: ferment in Spain and Portugal,
stalemate in Italy, a renewed Left
in France,

men

the Soviet 20th Party Congress outlined
a parliamentary

road to socialism. Western Communists interpreted
this as legitimating
a kind of "socialist

pluralism"^-

a development the Soviets clearly

reject, as shown by their crushing of the "Prague
Spring".

There are

certainly motives (and evidence) to suggest the Soviets
do not want a

revolution in the West.
,

.

It would risk:

Reactivating the Atlantic Alliance and destroying
detente
Spreading the pluralism infection to East Europe.

We reject here the ready-made notion that PCF International
behavior simply follows Soviet requirements. Such an explanation
would require no further analysis.
5

Joan Barth Urban, "Prospects for Revolution in the West",
Orb is . Winter, 1976, pp. 1359-1402.
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It would see., then, the
Soviets seek orthodoxy,
preferring

Parties they can control in
Western Europe.

All the evidence since the

war shows that those imposed
in power are .ore reliable
than the homegrown varieties taking power
on their own.

In the 1960s and 1970s,
however, the Soviets lost
control, as

the European Parties grew
independent and critical of Soviet
reality,

and sought power through elections
and pluralism. ^ The risks of
killing
detente (perhaps tilting the U.S.
toward an alliance with China)
or

spreading independent, pluralist-minded
Parties within its own bloc
were too great to tolerate merely
because independent European Parties
were seeking power.

This explains, perhaps, the often
open Soviet pre-

ference for de Gaulle and Giscard
d'Estaing.

The dilemma was great: on

the one hand they could not tolerate
seriously revolutionary parties in
the West (risking detente) and they
I
could not tolerate reformist Parties

(undermining their East-bloc Empire).

PCF-Soviet relations after 1963,

After "Prague

the PCF and CPSU moved

6.

Tiersky maintains that the embracement of pluralism
by the European Communists in the 1970s was genuine, but
always "muted by an
insistence on the vanguard role, that is a directing
role as an embodirnent of the working class". Communists
claim they alone are endowed
with scientific Marxism.
In this sense, Tiersky holds that the Party
has not de-communized , "but continues to claim
a unique legitimacy a
pretension to alone decide the nature of the regime".
See his essay
Problems of Communism

m

.

7

.

Admittedly, this line of argument would not explain why Soviet
Communists supported Cunhal in Portugal, who took an openly
antipluralist line.

-
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to repai.

U„,3 strained

the invasion.^

The PCP „as one of
the few
(along With the Portuguese
Co.unists) European Parties
to aocept ali
the theses of the June,
1969 Moscow Conference
of Co^unist Parties

(one Where the Soviets
were notably .escrihed
as the principle force
in

world struggle).^

When the PCP and CPSU signed
their Co^on Declaration
of July
7, 1971 (their first joint document
since 1968), there was no
mention
this ti.e of the "leading
role of Co_unist Parties",!^
a concession by
the CPSU, since the French
Co«unists were now embarked upon
an allianc e
with democratic soci alists.
Nor were the Soviets insisting
that Co^ist
g

restated

c^°nl^jg:L^e?^rwriLsi^?:-t\"^iL^;t:-

decisive factor"
^
said Radio Moscow, June 27 1968
Al'l tM=
when state relations bet^Ien'r^ice^'d'ti:
USSR^SLTgoo^d^"
rising considerably. Brezhnev noted
at his Party's 25th cinJess that
de Gaulle,^Soviet-Prench L^it
tai°s"^:rbec™:
a rraaition.
Vital Speeches of the Day February
24, 1976, p. 363.

IZTl

TtrlAll:~t:,T

.

9

asreementi^frI:-TpI;tSs™N.L=;eed"^^
^^"-^
in^:Ttoie:i^^i;'69r;"r°"
10
^""^^^
^ clarification of the Joint Declaration.
Communxsts replied they would insist on
their ties to the Soviet Co^.munists; that this should not interrupt
progress towards a Common
Program
Le Monde, July 16, 1971,
Claude Estier of the PS rep. 6.
jected the PCF attempt to liken its
international ties to those of the
PS with other social democratic
governments.
The latter, said Estier
never prevented "us from expressing our own
independent position
Le Monde , July 17, 1971, p. 5.
.

^

.
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Parties confo™ to a
particular .odel (as for.eriy).

Rather, they

accepted diversities in how
the various parties
"struggled and fulfilled
their tasKs".
The PCF and CPSU would
see. co^on actions,
and would
not be divided, it said.

However, in Fall, 1972, at
the PCF's 20th Party
Conference, relations with the Soviets
cooled.
The Russians now appeared
to disapprove
of directions being taken
by the PCF after
the

sions were only resolved
later in the year,

Prog^aMn^^on^

Ten-

.r.e7ZZ~rKan.,.

flew to Moscow to see Brezhnev
and his Central Co^ittee
advisors, Boris
Ponomarev and Vadi. Zagladin. In
the joint con^unique, the
Soviets

agreed to support the PCF strategy
of working out joint policital
ac
tions with other parties, especially
Socialists

But a year later, relations again
skidded.

-

This time, Soviet

Ambassador Tchervonenko had paida visit
to Giscard d'Estaing (Finance
Minister in Pompidou 's Cabinet) between
run-off rounds in the May

7,

11

.Soviet press gave less space than usual
to the PCF Congress
and ^deleted all attacks by PCF leaders
on French Government leaders
.

,

socialism, and wanted to preserve their
ties to the Pompidou Government.
12

^

Soviets handled the Joint Communique
discreetly, it being
the^eve of Pompidou's visit to Moscow.
But it did confer stronger
Soviet support for PCF alliance strategy,
unlike earlier ambiguities.
Le Monde
December 20, 1972.
^,

,
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1974 Presidential Election.

The PolitiV.l
r
Political Bureau
termed it "inopportune"

t.ons, .eing merely an
exploration of economic
questions.- Nevertheless
'
evoked memories of the
well-Known earlier incident
of Dece^er, i.S5
where the Soviet press
had indicated support
for ae
ror
de GaulJ
yy
Gaullee when
h
mMitterrand
was campaigning with PCF
support.

Disputes again surfaced in
Spring
pj-iiig, 1975
ia/:D.

nn
On ^y.
the eve of a trip

to

Pri.e Minister .ac.ues Chirac
promised to raise directly
with
Brezhnev certain issues
concerning the PCF. The
Co„nists, enraged,
warned against any attempts by
the French Government to
have Brezhnev
pressure the PCF." Detente was
fine, but could not be used
for restricting the actions of French
Communists. Peaceful coexistence
in no way
implied an economic-social status
quo in Europe.
It should be noted
that this marked a period when
the Soviets were growing
increasingly

critical concerning French Communist
behavior,
ance policy.

A Soviet handbook on Communist
strategy, edited by

.ighrankSfun-bt-s^:: -"cL^S?

^T^^l ^Z^/^^ If ,1

SS:rel^^t !,^e?p!l3!^^"" °'
14 r
Le Monde
15.

particularly their alli-

,

Centra/col'itte.

May 10, 1975.

Lejtonde, March 23-24, 1975. Chirac threatened
to discuss
certain contradictions in PCF policy: on
the one hand supporting an
independent defense for France, yet taking actions
weakening that
defense.
Chirac later denied such intent and never
did say whether he
did
fact take these issues up with the Soviet Party
leader.

m
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Konstantine Zagladxn, had
urged vigilance by the
.o-unist Parties
entering leftist aXiiances.
Clearly it applied to the
PCP.
But the
Soviets were probably
overreacting in this case.

The Soviets issued
a strong critique a
month later
a Lei, noting
notina th;,fthat a. genuine revolution

was impossible

outside the hegemony of the
working class
(Th^t)
^
modern-day conciliators were
prepared lo dis^
solve Communist Parties
into ideologically
amorphous entities under all
sorts of unity
arrangements, regardless of the
price.
Tactical
unity with social democrats
requires a simultaneous struggle against united
front
partners 1°
.

Chevenement notes that while this
critique was couched in
ideological terms, it concealed
the genuine fears of the
Soviet Union
which were strategic: namely
that bids for power by the
Left could
endanger coexistence."'"'^
flench Commu nis ts and Sovie t
domestic repress.'on

.

was another perennial issue.

Stalinis

And the PCF increasingly criticized

Stiefbold, p. 45.

reassure tlTpTty.^t^'^'"''^^''''

Marchais moved to

17

J. P. Chevenement, p. 188.
Rome or Madrid could upset detente.

18^

That successes by the Left in Paris
'

u
Marchais
had argued that Communists could not
be faulted for
'''''' '""'"^
''^^'^
Soviet
vulnerabUitv'hld
P^^^^^^'^^
from socialism; that Communists were
nn^,
I what was later
unaware
of
revealed.
L'Humanite , June 9, 1975, p. 5„

f

•

T

19
^'"'"^^ criticized the trials of Soviet writers
as far back
iQp^ Jhe one-time
as lybb.
unconditional attachment to the USSR would now be
a conditional attachment.
On the other hand, the Party insisted it would
never sink to "anti-Sovietism"
See Stiefbold, chapter 5.
.

21+0

aspects Of Soviet reality during
the 1970s." Kanapa,
speaking at the
Party's i:eco le centrale
asserted the right to challenge
,
violations of
hu^n rights and liberties. "These
are not merely (Soviet)
wrongs, but
wrongs done to socialise itself".
Hence,
French Co^unists had a duty

to criticize.

The Soviets, he added, were
often blind to the signif-

icant democratic liberties, describing
then, as bourgeois and
for«l.

"Actually, these are acquisitions „e
call upon the working class to
defend".

Open PCF rejection of Stalinist
practices in the East bloc countries, often served PCF purposes within
France.

The Party could show

that even L'Humanite protested outrages
in the East.

But in establishing

this distance from such Soviet practices,
a confusion was created.

In

the minds of people, Stalinism became
identified with something that was

merely a governmental practice, something remote.
as an outright deviation in the class struggle.

It was never described

Thus French Communists

were refusing to describe Stalinism as a possible
current within their
own ranks.

Most Frenchmen did not make this distinction.

For most

people, the phenomenon remains the Stalinist Party holding
state power.
They do not distinguish between repressive practices of a
government and
19

The Party criticized the trials of Soviet writers as far back
as 1966.^ The one-time unconditional attachment to the USSR would
now be
a conditional attachment.
On the other hand, the Party insisted it
would never sink to "anti-Sovietism". See Stiefbold, chapter 6.
20

Le Monde

,

December 14, 1977, p. 15.
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behavior inside the Party.
Partv

Rn-tBut
guarantees by the PCF of
democracy are

not sufficient.

Debates over Stalinism and
the extent that the PCF
could eritlcize soviet practices were
never fully resolved.
Soviet experience was
venerated because it had
socialized the economy, built
up what they saw
as a new society.
Even if it was deforced,
that was not essential.
What
was given priority in the
Co-unist mentality was the
emergence of this
new society.
But as Party historian
Elleinstein pointed out. „any
on
the Left challenged the
socialist credentials of the
USSR.
If it was a

socialist state, it had to be
defended.
"ide open to any critique.

Once conceded it was not.
it was

Elleinstein incurred strong Soviet
wrath

because he:
.

.

.

denied the socialist nature of the
USSR.

held the Soviet model of tansition
inapplicable to France.
urged the PCF to "disassociate itself
in principle" from Soviet experience .22

Ilje_persi_stence of PCF-CPSU links.

The force and persistence of
the ties

°" guarantees inside the Party as well.
The PCF often
^ftPn^""
r^^"'"''
"''""f''
makes
spectacular
demonstrations of abandoning Stalinism
(like rejecting the dictatorship
of the proletariat) which suggesSlhat

'"'^'^
^ ^^^^^
P-^- But'fo many
?he te'rm'sri
^^''T
arbitrariness, a lack of di^cussioi
of issues,
issues use
use";r
^^^^^^^^^f
of expulsions.
These are the real vestiges of Stalinism
^"^^"^S"'*
stemming perhaps from Leninist principles
of centralism!

LeMonde, April 13, 1978. The Soviets responded
that Elleinstein wanted the PCF to renounce its
essence and to "disavow the decisions of the historic Tours Congress of
1920..." New Times, No. 22
'

May, 1978, pp.

14-15.

'

between the French
Communists and the Soviet
Po
Communists has preoccupied
-ny observer..
PCP perpetuated tMs
XinKage, instead
breaMn, aecisive.. „,tH
t.e USSK Has, o.
course, .ee„ a central
aspect
Of this i„vestigatio„.^3
„^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
^^^^
had repeatedly embarassed
and injured
a
.
the
tne
J
PCF
PCF.
A„H during
And
the years reViewed here. Trench
Co»unists adopted a critical
stance toward the „ore
outrageous and repressive
Soviet practices.
This distance fro™ the
Soviet Party earned the
French Party a certain
respectahiUty. Often
it served as a
good-conduct pass, allowing
it to develop new
alliances
with other leftist forces.
Nevertheless, the ties to the
Soviets regained. Clearly, the Soviet
and French Parties (as
well as all of the
European Parties) continue
to have reciprocal and
overriding needs for
each other. Annie Kriegel
™akes the central point: that
without its
links to the USSR, the PCF
loses all of its political
force.
Hence,
"the world

«ve.ent enjoys an absolute priority.

plained the tenacity of the
attachment.

..

"^^

Marchais once ex-

At the 23rd Congress, he
noted

that the very existence of the
USSR and its bloc established
a relationship of forces and conditions
which guaranteed the life of the
French
Party.
Can one imagine that it would
be possible for
us today to discuss a peaceful,
democratic
road to socialism in our country
if the world
23

.

"^-"-^

„
national Movement.
,

2t

explored further in the section on
the InteriiiLer

Kriegel, in Blackmer and Kriegel,
p. 37.

21^3

relation of forces was in
favor of imperialism?

Marchais' explanation implies
a debt to world
socialism.
The
French road, different and
less costly than that
taken by existing
socialist states, is only
possible because of the
existence of those
states.2^ Namely, that the
French and Soviet Parties
remain together
much like an old married couple,
"for the children.
A break would
create internal problems, leading
to factions", he holds.
There still
being a significant pro-Soviet
current within.

These, then are some of the
reasons for the links, even
though

the PCF is condemned to repeated
embarassment by Soviet repression.

Kriegel makes the interesting point
that PCF relations with the
Russian
Communists vary inversely with their
links to other political forces
within France. 28 As the PCF recedes
into its ghetto, as in 1978 (or
19.8),
and places itself at odds with
four-fifths of the French electorate,
as
when it revived its fierce rhetoric
with the PS in the late 1970s, it
cannot continue it s conflict with the
Soviet Union.
L'

Human ite

.

May 10, 1979, p.

It cannot afford to

6.

The mere existence of the USSR will not
protect Parties abroad
from destruction
The undoing of Parties in Spain, Germany
or Indonesia
remains a live, historical memory,
Marchais' reasoning somehow makes the
gu^^antor of opposition party rights in a Western
European
cTx^lly
_

27

Andre Harris and Alain Sedouy, Voyage a I'interieur
du Parti
communiste (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974),
p. 272.
28

"L'Euro-Communisme 1978", Table ronde entre E. Bettiza,
Frangois Fejto et A. Kriegel, Commentaire no.
,
2, Summer, 1978, p. 147.
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close itself off on
both sid.s.
sid-s

Tt. ^
In
terms of international
behavior

Kriegel is arguing,
there will i^e
be a kind
kinH of
^
normalization alongside
of
the international
Communist Movement: that
Liiar tne
the PCF cannot
continue to
conduct a two-frnnt
two rront tt^vi
k
war, being at odds
with the
tne USSR ^r.^
and simultaneously
w»h its .roa.e. potential
alUes and constituents at
.o.e.
.a.itoh
•

.

„X

soviet .eiationship.The

^he

between Marchais and
the Soviets had

•san.Lfrere^oviet^
"S-£ad^^ocialiste...^°
The Soviets, too. gain
fro. the bargain of having

dose

ties to

the European Parties.

They oan present
themselves to the world
with an
ideological fajade and justify
their power position inside
their bloc
and even strengthen their
negotiating position with the
West.
They do
not .erely present themselves
to the world as a classical
power .hich
dominates a certain number of
states.
Rather, they are a force and
an
29
L hchec

permanent

trtZ]t'-^t'^

±L

Vol. XLIX No.

^P^^^^^-^^^m;
.

p.

loi.

Communists, who openly proclaim
their ^^^^^^
preferWestern Europe rather than in
"''^
Raymond Arc
t ribu = 1hL

ence tor
for ^^uTrd.'n^^
building socialism

them on

,

This global concept automatically
ranges

.

epSLe^

m

£il22H«£E,
la//,
19^7 p.
fa "'-a
p
48.
"A r
Communist oartv's TTnirTT^
^^^^
^^^^ andVodaiL it
aut'onoV^" ?hus r^'^r:
^h^^g^ its views on Angola or
:
Israel or
^l^T^^
label
Soviet domination of E.^ern Europe
as imperialist.

M^^^^

J

:

=H'-t;iiiufc;i

,
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idea that has .uppo.t
outside their frontiers,
outside their re^ioTo expend Tiers.^^s
.ra.e„or. . the Soviet
Union represents not
^ust a
governmental force or a
a nnnm+^v,
counter-community.
But It ;pH,r^^
iiut
yadvances the pretense
of acting as the
vanguard and tribune
le ror
for vital
vital .r.^^
.
worla forces.
Thus links
to an important European
Party
xy, such as the
tho French,
r
are a useful asset
to Soviet power.
1

^£^^^ll£LM£ti£ILs

with the Soviet Party

political force with ties
to the

3^^'

Soviets.

1-

It Will help to examine
as well some of the
links established

by the socialists.

After the War, the SFIO,
understandably, had been

hostile towards the USSR,

bike most groups in the
West, they saw Soviet

expansionism as messianic and
military, employing ideology
to cover
i.perialist-like actions.
No one on the democratic
left could forget
that the Soviets had been
the destroyers of social
democracy as a political force in Eastern Europe.
As a result of this history,
relations

between the two languished during
the first two decades after
the War.
Only when the Socialists loomed
as possible candidates for power
inside
France, did the Soviets take notice.
For example, a Soviet delegation

attended a Socialist Party Congress
for the first time at Pau in 1975.
31
is sensitive to Soviet links with
non-leftist forces
P^,,
in France,
viewing them as disloyal. When a
Gaullist youth affiliate
traveled to the USSR, the Communist's
youth affiliate objected. It was
^ionary organizations in other countries"
^Mond
m"" k or
Le
Monde , March
26, 1976, p. 30.

—
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The PS was a renewed
political fetation, a
force to be reConed
with."

Earlier effort, by Mitterrand
to form so.e ties
with Soviet
authorities .et with little
success. ^3 soviet aloofness
invited speculation that the CPSU was
signalling disapproval,
opposing a victory
of the Left.
We saw ^arlier
earner that
th;=,-tth^ cSoviets
^
the
never rejoiced over the
Programm e commun, xjuL
but thev
Lii<dy aia
diH pay
t^^:,..
i-It. ^
lip-service
to it.
•

i

.

The Moscow .eetin,

.

The significant breakthrough
in relations came in

April, 1975, When the Central
Committee of the CPSU agreed
to welcome
a delegation headed by
.^^
Mitterrand
I^is ^rked the first
important
contact between the two Parties
in 12 years, since Guy
MoUefs visit
to Moscow in 1963.3^ The
high-level meeting dealt with
international

hl»onde, February 2-3, 1975, p. 1. Both
superpowers ^
prudently, keep irnes open to opposition
parties having a potenuS
puLt;uL±ci±
government role.
,

33
""^^ cancelled
^ ^^^^
iQvu was
1974
cancelled by Pompidou's
endanger conciliatory steps made by
Pan-European Conference on European

m
^-n

by the Abrassimov incident.
Another
death.
The Russians did not want to
Giscard regarding hopes for a
Security.

34
^^^P P^ayda hailed the Union of the Left as
Fr.n.oT
K^"".^?^
°f
France's best
hope.
L'Humanite ,
1975, p. 3.
The 1959 World
,
Conference of Communist Parties called
for cooperation with Social Democrats where possible, so that the CPSU
was now acting within these
guidelines.
The PCF welcomed any broadening of ties
between Communist
and Socialist forces.
"They'll see there is such a thing as
socialism
ciaiism
the world", said Marchais.
Ibid.

A^^23

m

35

The Russians gave the airport arrival
full TV coverage. Along
with Mitterrand were Claude Estier,
Lionel Jospin, Pierre MaurSy and
Robert Pontillon, all of the Se cretariat
national
Others included
Chevenement, Didier Motchane and Michel Rocard of
the Bureau executif
and Alain Savary, ex-First Secretary. Along
with BrezhT^iT; they met
M. Suslov, B. Ponamarev, responsible
for Party relations in capitalist
states,
P.N. Fedossiev, Director of the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism,
.

'
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,.esUo„.. rather than domestic
issues or matters
eonneeted
aUianoe poUtios. Mitterrand

to Prenoh

reassured His hosts that
a Cover„.ent of

the Left would continue
the French-Soviet
cooperation of prior Governments.
So.e Of the issues
discussed included the
Conference on Security
and Peace, EEC. Vietna™.
the Middle East, Cyprus,
Greece, Chile and

rvench-soviet relations, as well
as relations hetween
the two political
parties

The meetings were reportedly
lively and frank, with
™uch good
hu.or on all sides.
Socialists felt, in fact, they
often received hotter

trea^ent and airing of their views
than they had
froB,

the PCF.

been getting recently

It was agreed that future
talks would be

held."

The Soviet side gave the
impression of being almost
"obsessively

concerned" about the Conference on
European Cooperation and Security.
Suslov asked how the PS envisaged
building a Europe conforming to
their

aspirations in a hostile and reactionary
environment?
posed by the PCF.

)

(A

question often

Mitterrand explained that since 1965
he had always

sought a simultaneous liquidation
of the two blocs in Europe.

With or

Inosemtsev, Director of the Institute
of World Economy, and Vadim Zagladin.
36

Jewish emigration issues and Czechoslovakia
were not discussed.

37

The hope was to institutionalize contacts,
A year later
Rocard and Pontillon did meet with CPSU
representatives.
In 1977 'cPSU
observed the Nantes Congress of the PS. The PS
is the only Socialist
Party in the Internat ionale -ocialiste to
institutionalize its links
with the CPSU on an international level.
Lazitch,
p.

231.

c
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wxthout a

Co^on

Market, the Left wo.Xd
take power in a
capitalist environ^ent, one har.X,
favoraMe to sociaUs™.
,e e.piaine..
.he Soviets
were further tol. that
any leadership takin,
po«er in a nation of SO
n^Ulion people could not
casually withdraw fro„
one defense systen,
without establishing a new
arrangement in its place.

Disagreements at the meeting
centered on problems of
Portugal
Where the Soviet side felt
the Trench Socialists
were lending support to
a "slander campaign"
against the Portuguese
Co^unists. Ponomarev referred to a particularly
dangerous role of the Socialist
International in
that country.
Mitterrand replied that it was
puzzling for the Soviets
to reproach one Socialist
Party for defending another.'^
The Soviet side

also raised questions regarding
the

"

role nefaste " of the Socialist
Inter-

national in the Middle East, keeping
in mind the close ties
between the
Israeli Labor Party and the PS.^^
Disagreements also arose over EEC.
The
Socialists were astonished at the
extent of Soviet hostility toward
the
40
Community
38

Mitterrand was reassuring: (We) always
urged Portuguese Socxal.sts to remain allies of the Communists.
Lazitch, p. 23lf Questions
relating to the Socialist International
and events in ?ortug;i wi!! be
discussed later.
•

^

O3
39

The final communique ignored differences,
calling only for
Israeli withdrawal under the UN Resolution
of 1967.
Fb representatives received the impression
the Soviets actually
preferred a Europe anchored to the United States,
rather than an independent Europe.
Le Monde , April 27-28, 1975, p. 3.

CHAPTER

X

GERMANY AND THE TWO PARTIES OF
THE

FRENCH

LEFT

Central to French foreign policy has been
Germany.

And the

German problem has never been distant
from the international behavi<
of political parties in France.

Following Liberation, it was under-

standable for Gaullists, Socialists and
Communists to align with the

broad designs of Bidault, creating, as we
saw, an essentially Poincairist solution: keeping Germany down,
internationalizing the Ruhr and

putting the Rhineland under Allied control.^
Despite a later rapprochement with the ennemi hereditaire . inspired by
the "Europeans" Monnet

and Schumann, the essential Franco-Soviet relationship
described in

earlier chapters persisted.

It persisted largely because of shared per-

ceptions concerning Germany.^ Even with de Gaulle's strong
ties to the
Bonn Republic, he never ceased to view Germany as an
inherent rival.

This was a nationalist line, one with which Soviet or German
Communists did not necessarily agree. Contrast this with World War
I,
where the PCF opposed Versailles and the Rhineland occupation.
2

Soviet commentators hold that French-Russian interests merge
on controlling Germany.
Both seek to prevent the FRG from acquiring
muclear weapons or seeking territorial changes.
See Internat ional
Affairs , No. 12, December, 1955, p. 13. Debre concurs, see Le Monde
October 24, 1975, pp. 1 and 5. De Gaulle had accepted the Oder-Neisse
line as far back as 1944 in discussions with Stalin.
This was confirmed at a press conference 15 years later.
See Grosser, p. 77.
,
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The French-Soviet link was,
in effert
ettect, ^a r.r.i
,
policy ^
for encircling Germany.^^

m

Germany Dominant^jrhe_French
Communist View
until the 1970s, there were
many on the Left who feared
that
Germany would be an inherently
destabilizing force until she
accepted
the realities of the territorial
changes wrought by World War 11.^
At
the start of the period reviewed
here, one can observe a steady
Communist
preoccupation with the B undesrepublik
as manifested by the Party
press
and journals as well as Central
Committee statements and other
actions
of the leadership. In 1959, much
of the obsession focused on Franz,

Josef Strauss.
was described

Thus the leader of the Christian
Democratic Union (C.D.U.)
as intent upon revising the Eastern
,
frontiers ^or nurturing

dreams of a "European" atomic force to
be shared by the Bundeswehr .^
The Party press repeatedly cited, and
often exaggerated neo-Nazi tendencies said to be rampant across the Rhine.

Marchais himself provided

a

3

—

Aspaturian, Soviet Foreign Police Sinc e Khruschcbev
(New
York: ^.J^^'^^^
Vikmg, 1972), p. 169.^
i+
.

This was the specter of a revanchiste Germany,
kept alive bv
many Communist Parties.
'

5

,

L'Humanite , September 25, 1959, p.

3.

5„

.possession of atomic weapons is a moral duty of the nation"
'
said Strauss.
Ibid.
After "Prague", the PCF feared that Germany would
use the events to strengthen itself and acquire nuclear
weapons. L'Humanite, September 20, 1968, p. 3.
.

7

o

Much was made of an NPD victory in Baden-Wurtemburg during
1968.
The issue was international, in that the rebirth of Nazism affected peace in Europe.
Fred Fischback, "Neo Nazi Tendencies and Revanchardes in West Germany", Cahiers du Communisme , January, 1959,
pp. 64-74.

^
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a suinmary of

Commnist grievances: the Potsdam Accords
had been ignored,

the German Communist Party (D.K.P.)
had been banned since 1955,^
and the

Bundeswehr was headed by ex-Nazi generals,
such as Speidel and

Heusinger

.

In assessing this list of grievances and
Communist purposes in

drawing it up, it should be kept in mind that French
Communists cannot
be understood as merely another political
party on the domestic spectrum.
It has been shown throughout here that they are
capable of behaving as
a broad, and sometimes dynamic, actor in the
international system,

bringing weight to bear on behalf of policy positions crucial
to themselves and the world movement with which they identify.

Perhaps nowhere

was this more evident than on these grievances regarding Germany.

Below are some tangible actions they took to influence policy.

When the Bonn Government moved to hold Presidential
elections inside West Berlin, the Political Bureau
of the PCF issued a strong statement calling upon
the French Government, one of the four powers with
special responsibility for Germany, to have the FRG
renounce the election.

.

By" not legalizing the German Communists, Chancellor Kiesinger
was stifling a genuine Left.
The argument was made that a reconstructed
German Communist Party was somehow related to France's own security.
Perhaps the PCF was repeating its role during the 1920s when it did
seek to aid the forces of the Left across the Rhine, doing whatever it
could (in those years) to keep France's occupation out of the Rhineland,
9

L Human ite
'

May 10, 1958, p.

.

6.

'^'

^L'Humanite

,

March 3, 1959, p.

1.

H
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In 1970, the Party
launched a widesnread
have Pompidou 's Government
recognize the
finally took such a step
on

FebSary

.

.

.

1,

Hv^n...

^

gS

T

if,t

With the signing of the
Soviet-German Treaty of
Frxendshxp, August, 1970,
Marchais wrote Willy
Brandt dxrectly, urging
legalization of the German communist Party.
That same month, the PCF
welcomed a lar^e Social ic;t
Unxty^Party (East German Communist)
delelaS^n ^o

Social Democrats in Germany
were attacked for not
opposing the U.S. role in Vietnam.

The major softening in the
attitude of French Communists
toward

Germany occurred when Brandt
entered the Government of the
Grand Coalition.
This marked the first Government
role for the SPD in the

history of the Bonn Republic.
point of view.
Bom..

The CDU had led nowhere, from
the PCF's

The hope now was that there
would be some tournant a

Perhaps the new Government would
now sign the Non-Proliferation

Treaty.

Or perhaps it would annul the
Hallstein Doctrine, requiring

Bonn to sever ties with those
states recognizing the GDR.

Most of all,

there was a feeling of momentum, of
a new orientation, now that Social

stressing the positive character of Germany's
new poli-ies
„
Marchais
asked why neo-fascists should be allowed to
openly engag.in
the political process, while the "Party
of Thaelman" remains illegal.
He adroitly called Brandt's attention
to the fact that the only Communist
Parties illegal
Europe were in those states with fascist regimesGreece, Spam and Portugal.
He further explained that the PCF. in its
new program was committed to a pluralism of
democratic parties, attaching
significance to the cooperation of Communists and
Socialists in France.
^Mitterrand also opposed any restrictions on Communists
in the FRG an
issue he took up with German leaders at Socialist
International forums.
Le Monde , December 13, 1975,
p. 12.)
,

.

m
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Democrats were in the
Government

L' HuTT,;.ni
Wluinanite
even reported that
Brandt

now favored negotiations
with the GDR.

And on November 16,
1969, the

PCF issued a joint
statement with the DKP, setting
forth common prospects.
Events dragged for the
balance of the year; talks
even broke
down between the two
Germanies.
On August 12, agreement
was reached
with the Russians, exactly
25 years after World War
II.
The FRG recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier,
launching a new situation in
Europe. ^It
was a fulfillment of a
long-time obiective of the French
Communists, and
unquestionably a victory for Soviet
policy.

While in no way diminishing the
extent of this victory for the
Communist camp, French Communist hopes
were over-exuberant, and even
naive.
Surely there were broad possibilities
for detente.
But it was

unrealistic to describe an end to
confrontation on the Continent, or an
imminent withdrawal of all troops from
foreign territory in Europe.
Nevertheless, the drama of developments
when the SPD negotiated a detente
with the East did lessen the credibility
of a revanchiste Germany that

Communist propaganda had constructed over
the years.

Party media, of

course, had to welcome the realism and
sagacity of Willy Brandt.

But on

the other hand, the specter of a dominant,
aggressive Germany would never

disappear from Party propaganda tracts and media.

Even under the new

Social Democratic leadership, Germany would soon
be described as "the

royal administrator of the interests of capital
12

...

the vanguard of

Jacques Denis had suggested this in Cahiers du Communisme,
"
February, 1971, pp. 68-79.

.
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U.S. imperialism"

The .ore nationalist
appeals designed to revive
the ancient con-

frontation between France and
Germany were firmly rejected
by .ost political groupings in France,
and definitely by Giscard
d'Estaing. ^ One
reason for the continuing
hostility by French Co.unists
towards
Germany,

despite Ostpolitlk and the
new realise, ste_ed fro.
so.e new developments in defense policy.
It win be recalled that
under Giscard
cJEstaing collaboration between
the defense forces of France
and Germany
had been strengthened, which
undid so.e of the .ore aloof
arrangements
that had prevailed under de
Gaulle.

There were even deeper and more
basic reasons.

trinal in nature.

And as the 1970s progressed,
French Communist disen-

chantment with the SPD heightened.
historic antagonisms.

Early hopes yielded to more basic

It should not be forgotten that
French Communists

had a deep suspicion of German social
democracy.
be the driving force behind

was seeking

13
_

-to

Some were doc-

1'

They considered it to

Internationale socialists

,

the force that

reorient the Socialists Parties of Europe
to the right

So said L'Humanite editor Rene Andrieu in
an interview with
February 23, 1975, pp. 89-92.
,

Per Spiegel

Le Figaro

,

February 15, 1979, p.

1.

15

See Walter Schutze's discussion in Le Monde
Diplomatique
October, 1975, pp. 12-13.
German and French Governm.ents had agreed on
the emplacement of Pluton missiles inside Germany.
Both the PCF and
DKP coordinated a drive to prevent this action
(without success).
L'Humanite , June 24, 1975, p. 3.
,

-
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ana certainly away f.o.
.oUaboration. with Co-unists.^^
Helmut Sch^i.t
for example, confined
the worst nightmares of
the Co.unists in a TV

ntsts had to be prevented
fro. assuming power in
large European countries
that there were no
significant Communist Parties
where social democracy
7
remaxned si^ificant.l The SPD
was suspicious and critical
of Mitterrand's cooperations with
Communists.
Specifically, he was yielding
too
much terrain to them and
betraying his commitment to
Europe."
•

1

The above were some of the
political and doctrinal
considerations

that engendered hostility
between the PCF and ruling
Government in Bonn.
Along with these arg uments, the
Communists also invoked economic
objec15

only to conceal
its ^apxLdixsx
capitans%'reaU?v'
°5 larsest
reality. '?he''?f
The oldest and
Marxi-^t P^r.i-,r ^-f r
^'"^ndoning

=lass collaboration.
? ^Brandt
waTno? ^?,d?n
through pseudo-reforms of co^"'""8
gest?™
For ?he'fM
"-^^ indictment, see

Gerard Cornillet and Claude"Tlnn
la :oc?arde-moc
JaSI'a?:?£™rp'''''^1d-t:"'^"^^^
sociales, 1979, pp. 77-97. Also see
^'
28 of the
''"""""^"^^ Voul.iu's essay "Points de repere
s^ir l.aftualiti"!
f

f

S

T"'

17

L'Humanite, May 7, 1976.
The PCF strongly protested the remarks
Chevenement went so far as to describe Schmidt
as tL "new Metternich"
threatening a "holy alliance of capital if
the PCF joined the ItaUan
'

^^^-^-^ D^..ocratL leaded
withhold any future new loans, if Communists
t. occupy
n
p^k"^""^
were to
Cabinet posts in any new Government. Schmidt,
whose
Government had ^ust authorized a $2 billion
loan to Italv, made this
commitment to Henry Kissinger at the Economic
Summit Conference in Puerto
Rico,
June, 1975.
New York Times July 18, 1976.
''''

IZlTolTl^

,

18

Le Monde

,

June 30, 1972, p. 7.
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tions to Germany and its designs
towards hegemony in Europe.
.

.

Jhus the malaise in the Lorraine steel industry
was
attributed to Germany. Germany's
steel industry hid
outdistanced that of France two-fold
in the pas^
^
quarter century.
Germany, because "it does not have
to channel a
significant part of its resources
into weapons or
expenses for war or colonization" is
at an advantage
because it can devote a greater share
of its resources
to productive investment. 20
_

_

.

The same forces that brought the
Nazis to power remain
the Federal Republic.
Thus the Coal and Steel
Community reconstituted Hoechst, Krupp,
Stinnes and
Ihyssen
the years 1954-1958.21

m

m

.

.

Chemical firms such as Bayerwerke, Farbwerke
and
Hoechst were suppliers of poison gas for
the U.S.
Army.

Germany ranks as the banker of Europe, with
monetary
reserves four times that of France. Thus the
franc
has steadily been devalued in relation
to the D Mark
since 1959.23

19
L'HuTTianite

,

February 20, 1979, p.

4.

20

This demagogic argument was made by Franc e
Nouvelle No 1735
February 12, 1979, p. 38.
Thus the PCF on the-^l^il^d-Tiji^^s a'cermary
that IS militarily strong and aggressive. Yet it
complains that the lack
of resources devoted to such efforts coiBtitutes an
advantage for Germany in its competition with France.
21^
Fred Fischback, op. cit,
.

22

L' Human ite , February 6, 1968.
A journalist in the Communist
press was apparently citing a West German publication from
Berlin,
Extradienst
There is no way to verify the accuracy of the report.
It
is only cited here to demonstrate the international
perceptions and perspectives of French Communists regarding the role of West Germany,
.

23

L'Humanite , February 20, 1979, p. 4. Communists argued that
any European money plans pursued by Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing
would only serve to legalize and heighten this domination by the Mark.

257

in conclusion, it can
be said that prior
to SPD participation
.n the rederai Repuhiie,
the PCP echoed the
Soviet line of a revanchist.

neo-nazi Ge^any that refused
to renounce nuclear
weapons and^^^ZT^
refused to allow a genuine
Left opposition to develop.
It

„as the only
state in Europe which did
not
or accept
accent Its
I'to o„,-o*existing frontiers. Following
the normalization in the
East, the hard-cutting edge
of th» German
threat was blunted. =^ The
danger was now the SPD, playing
a Hetternichlike role through its control
of the Henshevik Axis embodied
in the

lHi™£Hi^^2£iiUi!H-

It would seek economic
control of Europe and

deny any social change (ie
Communist advances) on the
Continent, as
dem.onstrated by its role in southern
Europe during the 1970s.
In fact,
the Communists distrusted their
alliance partners' links to German

social democracy much as French
Socialists distrusted PCF links
to Moscow,
There was a basic symmetry: each
rejected the international movement
of
the other.

Socialist Party Perspectives on Germany
Before examining specific Socialist attitudes,
it will help to

outline certain historical perspectives
regarding the Left in France and
social democracy in Germany,

One can properly note certain similarities

between the working class movements of the two
European states.
24

Certain-

It cannot be proven, but it is an arguable
hypothesis that
once the revanchiste military threat receded,
the Communists were able
to yield some of the concessions to the PS in
foreign and defense
policy cited in earlier chapters: on EEC, nuclear weapons
and on the
European Parliament, to cite only a few.
^

.
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ly both had been
sto^-tossed hy events at the
ti.e the Second International had spaced the
Third.
And it is obvious that
the Socialists
of France would develop
quite different relations
with German social

democracy fro. the PCF (although
the former, too, could
be quite critical of its brother Party
across the Rhine). A„d it
should be no
.urprise that SPD spokesmen
.ight react critically to
the 1960s dia^gue
in France between Co^unists
and Socialists."
Of course, the talks
in

France were occurring at a time
when Willy Brandt was himself
talking
to Willy stoph in Erfurt.
This is not to suggest a
parallel in the

substance of the respective dialo^es,
but only

to note the sy..etry,

perhaps symbolism, of the two
events.

What then were the similarities
of the working class movements
in these two key European states?

Both had been led into a Union sacree
in 1914,
Ignoring the anti-war declarations
issued at
Basel, Stuttgart and Amsterdam. ^6

.

Both had remained essentially divided
in the
face of Fascism during the war,

.

Both had emerged as antagonists in the
coldwar era

.

25

a Vienna gathering of Social Democrats,
Brandt, along with
Palme and Bruno Kreisky, strongly rejected
the idea of collaboraby Social Democrats with Comm.unists.
This was clearly in opposito the view of Mitterrand and certain
Southern-European Socialists
as Mario Scares (of the Portuguese PS).
Le Monde
1975,'
May 2 7-2

Olof
tion
tion
such
p

.

3

,

.

See Chapter II.

8,'

'
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But the differences,
as a.P. Chev.ne.ent
notes, were prCab.,
Sreater.
Thus the decisive and
.icient defeats of .he
Ce^an Kevointion in ieiS-iS.O under
the Sociai Democrat.
S.stav .csKe. resulted
in
a fratricidal st^ggie
between Co„unists and
Social Democrats that
Ultimately led to Na.is.f
„ar. and a redivision of
Ger»ny-a redivis.on Which ironically
.ade that nation the
effective frontier between
Communism and Social Democracy
in Europe.

on the other hand, the
split in the working class
movement in
France during 1920 was
essentially peaceful. And it
was followed by
those celebrated moments of
reconciliation, that we have
reviewed hire
in prior pages: Popular
Front, Resistance. Liberation,
and Union of the
Left.

Chevene.ent argues (and it is a view
widely shared by the CERES
faction in the French Socialist
Party) that somewhere in the
soul of
the French Left, the hope still
flickers that the working class
.ove.ent
can be reunited: that Tours can
be transcended
There is at least a
.

memory of a common struggle (which
the SPD and KPD would be hard put
to
27
^^'^

the

1=

•

called out Reichswehr and Freikorps
units to put down

^^---^^^^^^^ pos^ibiSSes

Mitterrand to the contrary: "Obviously many
Socialists are
dreamnna^!^''
dreamxng
of reversing the break of 1920.
I understand these people.
But we are far from that.
Communists and Socialists, separated for
nearly 50 years now, have crystallized their
characteristics in
contradictory fashion". Paris-Match , October
30, 1976 pp. 56-57

.
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evoke

)

If Cheve„e™e„t is
correct, the stakes for
Prance and Ger^nv are
Ultimately the sa.e: overco^in,
the dile»as inherited
fro™ the Second
and Third Internationals.^^
Spokesmen for CERES hold
out the hope that
the advent of a Western
European socialise, oriented
towards plurali..

and workers .anage^ent,
could exercise influence
over the Cer^n problem
somewhere in the future there
could he a spectacular
rapprochement
he-

reon French socialism and German
social democracy.

Such a development

according to Chevenement. would
create conditions favoring
a subsequent
rapprochement between the FRG and
the GDR.^° Germany, despite
its

energy

and hopes, remains a prisoner
of the international
situation.

And the
social democracy within, remains
divided in Its perspectives,
with
various factions and generations
pulling in different directions.
What
Chevenement has to say is often
provocative and speculative. But
it
does represent the interntional
perspective of one important segment
of
French Socialism.

So much for CERES.

There remains the attitude towards
Germany

held by the more mainstream segments
of the P.S.
29

Following the War.

Chevenement, pp. 282-288.

argument is that the natural drive for Germans
to find
their unity-if it is not to erupt in a
world war-can only be normalized by the two Parties themselves.
It cannot be done through a
Kapallo arrangement or a variation of the
Hitler-Stalin Pact
.

.

_
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ties between the SFIO and
SPD were not good.
Pood
on some key European issues.

t

p
Policy

disagreements arose

The SPD opposed EDC,
whereas the SFIO

under Mollet ultimately declared
in favor.

On the other hand, a large

group in the Party (and in
Parliament) rejected the Mollet
line, continuing to see Germany as
revisionist.
A rearmed Germany would
easily dominate a France that was so
preoccupied and dispersed defending
the French
Union.
Others made the argument that
to support EDC was to
support a.
non-democratic Germany. Far better
to identify with the positive
Ger-

embodied in the SPD, the trade
unions, and the Protestant Church,
rather than that represented by
Catholics and the old Ruhr magnates.
inany

But this stance did not prevail.

The SFIO supported the European
Army

(certainly with the understanding that
the U.S. would continue its

presence in Europe).

Relations with the German social democrats
declined ev^ further

when the French Party reconstituted itself
as the Parti socialiste in
1969.

As noted, its political and alliance
strategy was considerably

to the left of the SPD.

Also, there was a strong suspicion of close ties

between the FRG and the USA, especially in defense.

Schmidt's statement

opposing Communist entry in West European governments
irritated PS opinion
being a direct challenge to their left union strategy.

^"^There was a domination by the FRG in the Euro-Group
of NATO.
Dieter S. Lutz, "Eurocommunism and the Federal Republic of Germany",
Co-existence, April, 1978, Vol. 15. No. 1. p. 61.

CHAPTER
THE SOCIALIST PARTY

XI

AND THE

INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
This chapter will examine
some internatinn;.!
J.11 Lei iiarional
H.-r.
dimensions of the
French Socialists, focusing
on their links to the
broader base of social
democrats in Europe.
It will also examine the
critique by the Co^u-

nists of social democracy at
the international level,
particularly in
the continuing North-South
dialogue.
The thesis will be further
develop ea
that because of certain
irreconcilable perspectives, ultimate
cooperat ion
between the PCF and social democracy
is likely to fail.

Perspectives of the PS

^rtisme

since th. W..

with the collapse of Tri-

in 1947 (and the fear of Communism),
the SFIO understandably

identified its more reliable friends
in the wider world to be the
welfare

capitalist states of the West, allying
itself with such forces as the
British Labour Party, the Truman
Administration and many of the emerging
social democracies in Europe.^
the renewed Parti socialists

,

Despite this post war link to the West,

born at Epinay 25 years later, shifted

perspective significantly: declaring its opposition
to the "reformist"
^This identity is described by ex-Minister
Jules Moch.
Monde, February 21, 1968, p. 7.
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nature of social democracy.

It must be stressed, however,
that in rejecting classic
social

democracy, the PS was not revising
its essential identity with
the West
not changing its foreign policy.
Nevertheless, these new perspectives
did create tensions between
the Party and other social
democratic
forces in Europe.
There were sharply differing
evaluations concerning
the wisdom of the new alliance
strategies that the Socialists in
France
were developing with the PCF.
The more mainstream European social

democrats opposed these alliance
experiments by their French colleagues
One might even note a certain symmetry
here.

Socialists outside of

France were playing a role not unlike
that of the World Communist
Movement.

Much as orthodox Communists abroad,
particularly in Moscow,

distrusted the PCF's alliance with social
democracy, so too, the inter-

national socialist movement distrusted the French
Socialists' new

flirtation with the PCF.

If Communists and Socialists were to join

together as domestic political allies, they were
likely to generate
disturbances in the respective international constellations
of which
they formed important components.

There is no doubt that the more successful Socialist Parties
of
The Party affirmed its Marxism at this historic congress,
claiming to reject much of its reformist behavior. A motion callin
for withdrawal from the Socialist International was only narrowly
defeated.
Frank Wilson, The French Democratic Left p. 24.
This
constrasts with the SPD, which rejected its Marxism in the 1950s.
,
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northern E^ope welcomed the
emergence of renewed
Socialist Part les in
southern and Latin Europe. '
,,,,
^^^^^^^^^^
alliance with Communists
munists.
Tn
-hk-:^
In this sense they
oddly mirrored the
stuhhornness of the CPSU, which
we saw repeatedly
cautioned the
fraternal Parties against
contamination from Menshevik
forces.
The

_

Mitterrand strategy seemed
likely to conflict with
mainstream social
dem.ocrats of the Internationale
socialists (I.S.).

Thus at Epinay, the Socialists
of France established a
certain

distance from the I.S., despite
the fact that Mitterrand
remained one
of the 14 vice presidents of
the international body.''

The disputes with the I.S.
regarding Mitterrand's alliance
arose

from a deep distrust

by officials of that organization
of Communists

and their "new look" in the West.

At a Vienna Congress of social

democrats in 1975, Bruno Kreisky, Olof
Palme and Willy Brandt (all of

whom led successfull ruling Parties)
voiced opposition to collaboration
feared that French politics would fragment
P^,
y^^^l
baullists
and Communists, without any intermediate
force
democracy. Andrei Fontaine, Le Monde June
28, 1958, p.
Schmidt noted that Communist Parties
exercised influence
^^^^
s^^^k f^s^
decades". The New
_

,

To
^Q?f p.
xa, ly/b,
4

15.

~

—

into two blocs,
of social
l
Helmut
only where "old
York Times,
— May

A language of Marxism was now replacing
that of reformism.
As
Mitterrand noted at Epinay, democratic reforms and
improvements' in the
lot of the workers were not enough.
It was necessary to "penetrate the
heart of the current system, power in the economic
enterprise".
Lazitch '
^
p. 234-235.
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ial democrats with
Communists.^

In describing a

sy«try

national .„ven,ent. of the
left,

between the behavior of
the two interI

a™ not suggesting an
exaot parallel.

The l.S. Clearly lacks
the discipline and central
coordination that the

Co™„unist .ove.ent once had
so.e pretense of maintaining,
fact, one
.ight say that the Co«.ists
manifested .ore disarray
internationally
than did the Socialist-^
alist..
At- this
-t-hno
At
point^ it will help to examine
briefly
some historical aspects of
international social

m

•

democracy.

^h^Jl^l^EI}^!^^

Heir to the original Second

International, this body has survived
through difficult historic
periods?
The original organization,
as shown in Chapter II, almost
disintegrated
during the First World War, when
the various national components
rallied
to the trenches.
Lenin's formation of a rival
International constituted
the next blow.
The l.S. managed to survive World
War II years largely
through efforts of the British
Labour Party. After the War, the
l.S.
""7 2^-28-1975, p. 3. At other moments spokesmen
for the lInternational propounded a
more tolerant view of PS behavior
-'^ Socialists of Europe held no uniform 111:
Tn ^he
tll' iT'^'^r^
issue of _cooperation with Communists;
alliance decisions would
^I^^Srnent of individual parties.
Vienna Kurier March 12,
197B n I
M
International appeared to have a particular
dist^us; of
distrust
o; the vrl^
.u^^^
PCF.
Thus Brandt openly indicated a preference for
the
st>le of party run by Berlinguer over
that of Marchals.
Der St-rn
August 9, 1977. When the PCF renounced
its doctrine of t he dictato rship
of the proletariat, Kreisky dismissed
the reversal as a trivial- act
Der Spiegel , March 7, 1977,

ltZT?

^

'

Z

,

_

_

_^The organization included such early socialist
figures as Eduard
Bernstein, Jules Guesde, August Bebel and Keir
Hardie.
Individual
members were grouped in national sections.
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was reconstituted at the
Frankfurt Congress, 1951.

that had .erged with the

Co„nists

East-bloc parties

were expelled.

Kurt Schumacher and
Guy Mollet emerged as president
and vice president respectively,
on a

program pledging a democratic socialist
order.

—

i:rench_p^^

Identity with an established social-

ist movement, representing many
ruling European Governments, is
enhancir^
for French Socialists, particularly
in their competition with other

parties.

Just as Communists acquire stature
through links to powerful

forces on the Continent, so too do the
Socialists.

On the other hand,

I.S. activities can also intrude into
domestic politics.

For example,

when the I.S, convened in Paris in the midst
of January, 1973 legislative elections, it generated considerable
stir.

I.S. organizers in-

sisted, correctly, that it was a routine meeting,
scheduled well before
the French elections had been called.

But heightening the controversy

was the presence that week of many heads of state,
including Golda Meir,^
7

Eight post war Congresses have been held in Europe. A
general
Council meets between Congresses.
The 20-member Executive Bureau is
headquartered in London.
There is both an Asian organisation and a
Latin-American affiliate.
Le Monde
January 12, 1973, pp. 1 and 9.
In 1978, the I.S. met in Dakar, the first time in the
Third World.
L'Humanite , May 15, 1978, p. 5.
,

g

There had been disagreement on Mid-East policy, and the Israeli
Labor Party had been told that Meir's presence during an election would
be construed as support for Mitterrand, perhaps influencing the
250,000 Jewish voters in France.
Le Monde
December 28, 1972, p. 5.
Generally, Jews in France do not vote as a bloc.
,
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Bruno Kreisky, Olof Pal.e,
Ja..s Callaghan and
Pietro Nenni.'
Since other .en*er parties
of the l.S. rejected
cooperation with
Co^ists. Mitterrand, presiding at
the meeting, feit the
need to justify
h.s policies, .uch as he
had done earlier that
year in Vienna before
the same body.

The PCF was also sensitive
to this l.S. Conference
in Paris, a
-etlng of parties judged reformist
by their standards.
When finally
staged, the meeting itself
was more an exchange of views
than a for^l
conference reaching conclusions.^^
If today the Socialist
International
is hardly the disciplined
army many had raptired in during
the last century, neither is it an impotent
debating forum. Socialist Robert
Pontillon terms it a "collective
laboratory for reflection", one
that could
from time-to-time "bring world
pressure against dictatorships of
Western

Europe or against repressions in
the East bloc."
play in the construction of Europe.

The l.S. had a role to

Encouraging to many in the Inter-

national was the assumption of power in
Germany by Brandt, an event seen
9
'"^^^^^ Brandt, due in Paris
for an official visit two weeks henca
declined to attend. He did not wish to
compromise his links with the
inviation from an opposition Party during
& an
eZTtTnT
r'^'^n^
election.
^
Le Monde
December 28, 1972, pp. 1 and 5.
.

,

.

^

,

,

10

11

See the chapter on the Programme
commun

.

The Vietnam issue dominated dis:ussions,
with the l.S. calling
tor a halt to bombings and urging elections
in the South.
Mitterrand
and the Scandinavians took a stronger
anti-American stand; Kreisky,
Callaghan and Meir demurred. There was little
discussion of the Middle
East.
Various Socialists urged the Labour Party to enter
the European
Parliament.
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at the ti^e as enhancing detente
and fostering an intra-European

normalxzation.

12

The PS and the Socialists of
Southern EuronP

Southern Europe has unique problems,
for example, underdevelop-

ment relative to the countries of
the north.

While the southern nations

affirm links to northern Europe, they
have not foreclosed certain
special ties to the Third World, particularly
Africa.

The divisions

and affinities experienced on a nation
state level in Europe are also
felt within the I.S.
in May,

Recognizing this, Mitterrand, Mauroy and
Jospin

1975 organized a conference, inviting socialist
leaders of

Southern Europe: Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy
and

Belgium.

There

were several purposes behind the conference.

Defining future policy

.

The countries of southern Europe

constitute an area of historical and political interest
to France.
it was natural that Socialists

Thus

anticipating a future role in government.

12

Le Monde , January 12, 1973, p. 1 and 8
Perhaps this chapter
has ^overemphasized some of the distance between the I.S. and
the
Socialists in France. A few years later, Mitterrand said in an interview "We are members of the Socialist International along with Kreisky,
Brandt and Palme
While there are obvious differences between German'
or Swedish social democracy and French socialism, we still belong
to
the same family, the same international movement.
There is a socialist
group in the European Parliament comprising Germans, British and Frenchmen.
Perhaps we represent different wings of the movement". Paris
Match , October 30, 1976, pp. 56-61.
.

13

There was some fear in Belgium and the Low Countries of a
Europe divided into Latin and non-Latin regions - then falling under
possible German influence. See the analysis of Thierry Pfister in Le
Monde , May 24, 1975, p. 11.
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would be seeking to define
policy toward that region.

^I2--i£^i£2l^.
isolated politically.

In 1975 Mitterrand sensed
that the PS was

(This was shortly after his
visit to the CPSU,

also an attempt to overcome
isolation.)

The other social democrats
of

Europe had not rallied around
the perspectives of the PS.

Socialists

in Scandinavia, Austria,
Germany and Britain all had a
certain con-

fidence, all carried a certain
global weight as ruling parties.

Because
of this, Mitterrand sought new
ties southward, toward states
which in
the 1970s were shedding rightist
or military regimes.
In Spain, Portugal and Greece Socialist Parties
were beginning to assert themselves.

Thus it was natural for Mitterrand
to seek support in the south.

Airing common problems

.

Many Socialists in France felt an

affinity for the Socialist Parties of
Southern Europe because they faced
similar circumstances.^'' Unlike the social
democrats of the North, these
parties confront large, active Communist Parties.

structures of these nations are more archaic.
mostly Catholic and more agrarian.

Often the social

The Southern nations are

The persistence of traditional

elements has prevented the working classes from being
integrated fully
into society, an integration process which did
occur in the Anglo-Saxon

countries.

The PS had strong ties with the Spanish Socialists
during

the 40 years of the party's exile.

14_

Similar years of exile also

The analysis here derives from Pfister's essay, ibid.
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strengthened ties with the party
of Mario Soares in
Portugal." Mitterrand was thus invoking the
Southern European Socialist
Parties as a
counterweight to the social
democrats of the north. By
19V5, Mitterrand
was concerned about the
possibility of an integrated
Europe, and he

wanted to increase the options
of his own party in such
a political
structure. Details of the
discussions at the meeting need
not concern
us.

They dealt with a range of
problems: collaboration with

Co«nists.

attitudes of socialist parties
towards their countries joining
NATO,
and other relevant topics.
The important fact is that the
meeting was
held, defining a Southern European
point-of-view within social democratic ranks.

Social De mocratic International
Perspectives:
a Critique from the L eft

Thus far we have established that
socialists and social democrats
in general manifest a particular
world view.

Many of the perspectives

as they apply to French Socialists
have already been examined herein.

The important question now becomes:
how compatible, or incompatible,

were such perspectives with those of their
Communist alliance partners?
The answer here would largely determine
how one views the ultimate

similar reasons the PCF forged close ties with Cunhal
^
and
the Portuguese Communists.
The risk was that the two French Parties
would tend to identify with their respective
ideological allies,
threatening the ^already delicate balance in their
relationships! In
fact, such a spillover did occur when the communists
and Socialists of
Portugal entered a sharp dispute. The dispute soon erupted inside
the
two French Parties.
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viability Of the left alliance.

This chapter began by
noting the

general affinity and identity
of Trench Socialists and
European social
democracy with the Western ca^p.
Or in Brezhnev's ter^s,
..social demo-

cracy became a hostage to
bourgeois imperialism...

Co^unists who hold this view.

But it is not only

It will be helpful to
explore briefly

some of the arguments and
apprehensions of those who challenge
the
social democratic world order.
At the same time it will help
clear up
the Communist point-of-view,
and help explain the virulence
of their
attacks on social democracy.

The historical argument has been
made that it was the post-war

Western international system itself
which required or encouraged the

formation of social democratic coalitions
in the European states.

These

coalitions were formed as a force to preserve
the vulnerable post-1945

capitalist order, according to the argument.

Thus it is said that the

CIA subsidized social democratic parties
as far back as 1947.

Central Intelligence Agency placed Willy Brandt
on its payroll.

The U.S.
^'^

Wolfe

makes the argument that
...the centrality of social democracy to the

he told the World Conference of Communist Parties in 1969.
June 10, 1969, p. 5.

^^'So

Le Monde

,

17

Morton H. Halperin, et al.. The Lawless State (New York,
1974), p. 37.
Cited in Alan Wolfe, "Has Social Democracy a Future",
Comparativ e Politics, October. 1978, p. 104.
"What is surprising about
social democracy", says Wolfe, "is not that it exists in a capitalist
world system, but that in some ways it actually organizes that system
and defines its priorities", p. 103.
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political organization of
advanced capitalism
^^^^^^-^-^
e'd, inadvertently
entlv ToTe
to be sure, when they tried
to organize
the world capitalist system
under American
negemony after World War II.

Whether or not such a broad thesis
is valid is not the
point
here.
Tne point is that it attempts
to implicate social democracy
in a
political design.
While those creating a political
order in the West
might have preferred Italian Christian
Democrats, Adenauer, or Ludwig
Erhard, rule by these political
segments alone was untenable in
the long
run, since the very growth and
success of European recovery under

capitalism encouraged expectations in the
post-war working classes that
only social democratic parties could
fulfill.
Furthermore, if the whole
edifice was to survive, it required some
planning apparatus and state

interventionist manipulations."'"^

While French Communists would probably accept
much of the above

analysis, they would carry the argument one step
further.

Not only was

(and is) social democracy the preserver of the
capitalist order, but it
is also the destabilizer of any radical (that
is Communist,

m

)

attempts

Unce
power, social democrats, having raised expectations,
sought to fulfill their promises.
But they could only deliver on these
promises by mortgaging the future in the form of inflation. The
quagmire led to the difficulties experienced later by such
parties in Britain
and Scandinavia.
The state-managed order of social democracy was thus
viable during the pro-growth era of the 1950s and 1960s, but vulnerable
thereafter.
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to Change that o.der.

Thi. interpretation
explain, the sinister
nature

that Co™™uni.ts attribute
to social democracy's
international role
And it is this fundamental
interpretation by the. of
social democracy
Which I believe ^,es any
alliance between the two
forces ultimately
untenable. Chapter X discussed
the PCF-s suspicions of
the SPD that
emerged from Bad Godesberg
Therp
. h
iiiere w;.c:
was a
^^^s*
deen rear
ucep
fpa-n -hKn-tmat German social
democracy would act to stabilize
aoxixze a leftist
Ipftici- government
that might someday
come to power in France. '^'^

French Communists in 1978 considered
the PS to have realigned
itself with European social democracy.
1976 marked the end of

Mitterrand's brief and ephemeral tactic
of attempting to distinguish
the
Socialist Parties of Northern and
Southern Europe.^^ And Communists,
who
long took pride in their own
internationalist orientation, looked
with
deep suspicion upon the harmonization
of policies among the socialists
in Europe.

In fact,

the situation contrasted with the
lack of harmony

19
.^^^ ^^"^ example Ralph Milliband, Marxism and Po litics
^ „
Oxford
University

(Oxford

Press, 1977), pp. 183-185
These fears were intensified by the role of the SPD in opposing
the quasi-insurrectional
activities of the Communists in Portugal.
For a French Communist
discussion of the role of the SPD in the I.
S., see Louis Althusser, "on
the Jwenty Second Congress of the French Communist
Party", New Left
Review, No 104, July-August, 1977,
p. 6.
.

20

^^^^
PS joined in the Elsinor Conference, convened
to
elaborate a European-wide Socialist program.
This confirmed to them
that the PS was conforming to the SPD's vision
of Europe.
^

^

^
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between European Communists in
recent years.

One important instrumentality
of international social dlemo-

cracy, according to Communist sources,
is the Triedrich Ebert
Foundation
Directed from Bonn, its operations are
said to promote the international

purposes of social democracy, not merely
in Europe, but in the Third
World as well. 22 p^^^y journalists and
researchers have been critical
of the Fund for several reasons:
1) Important members of German industry sit
on its

board.

2)

It serves as a source of financial support
for
other Social Democratic Parties, as in Spain
and Portugal.
Furthermore it is active in
France, Italy and Greece, namely those countries
where change is taking place and where
Communists are active.
In France, both non-

21^

European Social Democrats in 1974 formed an office of coordination for Socialist Parties in the EEC Parliament and
Commission.
22

The Fund serves as a research and archive center, offering
seminars and conferences to 100,000 participants a year. Data is
from
Claude Montagny, "La fondation Friedrich Ebert: efficace demarcheur
de la social-democratie allemande". La social-demo cratie au
present
"
(Paris: Editions sociales, 1979), pp. 101-122.
'

23

These are said to include directors of Volkswagen, Hoechst.
and German banks.
Two board members are also members of the Trilateral
Commission, making them suspect. La social-democratie a u present,
The Swiss journalist, Jean Ziegler, reports that funds from
p. 30.
the SPD control the entire Socialist International, with the Friedrich
Ebert Foundation serving as the primary source of financing. Le Monde
~
Diplomatique , January 16, 1978.
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Coi^munist trade unions,
the F.O. and the
receive support. 2*+

C
F D T
^.l^.lJ.T.

It operates with Governmen-i-c:
the Third World,

in~XZL''"ZTZ
L

Senegal and Indonesia.25

ZZlt Sadf

°™

1973

"'Brussels oS!'

2::t

E C

""^^^ ==P°nsor seminars.

The pur!•
Do^r ,
1'' '°
move
^°
the
?Srd
Third World states away
from Marxian solutions
J-ucions,
towards social democracy.

-

T^ls is the critical
Co™,unist evaluation of social
democracy's
actions at the international
level, a mixture of truth,
demagogy and
conspiracy theory,
the Communist belief system,
the class struggle
has moved to a world level,
manifesting itself today in the
struggle
between rich and poor nations.
Leaders, such as Brandt, are
alarmed by
the destabilizing possibilities
inherent in this struggle at the
world
26
level.
Social democratic policy, therefore,
is one of reducing tensions

m

between North and South in the world.

It is in this sense that the
I.S.

24

"^^11^°^ "^^^ks were transferred from the Foundation
to
r
Lisbon
of the Socialist Party and its
journal RepubMca
?-ganizes seminars for journalists in
Burnfr of course, is to preserve capitalism
purpose,
and prevent chang; in
^'"""^^
^^'^ movement'towards
social
social'democ;"*
democracy, to ultimately create an
enlarged Europe with a
political center
Bonn.
Ibid., p. 118.

th. bank
the

m
•

•

S^^e

T

m

Montagny, Ibid., pp. 109-110.
26

Ibid., p.

133.
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has continued to intervene in
North-South relations.

The goal, then, is to avoid class
struggle at the planetary

level and attenuate the national
liberation struggles.

On the othe.

hand, if the social democrats
of Europe do nothing, famine,

overpopulation will endanger the entire
edifice.

di.
Lsease

and

Given this situation,

the Brandt solution calls for an
enlightened generosity in the

developed states: certain sacrifices to
be made now.

But it is the

working people of the Western countries,
the supposed constituency of
the PCF, who will be paying for this generosity.

national order that social democrats have in
mind.

This is the inter-

Communists, however,

are confident that the working people of
the developed countries will

not pay the costs of salvaging this particular
crisis of capitalism.
A final note

.

Social democratic perspectives cited in this

chapter on North-South issues do not always reflect the
views of the
French Socialists.

Neither the l.S. nor the Ebert Foundation speak for

the PS, a Party which formulates policies independently
on such questions,

The next chapter will examine policies toward the Third World
by both

the PS and PCF.
27

Thus the Commission formed by Robert McNamarra of the World
Bank, to resolve deadlocked issues between North and South, designated
Brandt as its head.
If the Third World was making demands, it was
Brandt's role to determine methods of attenuating these demands by
fostering class collaboration and defusing the world from dangerous
social upheaval in the less-developed areas.

CHAPTER

XII

THE THIRD WORLD:

PERSPECTIVES OF THE COMMUNISTS

AND

SOCIALISTS

The Common Program

The French left brings its own perspectives
to Third World

relations.

But

Communists and Socialists, given their different con-

ceptions, do not always align on questions relating to
underdeveloped
nations.

m

Each interprets events through its own prism.

The two parties,

the time frame examined here, were in the process of
redefining

proposals for a Government program.

And while 19 77 negotiations to

update the Program failed. Third World policies did not appear to
be at
issue.

Nevertheless, events in the Third World could in the future

divide the two coalition partners.

A sensible point of departure for analysis, then, is the

Programme commun
spectives.

.

It can shed light on certain broad

Further on

Third World issues.

I

Then

shared per-

will examine PCF and PS positions on specific
I

will examine some specific Socialist

proposals on "the new economic order".

The Common Program commits a Government of Left Union to seek a
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major restructuring of relationships
with the underdeveloped
world,
calling for cooperation based
on genuine independence
and non-interference in internal affairs.
While the document urges
^
an end to
colonial domination, it recognizes
that France holds special
links to
its former realm, especially
in Africa.
The two parties call for
an
aid program favoring public
development over the private sector,

directing benefits towards the needs
of the recipient states, rather
than the narrower requirements of
French investors.

The Program also

calls for a revision of the Association
status arrangements negotiated
between EEC states and the developing
countries, the so-called Yaounde

Agreement.

Nothing is said about national liberation
movements, other than

brief reference of support for independence
struggles.

Nor is there

any reference to France's dependency on the
Third World for raw

materials (the document was drafted before the oil
price rises).

In

sum, the Common Program tends toward generalities
with respect to the

Third World; one must probe elsewhere for concrete
perspectives.

But

first it will help to sketch some historical background.

Historical

Overview

Third World problems are not peripheral to French politics.

"

^Le Programme commun du Gouvernement de la Gauche (Paris:
Flammarion, 1978), pp. 120-123.

.

279

It was de-colonization and
the ensuing new nelationahip.
to Indo-China
and the African states which
so upset French political
life in the Fourth
Republic. The parties of the
left also grasp the political,
economic

and cultural ties binding France
to Africa. Asia, the
Caribbean and the
Middle East.

For the past 25 years, the PCF
has essentially accepted the

general world communist line towards
the Third World: supporting
the
Tiajor

national liberation confrontations of
the period.

Although not a

governing Party, the PCF has mobilized its
resources, taking the

political action steps available to it.

This includes issuing

pronouncements, acting in parliament, or
participating in world conferences

While proud of its anti-imperialist record, the
PCF has at times

equivocated on issues of colonialism.

The classical doctrine was not

always helpful in sorting out the issues, for Marx
rarely dealt with
issues of national liberation.

Only late in life did he interest himself
:

with the independence problems of India, Poland and Ireland.

Lenin had

wanted to bring the revolution to the colonies, but was unsure
if
colonial liberation was a one-stage or two-stage operation.

Would

colonies move to socialism directly, or did they first require development
of a national bourgeoisie?

Even Stalin was suspicious of independence
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leaders.

Men such as Ghandi were vassals
of capitalist, leading
independent nations, but dependent
on their ex-colonial
rulers.
It was
probably Khrushchev's insight to
accept the non-aligned states
as
basically compatible with the socialist
world.

It should be no surprise, then,
that a form of revolutionary

paternalism describes ear]y French Communist
attitudes toward backward
lands.

Socialism would come to the colonial
lands, but derivatively:

through the French people themselves
achieving socialism.

The Empire

would be socialized rather than de-colonized.^

Furthermore, the USSR approved these conceptions.

At the de

Gaulle-Molotov meeting of May, 1942, the Soviet
Union pledged to support
a

post war framework where all the peoples of
the French colonies would

yield to de Gaulle's leadership.^

Early PCF policy conformed to this

scheme: urging retention of colonies in the French
Union, but paying lip

service to some autonomy.

Algeria was not seen as a national entity.

In 1945 Thorez spoke of a "union of freedom" between
French and colonial

peoples, holding out some vague idea of self determination.

During the

early stages of the Indo-China War in 1946-47, Thorez, then a vice

president in the Tripartite Council of Ministers, supported credits for
2

On the other hand, the PCF was instrumental in the formation
of revolutionary parties in the colonial countries.
3

~

Claudin, The Communist Movement from Comintern to Cominfo rm,
"
Vol. II, pp. 336-7^;

^
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the war on the insurgents.^

.Socialists and the Th1 ^;^World.

The SFIO too underwent
painful

adjustments to France's declining
influence.
the 1955 Suez War.

Guy Mollet led France in

He went on to become a
major supporter of the war

in Algeria, despite an
earlier repudiation of the A lg^rie
Frangaise

slogan.'

These actions of the SFIO during
the Fourth Republic did

tarnish their image as friends of
the Third World.

Today, however, the Socialists have
fundamentally revised their

conceptions of the Third World.

They recognize the urgency of a new

economic order, attuned to the demands that
the underdeveloped states
have made on the industrial nations."^

Mitterrand's program in 1972 was highly critical of
France's
4

Claudm, p. 338. Some hold the PCF accepted more
mainstream
views on colonial questions in order to gather allies
in the struggle
against EDC, which they gave a greater urgency to.

m

socialists operate
a pluralist framework, where factions
could oppose or support various colonial policies.
Many who had a
falling out o-n the Algerian question later joined with Mendes-France
in
forming the PSU.
The PCF continues to cite the role of SFIO in various past wars
to demonstrate its historical opposition to liberation movements.
See
L' Imperialisme frangais
aujourd'hu i (Paris: Editions sociales, 1976)
p.

75.
7

Socialists evoke an historical parallel, analogizing Third World
demands for a new economic order with the 19th Century struggle of
workers to form unions for their rights. See Lionel Jospin (ed.) Les
Socialistes et le Tiers Monde (Paris: Berger-Levrault 1977), p. 120.
,
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past dealings with the Third
World.
iiu. ^

Existing policy ^favored
Lxistmg
French
•

business interests over the
Lne reauirpm^n+c
requirements of the poorer
nations.
Policy
was Often subordinated to
U.S. interests (a the.e
often stressed by PCF

pronouncements).
.

.

.

.

.

Below are some other themes
of the Mitterrand program:
The Third World must reach
its own development
goals, without particular
western models imposed.

Abandonment of priviliged

zones of French influence.

Promotion of a legitimate
French-speaking cultural
policy, in no way tied to development
aid.
No sale of arms to repressive,
racist regimes.

Developed nations must contribute
one per cent of
GNP to development aid.

French Communist Pe rspectives

In the last chapter certain broad
ideas were sketched.

While

the Communists accept the legitimacy of
national liberation struggles,

they reject the conception that there will
be violent explosions arising

from the Third World confronting the rich nations.

Contrast this to the

Brandt Report, which is predicated on the possibility
of such confrontations.

As Marchais told a press conference in Mexico City,
the inter-

ests of the people in developed countries cannot be
contradictory, but

must complement those of the poorer countries to form a
more just order.

Imperialism spreads the idea that there is a
contradiction between the aspirations of the
French people and working class regarding their

Frangois Mitterrand, Chanp:er la vie: Programme de Gouvernement
du Parti Socialiste (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), pp. 193-197.
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toe

CaribbeL^SLa'a^S

°'
AS?::?"'

Co^unists also reject what they
ter„ demographic theories
of
catastrophe.

Thus some of the poorest
African states, such as
Gabon and
the Congo, have a zero rate
of population growth.
Industrialization of
the Third world will not
lead to extreme population
explosions.
There
will be increases, as mortality
rates decline, but population
will

Ultimately stabilize, as in other
industrial states.

Thus problems of

population growth and food shortages
are judged false problems.
The
PCF is confident there
Liiere are rptir,n^T
rational T7=i,rc.
ways -i-^
to organize social and
production
relations to avoid these crises.
"'"^

The PCF critique of French policies

.

French capitalism emerged from

the Second World War in a state of
dependency, stagnation, indebtedness,

and general political impotence, according
to the Communists.
9

.

To regain

.

Visits such as this are one of many forums
used by the PCF to
promote its views on the Third World. Marchais
had been invited by the
Mexican Communists, who had been legalized
after nearly 40 years in
1978.
Marchais was also granted a 45-minute visit with
President Jose
Lopez Portillo. L'Humanite see the issues
of May 15, 16 and 17 which
gave wide coverage to the visit.
_

,

10,

^^^2
proper models for development, not surprisingly,
are
those of the Central Asian USSR, Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan and others which
have developed far more than Pakistan, Turkey
and Afghanistan, having
moved from feudalism to the modern era in a matter of
decades.
Andre
Mome, "Points de reperes pour les problemes du Tiers-Monde",
Cahiers
du Communisme May-June, 1958,
pp. 110-125.
^

,
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position .e,ui.ed a la.ge.
base.^^ Caullis. beca.e
the political
to accomplish this,
drawing upon

We

the Treaty of Ro.e and
the new relation-

ships deriving fro. it.

Pro. the viewpoint of
the communists, the new

Fifth Republic went on to
establish stable positions,
strengthening the
currency, reducing debt,
developing a nuclear force,
disengaging from
NATO and encouraging advanced
sectors of technology.

At the same time, Gaullism
required a Third World policy
to meet
new realities.
Its solution was to enter
into agreements of cooperation
and aid. Actually, de Gaulle
was establishing neo-colonial
relations

with the newly independent states.
1) Keep them

The goal was to:

within a capitalist mode of development.

2) Extend French economic penetrations.

3) Overcome France's backwardness in relation
to its

rivals.

To achieve this, France had a number
of foreign policy assets

at its disposal: its Security Council seat,
its nuclear arsenal, and its

network of bases capable of deploying forces
in Africa, the Indian Ocean
and the Caribbean.

Thus France pursued its penetrations through
its

policy of "cooperation".

The Third World states were seen as "privileged

zones" for commercial activity.

French capital flowed into the Ivory

L imperialisme franqais
Much of the analysis here is based
on the opening essay by Martin Vorlet, pp. 11-33.
It presents a good
outline of some Communist positions.
.

Vorlet, p.

m.
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Coast, Gabon, the Zaire of
Mobutu, or South Africa,
Iran, Egypt, even

^--1- Raw materials were also a prime
'J^^
target.
Despite its penetrations,
imperialism ultimately confronts
(or
even engenders) the inexorable
liberation movements.
These then are
some of the perspectives that
emerge when one examines the
seemingly
endless pages of Party journals
and tracts.
Through this Leninist pris^
imperialism appears as a force consciously
seeking to destroy the unity
of the younger nations.
The developed countries go so
far as to
manipulate the more reactionary regimes
of the Third World against progressive ones (that is those with a
socialist orientation)
Thus Zaire
„

or South Africa is summoned to
defend a faction in Angola, or Hassan's

Morocco is employed to preserve the
status quo in Zaire.
Some French Communist ass essments in the
1970s

cautiously optimistic in 1975.

liberation victory.

.

The communists were

The MPLA in Angola had achieved a

The Party noted that the U.S., frustrated
over Water-

gate and Vietnam, was powerless to intervene.

direct intervention had been diminished.

"^^

Imperialism's means of

Furthermore, the political

weight of the Socialist-bloc countries (namely the ability
of the Soviets
13

Verlet, p. 13

14

The PCF does not support every indiscretion of the liberation
movements.
The Central Committee condemned the killings at the 1972
Olympics as adventurist, "ill-serving the just cause of the Palestinian
Arabs". Cahiers du Communisme, October, 1972,
pp. 127-128.
15

Cahiers du Communisme , July-August, 1977,

p.

82.
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and Cubans to aid liberation
.ove.ents) had to be taken
into greater
account.
rivalry.

ilBPg.r'ialist
.

Vfhile the

Co.munists applaud any with-

drawal by French forces fro. areas
of for.er interest (as happened
with
certain Indian Ocean outposts), there
is one caveat: rival imperialist

powers might step into the vacuum.

It does not promote socialism
if

France withdraws, only to have the U.S.,
the Federal Republic or Japan

supplant the former role of France.
1950, has tripled

Thus Madagascar, independent since

its trade with the dollar zone.

Evidence of West

German penetrations into former French Africa
is a particular irritant.

Communist analysts make the case that the U.S. has
stepped into many
former French (and British) realms in the Indian
Ocean.
tions are ignored.

Soviet penetra-

16

The Communists, in their role as a vocal opposition
Party, oppos

Government military initiatives

.in the

Third World, such as Giscard's

threat, in May, 1975, to dispatch forces to Lebanon.

In fact, the PCF

rejected any attempts by the Giscard Government to assert France's role
in crises.

regime.

At the same time, it ridicules any signs of impotence by the

This inconsistency gives them the flexibility to be critical

where they see fit.
15

When Giscard did assert a role in Africa, as shown

South Africa's de Beers now prospects on the island. Japan
has secured fishing rights off-shore, and the FRG has extensive investments there, the PCF particularly objects to the SPD's links to the
social democrats on that island.
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by the airlifting of Moroccan
iiuroccan t-Pnn^Q
v
troops -t-^
^
to Zaire
•

m

april, 1976, it was

dismissed as an American-inspired
adventure.

These, then, were some
perspectives of the PCF concerning
the
Third World.
Next, it will help to examine
some problem areas.
The Indiai. Ocean reeion.

Despite withdrawals from this
region of one-

time Anglo-French influence, France
retains a residual force.

(And the

PCF retains its own influence through
its own extensive contacts with

Communist Parties in the region.)

French outposts lie along the sea
lanes

from the Suez Canal and the Cape route.

Major oil supplies come from the

Persian Gulf, and they require protection.

France also conducts atomic

tests in the Indian Ocean, requiring monitoring
stations.

Until 1975,

France retained its large air and naval facility
at Diego Suarez and the

island base at Tananarive.

When Madagascar insisted on full neutrality

in 1975, the Navy shifted to a new base at St.

Department of France.

Denis on Reunion, still a

Bases on the Comoro Islands were yielded, but the

one at Mayotte, on the northern entrance to the Mozambique
Channel

(opposite Madagascar) has been retained.

The area has strategic value

in any conflict, since it dominates the sea lanes along the eastern

coast of Africa.

The significance of this was not overlooked by the

Communist press, which noted that

a

million tons of oil flowed through

the channel daily, destined for Europe and the
17

L'Humanite

,

April 5, 1976, p.

2.

U.S.''"'^
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Djibouti, at the mouth of the Red
Sea, is a further strategic
site noted by the Communists.

In June,

1977, this area of the Horn

received independence after 71 years of
French rule.

The event was wel-

comed by L'Humanite, but the press report
noted many "remaining booby
traps".

18

Thus Giscard was seeking to manipulate
the government struc-

ture, and was intent on retaining the French
base there.

At the time

this was viewed as a threat to socialist-leaning
Somalia.

The Communists believe that both the U.S. and
France would oppose

any leftist-oriented regime installed in that area of
the Horn.

They

also suggest that strongly anti-socialist Saudi Arabia would
willingly
play the role of protector for the new state of Djibouti.

In terms of

overall Indian Ocean policy, the PCF appears convinced that France is

determined to maintain what influence it can,
Vali.

a

viewpoint confirmed by

By maintaining a permanent military presence capable of inter-

vening in crises, France is opposing the right of new nations to settle
their own affairs.

20

The Communists claim they would offer a "more democ-

ratic policy in the Indian Ocean, a region where France could make a

positive contribution towards peace and security".

^^Ibid.
19

.

.

The base is operational, say the Communists.
This is confirmed
by Ferenc Vali, who cites its excellent military harbor, and notes that
its garrison is reinforceable by a force d' intervention.
Vali, Politics
of the Indian Ocean Region (New York: Macmillan, 1975).
20

See Michel Chariot in L' Imperialisme frangais, p. 65.
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The Middle East, Africa
and Energy Issues

The PCF had been critical
of Giscardian policy toward
the Middle

East, a region furnishing
85 percent of France's
petroleum.

For instance, the Government favored
certain oil producers, such as
Iran and
the Arab states of the Gulf,
over the more socialist-oriented
Algeria,
Iraq and Libya.
While the Communists may dislike
certain Arab regimes,
they are in no position to close
off supply sources.
But they would

prefer to increase imports from the
latter nations listed above.

(The

Mitterrand Government has shown signs of
agreeing with this policy.)

The Communists also hope that the Left
Government will expand

trade with the Soviet and East-bloc states.

However,

I

have nowhere

located the suggestion that the Soviet Union
could itself supply petrol-

eum to France, being already over-extended in
Eastern Europe.
Relations wi th Algeria

.

Communists always viewed the Evian Accords as

a device allowing Franco to control Algerian national
wealth.

But the

Boumedienne Government was said to be leading a legitimate
independence
struggle for control of this wealth.

The PCF welcomed Algeria's decisive

nationalization of the oil and gas facilities of ELF-ERAP and Compagnie
21

Jacques Goulard,

L'

Imperalisme franqais , p. 59.

22„
But see Bernard J. Crescenzo, "Quelle Politique Energie pour la
France?", L' Imperialisme frangais , p. 108. He suggests that cooperation
with the East-bloc could provide France with natural gas and oil.
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fransaise des pe'tPoles in 1970-71.«
Algeria was carrying out policies
in 1971 that Mossadegh had
been powerless to do in Iran
in 1951.

This,
in fact, confirmed the notion
that the world relation of
forces was

shifting, further demonstrating
the ™yth of the invulnerable
monopolies.
There was also the hope that such
nationalizations would inspire Syria
and Iraq to take similar steps.
Ties to the FL N,.

One of the more interesting
aspects of the

PCF's involvement with the Third World
is the network of proto-state

relations enjoyed by the Party and its
leading functionaries with
various heads-of -state
the globe.

,

political parties and liberation movements
arouni

The Communists, if not a government, are
a potential govern-

ment, standing ready in the wings.
its special links to the FLN.

improved.
to the FLN.

Thus the Party has carefully guarded

Ties, strained after 1965, have since

In 1972, Raymond Guyot of the Political Bureau
led a delegation

Among other things, he spelled out what a new energy
policy

would be under the Party's democratie avancee

would be nationalized.

:

namely that FRAP and CFP

Future agreements would be negotiated fairly,

without any suggestion of neo-colonialism.

Two years later, Boumedienne invited George Marchais and Jacques

Denis to Algiers.

The wide-ranging talks had almost the flavor of a

23

Robert Lambotte, "L'Algerie dix ans apres
Cahiers cu Communisme , October, 1972, pp. 88-98.

1

'

independence'
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gove.n.ent-to-gove™.ent parley.

=^

„,rchais noted that France
had

retaliated Because of certain
Algerian nationalizations:
limitations
were placed on l^igrants
co.ing into France, and
restrictions „ere set
on the import of Algerian
wines.
Such neo-co]on,-.l
neo colonial pressures
would not
be applied by a Government
of the Left, he said.
In April, 1977, C.G.T
secretary George Seguy visited
Algiers to discuss racism
toward ^Igerial
workers in France.^^

When PCF delegations .eet with
their Algerian counterparts,
it
is not .erely to support
issues of interest to their
hosts, nor to issue
resounding pronouncements on the
urgency of Third World liberation.
Often, there is some important
quid pro quo, with the Algerian
side af-

firming positions more crucial to
the Communists.

The PCF, after all,

is a non-ruling European party,
excluded from various world forums.

By lining up governmental support
from a friendly Third World state,
it

increases its prestige and leverage as a
political force.

For example,

in 1971 the PCF held consultations
with Algeria's Parti Avant Garde

Socialiste (PAGS).

Typically, the joint declaration included
certain

ritualistic Third World positions: condemning
Israeli expansionism and
the South African regime; supporting the
PRC in Vietnam, the MPLA in

Angola and opposing Portugal's activities in Mozambique.
24

But the

L Human ite, September 12 through 16, 1974
Links to the Third
World were active that year. Earlier, Marchais journeyed
to Hanoi to
summon a world front against imperialism.
'

„

L'Humanite , April

7,

1977, p. 7.
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declaration went on to support
certain nth^^
PP
other mainstream
Communist
political obiectives
es, such
snrh as a^ r
European Security conference,
recognition of the GDR, and a
de-„uclearized Mediterranean.
-t:

Sub-Saha ran Africa.

In thp
iq7no -hk
the 1970s
this region became an
important arena

of anti-colonial
ai actwii-sTactivity.

•

ti^^
The

n

Communists are on record as
having

opposed:

.

.

.

.

French Government collusion
with Portuguese forces
furnishing aid to South Africa.

m

French military intervention in
Chad and the
sending of paratroops to Gabon„

Expanded French investments in
Africa under the
cover of aid and cooperation
agreements.
Accords between France and African
states, if they
were imposed in negotiations that
were unequal.

In cultural relations with former
French areas, the PCF remained

suspicious of the official policy of
Francophonie

,

in that it masqueraded

neo-colonialist objectives.

Po licies toward African liberation movements

.

The PCF resented the fact

that the PS (like most European social democratic
parties) supported
the FNLA and I'Unitas against the M.P.L.A. in
Angola.

Communists

opposed Giscard's efforts to salvage the Mobutu regime
in Zaire, seeing
both French collusion with Belgium and attempts to
solicit U.S.- intervention,

l^men

Giscard provided French transports to King Hassan II to

airlift 800 Moroccan troops from Kinshasa to Shaba Province, the PCF

.
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reacted strongly.^^ ,^3,,,,

^^^^.^.^^

^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^

international law. and acting
without authority of Parliament.

Socialists, too, opposed the venture,
but softened the tone and
substance of
their objections.

The Soviet role in Africa
could also generate differences
b et.een the two coalition Parties.

The PCF justifies Soviet
and Cuban

penetrations, while the Socialists
oppose these ventures^
The Left and Latin Ameri ca

While Latin America is not a major
area for French penetrations.

Communist

sources note that of all the colonizers in
that region, it is

France that retains virtually the only toe-hold.

The important outposts

are the Overseas Departments of Martinique
and Guadeloupe.

and PCF urge immediate self-determination.

Both the PS

Communists have also chal-

lenged aid programs: a ruse to offset the large
payments deficits of
these islands.

The funds are used merely to finance French imports,
ul-

timately returning to France as private capital,
perpetuating the dependency

27

26^.

Giscard argued that he acted on behalf of "Europe".
discussions in L'Humanite of April
and 11, 1977.
27

See

Cahiers du Communisme , January, 1977, p. 121. Also see L'
Imperialisme frangais pp. 153-154. The PCF maintains ties with local
Communists on the islands. Thus in November, 1976, PCF leaders and
corresponding leaders in the Departments met in Paris.
,
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Allende's Chile and the L^ft
in Franc
ice
Domestic events in Chile during
the 1970s had strong international ramifications because
the Left in France drew
many lessons from
them.
These lessons strongly influenced
strategies and political relationships inside France. Chile,
even though a Third World
country,
had important symbolic value:
Communists and Socialists had, after
all,
achieved power through an alliance.
This appeared to confirm the
strategy of the Left Union in France.
Furthermore, the Popular Unity forces
had accomplished their victory through
the electoral process, and by

preserving democratic liberties, policies
that both signers of the
Programme commun were committed to,,^^

After the coup, much of the euphoria surrounding
Allende's experiment of course sounded naive, and each segment
of the Left drew its
own revised conclusions.
in the Left alliance.

All agreed that it revealed the vulnerabilities

Some in the PS were confident that the French

Party was in a stronger position than Allende's Party.

Mitterrand con-

cluded that it was vital to broaden the base of one's allies;
that a

truly majoritarian movement was necessary.

And the Communist Parties of

28,,.

Mitterrand admired the Communists of Chile as more realistic
and moderate than the French variety.
They would not try to dominate the
coalition, let alone attempt a coup de Prague
And the PCF admired
Chilean Socialists:
they were more Marxist than the European variety
(and were not linked to the I.S.)„
And they had been favorably disposed
toward liberation struggles in Vietnam, Cuba and Algeria. See Le Monde
,
November 17, 1971, p. 12 and L'Humanite , November 25, 1971, p. 1.
.
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Europe drew siMlar conclusions
on the need for broader
alliances.
Co^unists also revived an old the.e,
the need to prepare for
various
kinds Of struggle; counter-revolutionary
violence was always possible. 30

Events in Chile increased
Socialist suspicions of the World
Bank.
The Party had long been critical
of IBRD as manipulative in
its
loan and development policies to
Third World states.
Socialists claimed
that Robert MacNamarra and pressure
from the United States played
a contributory role in financially singling
the Popular Unity Government,

Both the PCF and PS agreed that France
would halt all aid to the

Pinochet Government, particularly the sale
of arms.^^ ^.^^^^

^^^^

criticized for providing such aid.

Berlmguer said that drawing 51 percent of the votes
in an
election would not sustain a government. This was
the logic which induced the PCI to design its Historic Compromise.
Rinascita, October 12
1973.
The PCF agreed: a left government was not viable if
49 percent of
the electorate was hostile.
Le Monde , July 4, 1974, p. 6.
30

Lazitch, L'Echec permanent , pp. 48-51.
Socialist Deputy Jean
Poppern also supported this view, but did not have the backing
of his
Party.
The PS did not want to identify rule by the Left with civil war,
always a latent possibility in France.
31
32

Les Socialistes et le tiers monde

,

p.

173.

The PCF would cease all commerce in arms to states that are
fascist, racist or aggressive.
(The PCF would, of course, be defining
these categories.) The Party has opposed sales to Saudi Arabia, Iran
and Morocco. The Socialists have been outspoken against sales to South
Africa and Rhodesia.
Ibid,, p. 173.
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Support for Liberation Movements
The two left Parties could
probably agree in most cases on
which
regimes to withhold weapons sales
from.
But could they agree on which

regimes or groups to supply arms
to?

Probably not, if they disagreed

on the validity of a particular
liberations struggle, or were backing

different factions (as in Angola).

And here, it would seem, is a
likely

or possible source of disagreements
for the Left Coalition.

I

would

assume that French Communists, like
their Soviet and Cuban comrades,

would be eager to supply certain liberation
forces.

The Socialists

would not, if it interfered with overall
relations with their allies or
the West.

This conclusion stems from the point
established earlier in

these pages: the French Socialists remain
fundamentally bound to the

Western camp.

33

The "New Economic Order"

The concept of a new world order in trade and economic
relations
33

The Socialist Government has agreed to sell 15 trucks, two
Alouette III helicopters and two patrol boats to the Sandinista Regime
in Nicaragua
Le Monde
January 9, 1982, pp. 1 and 3. The country is
said to receive weapons from the USSR and Cuba.
(In August, 1981, the
Mitterrand Government also deviated from U.S. policy by recognizing the
Liberation Front in El Salvador.) Charles Hernu noted that France did
not have "to justify its plans", since France was not part of the
military command integrated into NATO.
"The United States should be
pleased that this Government (Nicaragua) is addressing itself to France,
rather than the Soviet Union or Cuba", the Defense Minister added.
Socialist policy is to free the Third World from being dependent on
one or the other superpower.
^

.

^

,
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was originally put forth by
11XJ.U World
J the Third
woria ^.t^-^,,
states at various North/
South conferences.
Both I.efiLeft p^-n-i--;^^
Parties
France support these demands
to re-structure relations.
Both describe this new
economic order as
representing the legitimate
aspirations of the Third World
to Industrialize and develop.

m
•

Yet differences in policy can
be discerned.

The Socialists

support export stabilization
programs between EEC countries and
the
Third World, for example.
The Communists do not.
T^ese programs, a

concession to developing countries, are
intended to reduce the sharp
fluctuations in the prices of raw materials
exported to Europe.

The

Communists, however, counter that they are
merely a device to assure a
steady supply of raw materials to the EEC
countries.

That they preserve

the developing nations in their role of
supplier of raw materials at

low prices.

They have the subsidiary goal of preventing
the formation

of Third World cartels, such as OPEC.

The call for a new economic order is not a demand
for immediate

equality among all nations, rich or poor.

Rather, say its advocates, it

is an attempt to reverse the overwhelming dependency
that has character-

ized the Third World's relationship to the industrial states.

Since

World War II and the advent of the Bretton-Woods framework, they argue,
the industrial states of the West have managed both the rules and

functioning of international economic arrangements.

While the formal
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aspects Of Western political
domination collapsed with
colonialism, the
substantive aspects of this
domination have persisted into
the e.a of
de-colonization: the so-called
neo-colonial relationship.

In France, the two mass Parties
of the Left have apparently

embraced this Third World conception-as
well as the demands that flow
logically from it. They begin with
the assumption that the relationship
between the developed and underdeveloped
nations is inherently inequitable.

One must recognize this assumption
to understand their policies.

Thus, as we have seen, the PCF argues
thar many of the past accords

reached between France and various African
states should be revised: they
contain clauses that restrict the sovereignty
of the developing states.

Furthermore, runs the argument, they were imposed
in negotiations that
were unequal during a period when these states
were arriving at indepen-

dent status.

And finally, the PCF and the PS insist on disinterested

aid: political conditions tied to aid as a means
of pressure must cease.

Only in this spirit can there be valid cooperation
between France and
Third World states.

The Socialists and the Third World

The weight of analysis this far has emphasized PCF policies and

perceptions of the Third World.

It remains to show how the Socialists

envisage France's relations to the underdeveloped nations.
34

Most of the following analysis is based on Les Socialistes et

le tiers monde.
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They begin with the assumption
that investment and
financial
decision-making in the wo.ld is
generally determined by the
developed
nations.
Because of this, the new
nations a.e forced to conform
to an
international division of labor
enforced to their detriment
by an

exploitation of their natural
resources.

As a result, the modernized

sectors of their economies are
largely shaped and controlled
from
abroad.
Some pf the poorer developing
states have become so totally
dependent on the industrialized nations
that they no longer control

their development.

For example, the need to import
elaborate techno-

logy from abroad forces them to
acquire foreign exchange.

poorer nations must develop their

owr.

ment of foreign firms on their soil.

Hence the

exports and accept the establishFurthermore, the pattern of world

trade imposed by the dominant countries forces
them to be suppliers of

relatively simple commodities.

Then, too, the Third World nations are burdened
with foreign
debt, which, it is pointed out, has risen from $51
billion to $119

billion between 1957-1973.^^ Debt service alone had reached
$11 billion

annually (in 1973), compelling these states to assign an ever-growing
share of their export revenues merely to the servicing of these debts.
The accumulated debt could exceed the net transfers made to the Third

World:

"The Third World states will thus be aiding the developed states,

an absurd situation", say the Socialists.
35

Ibid.

,

p.

58.
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First, the socialists as.
that steps be taken to
lighten the
burden of this debt.

France in 1975 contributed
private and public aid of

17 billion
francs (over 1.0 percent of its
GNP) plus an added H.2 billion,
if the
overseas departments and territories
are included.
France's public aid
to the Third World is
approximately O.H percent of GNP,
well below her

goal, which was 0.7 percent.

This aid chiefly goes to states recently
administered by France,
70 percent to Africa.

Private aid, on the other hand, is more
divers-

ified: only 36 percent going to the French
Zone and North Africa.

In

other words, the Socialists argue, French
capitalism has a well-protected preserve in Africa, yet it does not reject
other profit opportunities
in areas such as Latin America

(a

point equally noted by the Communists).

The Socialists, like the Communists, have been
critical of

certain French public aid projects.

Often they are designed to further

French cultural interests by encouraging language and schooling
under
French methods, based on modes of instruction introduced in the colonial
era

— ill-adapted

to the needs of modern Africa.

Below is a summary of certain critical evaluations the Socialists

Ibid., p. 63
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have „ad. of certain
international agencies dealing
with Third World
development:

•

•

g^JMt^lNati^

Not only is it weak, but
it is
far more political than
it pretends.
The U.S
chxef _furnx3her of funds,
has an inordinate viLe in
decision making.

ItSWgldBank.
It
afflZ as
arrairs,

.

m

IBRD imposes unreasonable
conditions
i«<=-feres in their internal
rlT'
Chile.

EEC

Socialists are more tolerant here.
They approve
the Association status accorded
to African states at
^^"^^"^ extended at the Lome
Convention in
iTlT They^""tfavor the STABEX
197b.
mechanism to protect
against the fluctuations in exports.
Certain duty
exemptions on goods coming into EEC
countries are also

approved of.

The Communists would most likely agree
with the first two evalu-

ations, but challenge the third given their
basic suspicions about EEC.

The Lome Accord is viewed here as an innovation
between under-

developed and industrialized states, since it attempts
to correct imbalances in relations: giving the Third World non-reciprocal
advantages
on the export of products into EEC nations.

Nevertheless, Lome does not

respond fully to the requirements of the new states, which
seek longterm development agreements.

38

They require

a basic redistribution of

world wealth, not based on capitalist rules of international exchange.
37
38

Ibid., see the discussion starting on page 86.
.

Ibid,

For a discussion of the Lome Accords see page 98.

.
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Capitalist and social ist development

mode.l.s

:

Socialist Party

analysis distinguishes between
capitalist model and socialist
model
states.
The former:
.

are states such as South Korea,
Singapore and Brazil.

.

tend to develop export

.

are wide open to multinationals.

.

goocfe

economies

ignore the needs of the bulk of their
populations
by developing a comprador class, fostering
wide
inequality.

Socialist model states are such states as Algeria,
Cuba and
China.

Their policies seek more than mere increases in
GNP.

They are

also attempting to meet the broader aspirations of the
great majority
of their people.

To attack the roots of misery, they will accept
a

less dramatic rate of growth.
Breakdown of the economic order

.

The Socialists argue that the

capitalist world economic order is beginning to alter.

Economic

liberalism or the laissez-faire rules of world trade, as conceived at
Bretton-Woods and further developed by GATT, along with the entire
structure designed on post war U.S. hegemony— is weakening.

It was a

liberalism designed to prevent the narrow protectionism of the interwar years; but it still signifies the old world order to the Socialists
Several factors are operating, in their analysis:
1)

The rise of Japan and Europe as powers in their
own right.

.

303

2)

The loss of dominance by the U.S.,
particularly
with the "77" making broad challenges
at world
forums

3) The U.S.

defeat in Vietnam.

^) yhe coup de grace provided by the oil price

increases of

197M-.

Given these developments, the Third World is
demanding new rules

of the game.

The old economic order, postulated on
unlimited access at

cheap prices to the world's natural resources, is now
undermined: the

industrial nations are now compelled to negotiate.

The OECD states confront an array of coalitions: the non-aligned

countries of 1973; the bloc of "77" at the United Nations; and the
OPEC states.

By the 1980s these groups could compel the United States

to attend a North/South dialogue

expand the agenda beyond

a

,

And they were strong enough to

discussion of the energy crisis, raising

questions of equality, despite the objections of the United States.

Such, then,

is the Socialist Party's description and analysis of

the Third World's confrontation.

They are in essential agreement with

these demands to restructure the rules of international exchange.

To

stabilize raw material prices, they propose a system of "stockage", the

storing of surplus produce to regulate the tensions between supply and
demand,

they would further extend the policy of "generalized preferences"

.

..

-- establishing a system of
non-reciprocal preferential tariffs
to

allow Third World nations to export
their manufactured goods to
indusirial nations.
(This would extend an already-existing
EEC mechanism.)
They propose some novel reforms of
the world monetary system,
modifying the voting system within I.M.F.,
giving these countries a larger
voice

In financing development aid, the
Socialists would emphasize

public funding.

It would be multilateral in nature, not
bilateral.

This would preclude the donors using it as a
means of influencing the

beneficiaries

The Socialists are also proposing an unusual (perhaps
Utopian)

system of communal ownership of unexplored territories, such as
ocean
explorations.

Profits would be used to finance Third World development.

And finally, they set as a goal for France: the achievement of
a rate of public aid at 0.7 percent of GNP.

It is now at the 0.39

level

Some

Conclusions on Third
World Policies

When beginning this project, my judgments on future policies of
a

Government of the Left toward the Third World were subject to some

305

intervening unknots: would
Co^.unists or Socialists
dominate the ™ii„,
alliances How .uch leverage
or veto power would
the

Co™nists

have,
Today, the answers are clear:
Co^.unists are ™ore of an
appendage to
the Mitterrand Government.

It would also have been iicj-pLUj.
helnful to
^i- an
CO knnrr
Know at
earlier stage the

mandate of the Left.

If strong

the Government would be able
to mobilize

public opinion and undertake initiatives
in foreign policy, more so
than
a weak regime vulnerable to an
articulate
opposition.

Given that the

mandate was sl^ong, one still wants to
know: can the two Parties carry
out commitments and programs?

Electoral restraints.

Can they be translated into policy?

Programs enunciated before taking power

by parties in opposition are not to be
taken as literal commitments.
Many of the PS and PCF proposals outlined in
this Chapter favor Third

World aspirations.
electorate?

But would these proposals be popular with
the French

A party does not necessarily please its
constituency in Pas-

de-Calais by furnishing more development aid to Chad,
or by seeking to
fulfill a Utopian "new economic order",

Jahangir Amuzegar has posed some questions regarding the indifference of voters in Western democracies towards the demands of the
J
39
developing
countries.^
If he is correct, many in France view the "77"
•

"A Requiem for the North/South Conference", Foreign Affairs
,
1, October, 1977, pp. 136-159.
Amuzegar was formerly Iran's

Vol. 56, No.

representative to the I.M.F.
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as demanding unacceptable sacrifices
of jobs and living standards.

If
there are to be changes, it will
require new public attitudes,
according to Amuzegar. Electorates
.ust be convinced that the
present world
pattern is still fundamentally colonial,
with unequal partnerships

between the have and have-nots: that
the North's prosperity increasingly depends on the resources of the
Third World.

The question, then, is can the Parties
of the Left mobili^
-ze

their working class and other constituencies
behind the changes they
are urging?

The Socialists, we have seen, at times invoke
a moral fervor,

likening the struggle of the Third World to that of the
workers in the
Nineteenth Century.

At other times they invoke an enlightened self

interest, suggesting more efficient uses of world resources.

Communists,

too, in what Tiersky calls their "tribune" role, have not hesitated
to

appeal to self interest.

Thus a policy that allows multinationals to

operate freely abroad can also result in pockets of unemployment in

specific regions of France.

This harms the constituency whose interests

Communists claim to embody, suggesting that there are perhaps prudential
reasons for limiting the monopolies.

The point is that success in

carrying out the plans of the Left will depend much on the Government's
ability to persuade Frenchmen that a "new economic order" will be to
their benefit.

1
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lE^I1^2FII^tion^^

When a nation adopts a
socialist orde

one can reasonably anticipate
changes in its international
behavior.
(Castro's Cuba backs policies
unthinkable for the pre-1959 regi.e.)
This is not to say that a
Mitterrand Government, with
Communists in some

ministries, will be dispatching troops
into liberation wars.

But other
means of support cannot be ruled
out: thus one can supply or
withhold

weapons, as France does with Nicaragua.

But it is doubtful that a Left Government
in France will risk
an adventurous policy in the Third World;
there are too many constraints
1)

It would upset existing alliance ties.

2) The more radical Communists will be held in check

because of their very junior status.

3)

Both Parties will be preoccupied with domestic
problems.
Domestic social change holds a priority
for the new regime.

Nevertheless, Third World problems would be decisive to the
40
coalition.
The PCF continues to conceptualize in Leninist terms.
Its
.

.

affinities still lie with the broadly defined anti-imperialist camp.
But it is wedded to a Socialist Party which, in the final analysis,

identifies with the West.
d 'amour,

In Duverger's phrase, it is not a "mariage

mais un mariage de raison".

4-

4-0

Recall that the PCF and SFIO had a major falling out over
whether to furnish the Spanish Republic weapons in the 1930s.
(Spain is
not in the Third World, but the lesson is relevant.)
41

Le Monde, January 9,

1982, p.

1.
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Continuities in policy.
y
y.
has been too great here.
herp

^.
Perhan^ tne
i-h^ ^
t^ernaps
emphasis
on transformation
•

ti-,=.v,^
There
are certain permanent
fixtures in French

policy toward the Third World.

Access to energy and resources
will he

a permanent requirement of
any Government, left or
right,

fiance's

dependency on the^ ijiaaie
Middle hast
F^i<=;ih^c r^^-thas
y
not ^•
disappeared with the arrival of
the Union of the Left Government.
The Government must devise
tolerable
relations with regimes it disapproves
of.

^^at is most likely is that

the Government will continue to
flaunt its radical bahavior and

egalitarian credentials in Third World
areas remote from France, such
as Central America, where there can
be no real risk to France.

But it

will manifest prudence in more vital
regions, such as Saudi Arabia or
the Gulf States.

CHAPTER

XIII

CONCLUSION

The Communists

1^^!^J^I^122.J^±^^^

The contradictions in French
Communism

arise from the ambiguity of its
identity.

Draped in the Trdcplo_re, the

Party during one phase proclaims
its national or patriotic
aspect. At
another, it displays an international
face, defining the advance toward

socialism in terms of the interests of

a

world movement.

Its reference

point is a broad anti-imperialist bloc
and other fraternal Parties.

The

fact is, the PCF is implanted in two
constellations: there is first this

world movement, loosely headed by the USSR,
and second, there is the
domestic political system, of which it is a
component.

It can act on

behalf of each and form alliances within each, as
we have seen.

But

from the start, maintaining membership in this
world movement was

assigned a primacy.

It was intimately linked to

goal, worldwide social transformation.

the major millennial

The progress of socialism proceed

at a global level, deriving largely from the achievements of
socialism

already realized in the USSR.
elaborated
1)

tvra

Proceeding within this framework,

I

have

further ideas, namely that the Communists:

thwarted in making their own revolution merged their identity
'

with the Soviet state;
2)

confronted with the Yalta settlement, accepted Stalin's post309

.
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war injunction to
substitute power-bloc
xoc politics
oolit^V. for
f
insurrectionary
politics
•

But the USSR Ha.

raiso,^

.ts

Us o»
,,,,

requirement..

It

.ine»i.,.a.s.

assi^ed primacy

to

require, o.e.ient

parties in .he West, an.
the PCP eompiie..

Respite this co^piian.e,
the
xdea .eveioped here has
been that the French
Co»unists never stifled a
capacity for radical action,
their vanguard pretension.
Rather, their
ability to substitute an
internationalist purpose or
ideal over domestic
advantage was, in their o™
eyes, a manifestation
of radical capacity.

A long period of exile
from the mainstream of
post-war life led

to some new conceptions.

By the 1960s it seemed
that the efficacy and

legitimacy of the PCF depended
more from its ability to
link up with
broader social classes and strata
inside France, rather than in
following
a world movement which was
losing some of Its coherency.
This realization ar^ed for a weakening of
ties with the world movement,
the establihment of a format that the Italian
Communists prefer to term "unity in
diversity".

Once the USSR was no longer the
embodiment of the new

society, the unconditional unity of
the entire edifice was under a

challenge.

I

have shown how the new domestic politics
strategy of the PCF

became imperiled in 1968.

That was the year

the Russians again invoked

:
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power-bloc politics; allX Western
western .arties
^^r^i-^c^ were
enjoined to support the
invasion designed to preserve
the bloc.
However, obedience by the
PCF
would have shattered its
"peaceful road'' strategy,
then ripening into
a union of the Left
(.uch as the earlier obedience
Jettisoned insurrectionary strategies in 19.6-^7).
The PCF refused this
obedience.
It
•

rejected this second post-war
atte.pt by the USSR to thwart
for achieving power.

first

tir^e

Ignoring Soviet

r^ispn_d:^

a strategy

the PCF for the

acted to further its own domestic
legitimacy.

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

level

.

But

it is this domestic legitimacy,
endlessly pursued, which is so elusive
to the Communists.

Their vanguard pretensions, their
internationalist

identity and their insistence on democratic
centralism have left many

Frenchmen sceptical of the Party's loudly
proclaimed commitment to

pluralism, democracy and the electoral road.

Questions of pluralism and democracy can be
analyzed on three

planes
international movement

1)

th,e

2)

the domestic politics

3) the internal party.

Pluralist mechanisms are denied on level three, we said.

cracy is not practiced inside the Party.

Demo-

On the other hand, pluralism

(that is the coexistence and tolerance of diverse views) is practiced.
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indeed insisted upon, on level
three, the international.

Such widely

divergent parties, as the Italian
and French both proclaim
that there is
no longer any center to the
movement: each party, they
insist, is
in-

dependent and sovereign
raises a question.

-

and arrives at its

o.n.

conclusions.

If there is no longer one
central line binding all

parties, why such a Leninist procedure
internally?
is glaring:

nally?

But this

The contradiction

if there are many truths
internationally, why but one inter-

Pluralism at level one suggests the
introduction of pluralism

at level three.

This is an area where further
research would be helpful.

An equally interesting question concerns
level two.

Would the

PCF in power respect the values of pluralism
in domestic politics?

Would

it guarantee basic rights and tolerate
alternation of power, diversity,

ambiguity and opposition groups?

Observers differ.

It might during the

transitional phase now postulated by the Party as "advanced
democracy".
But after that phase, it is not clear..

This vanguard pretension remains

a major obstacle between the PCF and its alliance
partners:

ence upon the idea

deriving from

-

ical emanation of the working class.

Lenin

-

the insist-

that it alone is the histor-

This insistence of a uniqueness

and a leading role is distrusted.

In most normal circumstances, the PCF will continue to support

Soviet raison d'etat

.

It will challenge Soviet authority only when in

its judgment, orthodoxy would endanger its own viability (Czechoslvakia,

for instance).

Or, if the interests of France are clearly at variance
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with those of Russia, it will offer
a challenge.

(Even such a loyalist

as Thorez challenged Molotov's
position on the internationalization
of

the Ruhr in 1945.)

One can now expect policies to
be calculated in-

creasingly with domestic considerations
in mind, as in 1965 and 1968.
However, since its electoral setback in
1978, the PCF has been far more

supportive of Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

This shift will be

discussed further on.

_Regionalism: the Euroc ommunist phenomenon .

Pierre Hassner is probably

correct in describing Eurocommunism more as an
attitude toward the value
of Western democracy, pluralism and internal dissent.^
Employed in this
sense, the term suggests the Parties of the OECD states:
Parties which

felt they would be isolated so long as they were identified
with the

despotism of the East bloc.

But these Communist Parties of Europe lack any coordinated

strategy or any coherent doctrine of what their final societies will be.
They may have some partial convergencies

,

but that is al±.

The only

point where they probably all agree is on the desirability of reaching
out to broader alliances beyond the old proletarian constituency.
(This was one important lesson of Allende's defeat.)

Thus all Parties

insist on their own identities.

French Communists continue to reject conceptions that impose a

"L Euro-communisme
stade finale du Communisme ou de 1' Europe?"
Vol.
No.
Summer,
1,
1978, p. 135.
,
2,
'

Commentaire

:

3

m

regional unity.

And this is consistent
with thei. well-known
defense
of national Independence,
their strict assertion of
national sovereign^.
This can he ter.ed their
Gaulloco«nist manifestation.
Euroco«is.,

like the European

Comity,

is viewed as another
supranational entity.

They will neither accept
regionalism (or regional decision-making)
in
a capitalist framework, nor in
a Communist body.
We have seen that the
PCF has held widely diverging
views from the PCI on many
questions,

ranging from the integration of Europe
and the validity of NATO, to
judgments about the tactics of the
Portuguese
Communists.

As the

capitalist world moves toward supranationality
and the abandonment of
sovereignty, the Communist world moves in
reverse, towards less supranationality, toward what is termed poly centr
ism.

This may defy their

classic dogma, which promised an international
vision, but they insist
on this.

This does not mean that the PCF rejects all
cooperation at the

regional level.
forming.

It will act jointly if there is no danger of a
center

PCF activity on the regional level was well-reflected
at the

Brussels Conference of European Communist Parties, January, 1974.

This

foreshadowed the type of cooperation that existed until 1978, but which
seems less likely during the 1980s, as certain European parties drift
apart.

The agenda at Brussels was broad, the monetary crisis; migrant

labor, multinational corporations: in short, problems peculiar to Europe.
The PCF was not seeking any special relationship to the Parties of the
2

and

2.

Le Monde

,

October

5,

1973, d,

10

and January 20, 1974, pp.

1
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EEC states.

Some document might emerge with
action proposals, but any

statement issuing from Brussels would
have strictly the status of recommendations.

The PCF, along with the other
parties, preferred con-

sensus rather than majority-rule decision-making.

It sought a vol-

untary coordination in which parties would
exchange information and
experience.

However, the French and other Parties will
evolve common

strategies on questions peculiar to Europe.

The internationalization of

production requires some internationalization of
struggle, given the
progress of the integration process in Europe.

For instance when two

European Parties are dealing with the same multinational,
coordination
is feasible.

A resolution was adopted at Brussels supporting 75,000

workers on strike against Michelin in Britain, Ireland, Spain and
Italy.

On more basic issues no regional positions emerged.

Thus an

attempt to set forth a common strategy for dealing with social democrats proved elusive.

Discussions were frank, with no attempts at a

cosmetic unity, which suggests some democratization of old Stalinist
practices, at least at the international level.
The Soviet connection

.

It was suggested earlier that Euro-

communism implied a certain distance between the Western Parties and
the USSR.

Indeed in the 1970s all of the Parties in Europe insisted on

a broadened licence to criticize repressive aspects of the East bloc.

The PCF was more muted than; some of the other Parties.

But Marchais has

moved far beyond Thorez, and has persuaded his membership "to abandon
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the illusion that so.ewhe.e in
the East there exists a
perfect society".^
On the other hand, it is necessary
to distinguish between
what is a

fundamental, a priori anti-Communist
choice, and what is instead, a
reservation, a demur, a disagreement,
a dissent on certain
positions.^
Kriegel has gone so far as to argue
that Eurocommunism does not mark
a

break with the Soviets.

In her view, it is still very
much Communism.

The Western Parties require the Soviet
Union; they are powerless

without it.' Whether such a view still
applies to the Italian and
Spanish Parties, which have broken with
the CPSU on major issues, is

open to question.

But it still applies to the PCF.

Tiersky, too,

doubts that there would ever be a full break
between the PCF and the

Soviet Communists.

The im.portant point is that the PCF continues to
conceptualize
in bloc terms and it rejects the West in principle.

This distinguishes

it from some of the other mass Comm^onist Parties in
Europe. Paradoxically,

even its repeated insistence on national independence has an internationalist dimension: the goal being 1) reduce United States influence on the

Continent, and

2)

to prevent Western Europe from evolving into an

economic, military and political community that might imperil the Soviet
3

Annie Kriegel, French CP Regroups", The New Republic
September 15, 1978, p. 10.
4
5

g

Antonio Rubbi in Rinascita 6, February

6,

1976, pp.

,

17-18.

.

Private discussion, November 14, 1978.

"The French Communist Party and Detente", Journal of International Affairs (Vol. 28, No, 2, 1974), p. 205.

.
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bloc

In fact,

I

can locate no actions or
strategies of the PCF de-

scribed in these pages that would in
any way contradict either of
these
two propositions.

On the other hand, one should
not distort this inter-

nationalist dimension into the misconception
that the French Communists
are seeking a reversal of alliances, a
joining by France to the Warsaw

Pact

At its Twenty Third Congress at Vitry in

19 79,

the PCF realigned

itself closer to the Soviet Union, declaring its
overall judgment of the
Socialist states to be positive, "le bilan globalement
positif ".

By

1980, it would be difficult to speak of a genuine Eurocommunism
at all.

The PCF went on to ccnsumate the break with other European
Parties by

supporting Soviet action in Afghanistan in 1980 and by its acceptance
of the military takeover in Poland in December, 1981.

Italian Commu-

nists, on the other hand, have undertaken a possibly historic break

with the USSR, going so far as to suggest that the propulsive force
issuing from the October Revolution is exhausted.

For the Soviet Union the dilemma is real: as it stuggles to

preserve empire in the East, it loses the allegiance of its pro consuls
in the West.

The process of regaining Czechoslovakia and now Poland

back into the bloc has induced the Eurocommunist parties of Spain and
Italy to break with Moscow.

The PCF continues to walk a tight rope.

.
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juggling the arnbiguities of
independence and loyalty.

The core of the proble. arises
fro. the fact that the
Co..unists

long ago designated the nation
state to be the vehicle of
social transformation.
When there later ca.e into existence
a plurality of Communist states, it was no longer feasible
to preserve the single center
of ideological authority in Moscow.

This led to the divergencies in

the system which today are progressively
disintegrating the world

movement

There is a further problem.

As the

reformist parties of the

West, those that have broken with the USSR, enter
into a government role,

they generate dangerous revisionist tendencies in the East
European
states.

This could be destabilizing and even lead to the dismemberment

of the entire edifice.

This remains speculative at this time, but it

does suggest areas for further exploration.

Detente and the status quo

.

Clearly, then, the USSR has valid reasons

to be wary, of the reformist Parties.

But it also has reason to restrain

the more progressively revolutionary Parties, such as the Portuguese.

These parties could endanger the status quo in Europe

.

And during a

period of detente, the USSR is eager to preserve the existing balance
in Europe.

Why risk the tangible benefits of detente for a possible

victory in Portugal?

Recognizing this, the PCF in the 1970s repeatedly

.
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remnded its adherents

(and the USSR) that detente in
Europe in no way

implied acceptance of the status quo in
France.
to make its frans format ions

.

It reserved the right

This was important during the years re-

viewed here, essentially years of detente.

The issue is more muted

today with the passing of detente in the
1980s.

One must conclude that the PCF remains ambiguous
about the

desirability of detente.

Officially it supports detente, and for valid

reasons: many historic achievements have occurred during
periods of

relaxation, rather than when East and West were clashing.

In fact,

most Communist Parties, including the PCF, developed their national
and international strategies on the assumption that detente would be
lasting.

A more benign USSR makes the PCF appear less menacing, more

legitimate

On the other hand, detente suggests to Frenchmen a superpower

condominium, a freezing of the status quo, evoking the Yalta style of

decision-making over the heads of Europeans,
political groupings.

This is rejected by all

Even today, Mitterrand identifies the Yalta

Agreement as a ma^jor source of tension.

7

A further factor concerning Communists and the East-West balance
is that the PCF (and the PCI) has grown so powerful in its own right,

that it is a complicating factor in East-West relations.
^Die Welt, January 2-3,

19 82,

p.

1.

The Soviets
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must deal with it not merely as a
fraternal party, but as a political
force in its own right, influencing
government policy, and therefore

interstate relations.

In this sense as well, the entry
of a Communist

Party into government could be destabilizing
to superpower relations.
The interplay of domesti c allies and foreign
support

.

Following the

collapse of negotiations over the updating of
the Programme commun in
September, 1977 and the electoral defeat of the Left
in Spring, 1978,
the Communists re-enclosed themselves, if not in
a ghetto, in relative

isolation.

The strategy of employing the PS as a stepping stone
to

power had failed (largely because the Mitterrand forces were entertaining the same strategy in return

-

successfully).

The Party acted

to renew ties to its traditional working class base, continuing to

attack the Socialists, now increasingly described as social democrats.
It av/aited better days.

And while it awaited better days, it conceded

vague allegiance to the Union of the Left.

To employ Tiersky's terms,

the Party was shifting from its "government" aspect to its "tribune"

function, rallying Frenchmen around various popular domestic themes,

unemployement , the drug danger, and the problem of immigration.
demagogic and even racist themes emerged.

Some

What is significant for our

analysis is that in a period of domestic isolation such as this, the
PCF has a continuing need for allies.

This suggests an interesting

dynamic in their behavior.
1)

Cut off from domestic allies, the Communists will move to

.
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strengthen ties to the USSR.
2) Conversely, when isolated from the Soviet
Union, the PCF

seeks broader domestic alliances.

Thus the search for new allies at

home varies inversely with the closeness of the
relationship to the
USSR.

With its domestic alliance disintegrating rapidly
in 1977-78,
the PCF in isolation prudently edged closer to the USSR
and the foreign

policies it proclaimed.
.

.

.

.

Thus the Communists:

Issued their positive judgment on the Socialist
countries at their Twenty-third Congress.

Supported the Soviet interpretation of the
Sino-Soviet War.^

Organized in April, 1980 a Paris conference of East
bloc and Western Parties to mobilize support behind
Soviet positions on disarmament in Europe: opposing
the NATO decision to emplace cruise missiles in
Europe
Supported the Soviet Union, isolated by its invasion
of Afghanistan.

In edging closer to Soviet foreign policy the French Party was
growing increasingly out of alignment with other European Parties, particularly the Italian, which was itself developing some novel perspectives.

in the 1980 disarmament con-

The PCI declined to partici

ference organized by the PCF.

In fact, that week Berlinguer pointedly

held discussions with Mitterrand and Willy Brandt, pursuing his new

Le Monde, May 10,

1979, p.

10,

1
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strategy of the •Euro-left",
opening .p a broad dialogue
with social
democratic forces in Europe.^

The crisis in Poland, following
upon the Afghanistan crisis,

undermined still further the solidarity
of Western Communists.

The

PCI, in condemning that East bloc
repression, moved toward its historic

break with the Soviet model.

The PCF was one of the few major
Western

parties (and surely the only one linked
to the exercise of power) which

defended the dictature militaire in Warsaw.
readiness to provoke

a

The Party displayed its

possible first split inside the Government
since

the joint victory of the two parties in May,
1981.

The PCF, as so often

in the past, was prepared to endure unpopularity
to regain its inter-

nationalist identity, which, we have seen, it interprets
as
for radical action.

a capacity

Having 14 years earlier condemned the invasion of

Czechoslovakia, why did it now not assert a similar stand for
independence regarding Poland?

In the latter case, the Soviets were implicated

less overtly, less brutally than in 1968.

The PCF could uphold the

fiction that it was a purely internal affair.

More important. Rochet

and the PCF leadership could never accept the Soviet argument that
Dubcek was a threat to socialism.

Com.munist leadership however does

today "judge Solidarity as an anti-socialist force.

International Herald Tribune
10

11

Le Monde

,

,

April

December 17, 1981, p.

2,

1

1980, p.

1.

1.

See Marchais' letter to Jaruzelsky, Frankfurter Rundschau ,
December 25, 1981, p. 1.
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Intr^socialis^^

These various conflicts and
crises around

which the Russians attempt to line
up the loyalty and approval
of
various Communists, suggest a new
factor in international relations,
what Kriegel terms the Guerrejr^^^
p,,g,,^ Budapest,

Somalia, Afghanistan, Poland, and the
Sino-Vietnam war: the PCF

variably drawn in to take

a

position on these conflicts.

hLS m-

Sociali.
Lsm

has not solved the problem of war and
peace, which had been the great

hope of 1920 when Lenin founded the
International.
has supported the Soviet view.

Generally, the PCF

Thus China was blamed for the 1979 war

with Vietnam.

The durability of the Left coalition

.

It is too soon to make an

informed judgement, but some observations can be made.

Chapter IV on

the Programme commun noted that it was invariably
foreign policy

disputes that had shattered the great historical alliances between
the

Communists and Socialists, whether in 1939 or

19'+7.

Thus it would be

imprudent to ignore the latent possibility, particularly since each

coalition partner conceptualizes and draws its values from
international bloc.

a different

The PCF enters the new Government in a diminished

position, having dropped to a 15 percent share of the electorate in
1981.

Nevertheless, the two coalition parties, despite sharp foreign

policy differences, manifest a shared interest in preserving the co-

alition intact.
12
'

From 1978 to 1981, the PCF had maneuvered itself into

Le Figaro, February 26, 2979, p.

5
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isolation, resulting in its weakest electoral
performance since the

Third Republic.

Rigid structure, and dogmatic behavior are
growing

archaic; a renewed tilt toward adventurist Soviet behavior
is also
damaging.

The PCF risks being marginalized, as it persists
in pre-

serving its identity and its uniqueness.

The Socialists:
Some Concuding Observa tions

Since World War II, the Socialists have recast international

perspectives fundamentally.

The more crucial areas

I

would list are

the following.

Alliance policy

After some agonizing, Socialists accepted the

.

post-war consensus of the Center, adhering France to Germany against
the continental threat from Russia.

Defense policy

.

This was a historic reversal.

After some confusion, the PS has devised a

coherent policy overcoming the pacifism that had been so self -destrucThis too

tive in the Third Republic.

Third World policy

.

I

would label basic.

Earlier Socialists accepted the essential

framework of Empire and French Union.
summons to the emerging colonial world.

They lacked any persuasive
This has been reversed.

The

post-Mollet Party emerging from Epinay has gone on to elaborate some
broad humanist policies to deal with basic inequities in
colonial era.

a post-

Under the direction of Lionel Jospin, these have even

evoked some of the fervor of the Nineteenth Century struggle for French

.
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workers.

On the other hand, policies are
tempered by realism in

regions vital to France's requirements.
Independence.

Socialists continue the Gaullist legacy
of

national independence and autonomy from the
United States.

In their

own manner, they appear committed to
dislodging the hegemony of the

superpowers
Europe.

They appear committed to the view that a
Socialist

France requires a socialist and integrated Europe
(although there is

disagreement here).

Like the Communists, they have taken a critical

distance from the larger international movement to which
they adhere.
Tempering the Communists

Since 1968, Socialists have helped

.

integrate the PCF into France's political system, negotiating them into
the acceptance of realities of European integration, a more objective

view of the USSR, and a more realistic view of certain defense questions.
These too would have to be cited as tangible achievements.
this is a broad listing of general achievements.

Admittedly,

All have been

examined in the foregoing chapters.

The PS and the dilemma of bipolarity

ments, there is one area where

I

.

In reviewing the above accomplish-

would note some confusions.

concerns the adjustment to a bipolar world.

This

On the one hand, the PS,

in its Gaullo-socialist aspect, aspires to escape the dominance of the

United States over the West.

plishing this.

Yet it recognizes some risks in accom-

The ability of the United States to dominate or mediate
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the rivalries among the states of
the industrial West has provided
a

framework of world order.

war as in 1914 and 1939.

producing effect of

a

Left to themselves, capitalist
states might

Even Lenin did not anticipate the order-

hegemonistic superpower.

If

I

am interpreting

Mitterrand's design correctly, this framework is
to be dismantled.
Instead, there would arise autonomous power
centers among the capitalist democracies, with all the instabilities
inherent in such rivalries.

Here too there is room for further investigation
to discern what

exactly the PS has in mind

-

and how it differs from Gaullist conceptions.

View of the United States

By 1974, the Socialists had moved

.

far from earlier Atlanticist positions.

Despite the end of the war in

Vietnam, there was a deeper suspicion of United States objectives on
the Continent.

It was described as seeking a hegemony through the

penetration of its multinationals and through the Kissinger doctrine
1

o

which described Europe as a mere "regional power" during the oil crisis.
Party pronouncements warned of becoming a satellite of the United States

and termed, American power a destabilizer of the Third World and a

supporter of totalitarian regimes.

14

Mitterrand was sharply critical of

America's unilateral renunciation of the Breton Woods framework.
^^
14

Le Monde

,

April 14, 1974, p.

4.

Jean Paucot, Re flexions , p. 44-45

^^Le Monde, October 8, 1974, p.

12.

15
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^ocialAst_2olAc^^

Despite rhetoric, one would
have to

conclude that the PS has never
renounced its commitment to identify
France with the West, which in the
final analysis rests upon a
shared
value system.
The mainstream of the Party
does not challenge this.
One can, though, distinguish policy
areas where the new Government may

assert independence.

At this point one may discern some
broad patterns to Socialist

Government policy since May, 1981.

For instance, there has been a

consistency in opposing all super power interventions
istan or Central America.

,

whether in Afghan-

And it is highly significant that the presence

of POP ministers in no way hindered the Government
from registering a

firm opposition to the military takeover in Poland, a
stand which marked
the first foreign policy dispute among the two coalition
Parties.

have agreed to disagree, which may provide

a

They

formula for handling such

disagreements in the future, suggesting a certain stability to the
coalition.

The regime seeks to avoid giving offense to either super power,
a goal which is probably illusory,

pursued.

if genuine independence is to be

Nevertheless, President Reagan at the Ottawa Summit declared

himself "pleasantly surprised" with policies of the new Government.

And

the Soviets through Pravda cited the "positive but limited nature" of
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PS

performance. IS

^^e statement was nuanced,
approving areas where

Mitterrand was continuing established
Gaullist positions (remaining out
of NATO and furthering the development
of ties with the USSR) and
where he was launching new initiatives,
as in Central America.

criticized his support for NATO rearmament.

They

(France has approved the

emplacement of intermediate range missiles in
Europe, but they would,
of course, not be placed in France.)

Mitterrand has been reassuring verbally toward
the United
States, always careful to avoid genuinely angering
the Russians.

Thus

he has not supported sanctions against the Soviets
regarding Poland.

And he has signed a multi-billion dollar gas pipeline project
with
the USSR.

By pursuing such initiatives, Mitterrand could collide with

some of the more crusading aspects of anti-communism manifested across
the Atlantic.

A new, Gaullo-socialist independence is discernible in Third

World policy.
be halted.

Sale of weapons to totalitarian or racist regimes will

On the other hand, a favored regime, such as India, will

be sold Mirage aircraft valued at over three billion dollars. 17
16

Analysis was by Pravda Editor-in-Chief Victor Afanassiev,
October 16, 1977, as reported in Le Figaro October 24-2 5, 1981.
,

17

New York Times, November 13, 1981, p.

3.

329

AfEi£^.

The new Government provides
support to some important

black guerilla groups in South Africa
and Namibia, which is at variance
with United States positions. The
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) was permitted to open
an information bureau in Paris.

Steps such as this highlight a new tone
in foreign policy, revealing a

spirit of independence not displayed under
the Giscard d'Estaing
Government.

The PS is living up to a heritage of
support for certain

leftist and revolutionary causes, in much
the same spirit that it

supported Allende in the 1970s.

Mitterrand has said he will continue

to support certain causes.

On a more pragmatic, less ideological level, the new
Govern-

ment is aiding Chad in removing Libya's troops.

This is related to a

broader effort to preserve French influence in Africa, and to continue
support to governments and forces that historically had good ties to

earlier French regimes, such as the Ivory Coast, Gabon and the Central
African Republic.

19

Latin America
direct.

.

The challenge to the United States has been

France has recognized the guerilla organization of El Salvador

as a legitimate partner to negotiations.

moral support by Socialists.
18
19

There has been very strong

An arms agreement has been concluded with

International Herald Tribune

,

New York Times, November 4,

1981, p. 4.

September 12-13, 1981, p.

3.

1
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Nicaragua (which the U.S. terms a subversive
center throughout the
region) to furnish weapons, helicopters
and patrol boats to the

Sandinista forces.

The rationale here

Mirage jets to India

-

-

and in the large sale of

is that Third World states should
not be

compelled to be dependent on the superpowers.

In both of these

instances, the USSR would be the normal supplier.

believe that the

I

Socialists see France as able to offer an intermediate
option to those

countries that do not wish to be wedded to particular
superpowers.
Socialists, disarmament, and the "defense consensus ".

guidance of Charles Hernu, the PS is carrying out an

m

defense spending.

2

Under the
18

percent increa^

The Defense Minister goes on to note, correctly,

that "France is less thwarted by neutralism (than the NATO countries)".

There is little dissent to her nuclear weapons development because of
the so-called "defense consensus"..
on the force de frappe

the weapon.

,

When, as we saw, the PCF reversed

there, was no longer a mass party opposed to

But how durable is the new consensus?

The new Government

is on record as favoring the U.S. proposal to station Cruise missiles

in Europe as long as the Soviets do not remove their SS-20s.

1980s, France may lack a peace movement as such.

sensus" may be more illusory than appears.
20

21

LeHonoe, January

9,

1982, pp.

1

In the

But the "defense con-

As has been documented in

and

New York Times, November 15, 1981, p.

3.

5
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these pages, there is a historical
sentiment (for example, the
pacifism
of the inter-war years) that is
anti-war and anti-nuclear. This

sentiment exists, suhmerged, inside
the PS.

The enthusiasm generated

in other European peace movements
has probably been diverted into the

general euphoria of renewal following the
Mitterrand victory.
sentiment could change.

But such

Mitterrand has been critical of neutralist-

pacifist positions in West Germany, Britain
and the Netherlands.

On

the other hand, their Communist coalition
partners have taken the lead
in organizing anti-American (not anti-Soviet)
disarmament manisfesta-

tions in Paris.

The suggestion here is that the latent pacifist

sentiment could be released by this campaign, upsetting the
assumptions of the "defense consensus".

Final Considerations

The Communist-Socialist dynamic continues to unfold.

Tours has

not yet been overcome, as CERES would have it, but the two Parties are
again in uneasy alliance.

If anything, we have seen that communism has

been largely nationalized as a world force.

And, if a generalization

is permitted, socialism has been internationalized.

Despite the Jacobin

cry that 1789 remains unfulfilled, revolutionary politics is not now
on the agenda.

This has been confirmed too often, as the East-West

struggle has superimposed itself over the old struggle of the workers.

Robert Pontillon, a veteran of the Resistance and now a PS national
secretary, has said that the "two superpowers are in Europe.

The
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Russians are there by geography, the
Americans were called in by
history".

Geography is probably more immutable than
history, but

whether or not the superpowers will disengage
on the old Continent is
almost irrelevant.

They are condemned to an uneasy interdependence,

particularly since the East-bloc is no longer insulated
from the boombust cycles of the capitalized West: one bloc condeimed
to the contradictions of the other.

Perhaps it is this interdependence which will

allow the PS to sustain its alliance with what many in it
continue to

view as a surrogate of another power bloc.

been nationalized, the risk is not so great.

If the Communists have

Marchais, speaking about

the vanguard role, once said that it did not come about by decree, nor

was it a demand for hegemony on the Left: it was the recognition of a

historic fact.

But as Chevenement noted, this is dogma, not fact,

hence irrefutable.

23

Duverger has been generous.

with an integration function.
1920 restored a consensus.

24

Despite everything, they have since

"They have revalued all values".

riating old values and symbols

-

Tricolore, Marseillais e

reintegrated the working class into its own pa trie
is probably correct.

He credits the PCF

.

-

By approp-

they have

In this sense he

They have compelled the once-excluded workers

to participate in the

nation-building process, picking up where Jaures

They have played the parliamentary game, and in that sense

i}ft off.

22
23
'

94

-

Reflexions , p.

3.

Les socialistes, les communistes et les autres
Le Monde, March 17,

1968, p. 9.

,

p. 43
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contributed to making that game legitimate.

But despite their

integrating function, they have not renounced their
revolutionary
calling.

And herein lies the ambiguity with which we
began this

exploration.
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